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ABSTRACT 
 
ON-THE-JOB TREATING: PATIENT RESPONSE TO A SHOCK IN PRIMARY 
CARE ACCESS AT THE WORKPLACE 
Julius L. Chen 
Guy David 
Time cost is a salient determinant of the demand for medical care.  Over the past two 
decades, innovative organizational forms of health care delivery that lower the time cost 
of basic care have emerged and widely grown in popularity.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand what might happen on the demand side when a new provider enters the 
market for medical care and offers services at a lower time cost to consumers.  Economic 
theory predicts that market expansion and/or business stealing can occur.  In my 
dissertation, I test for these effects in a unique empirical setting where entry of a low-time 
cost provider occurred: A large, self-insured corporation opened a worksite health clinic 
on its California campus in 2013 but did not feature a clinic on its Texas campus.  I 
utilize a novel data set, 2011-2015 medical claims data for the corporation’s employees 
and their covered dependents.  My primary empirical strategy is a difference-in-
differences approach, whereby I construct a suitable control group by leveraging the fact 
that Texas-based employees were never exposed to worksite clinic availability.  Overall, I 
find that market entry by the clinic only impacted utilization and spending for a narrow 
set of services (i.e. services that were available onsite), and these effects were 
concentrated among the subset of employees that actually used the clinic.  After the clinic 
opened, patients did engage in some substitution, as they shifted certain services away 
from outpatient settings and towards the clinic.  At the same time, there was a substantial 
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amount of new utilization; patients significantly increased their demand for primary care 
office visits, physical therapy, and alternative medicine.  This consumption of new 
services consequently drove an increase in total spending, particularly among patients 
who generally utilized a modest amount of care. 
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CHAPTER 1 – PRELIMINARIES 
 
1. Introduction 
Discussions about the costs that patients face when obtaining medical care often 
emphasize the role of monetary costs.  Nonmonetary costs, however, are arguably just as 
important and can significantly affect patient decision making.  One key nonmonetary 
cost is the time cost of care, meaning the time spent traveling to, waiting for, and 
receiving treatment from a provider.  Time cost is a salient determinant of the demand for 
medical care, affecting the initial decision of whether or not to seek treatment, as well as 
the subsequent choice of which provider to visit.  Ray et al. (2015) show that the 
opportunity cost associated with obtaining medical treatment is nontrivial.  Using 2010 
utilization figures, they calculate that the total opportunity cost per year for all physician 
visits in the United States is $52 billion.  A high time cost can disincentivize patients 
from seeking care even when needed.  It can also push patients to seek care in settings, 
like the emergency room and urgent care clinics, that trade greater convenience for higher 
prices to both patients and payers.  
 In light of this, innovative organizational forms of health care delivery have 
developed over the past two decades that lower the time cost for treatment of low-
severity conditions.  Prominent examples include telemedicine, retail clinics, and 
worksite health clinics, all of which increase access to an array of basic medical services.  
Convenient care providers have rapidly grown in popularity and are becoming an 
increasingly common player in many medical care markets.  At a high level, this 
movement is important and of interest to economists because it raises age-old questions: 
What happens to a market when a new seller enters?  What happens if the entrant offers 
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products at a lower cost to consumers?  The industrial organization literature explains 
that new entry into a market can lead to business stealing and market expansion.1  The 
relative magnitudes of these effects and their impact on consumers can be empirically 
investigated in specific markets and scenarios. 
 My dissertation looks specifically at the entry of a worksite health clinic into a 
market for basic medical care, where consumers of care are the employees of a large 
corporation.  A worksite clinic is a clinic located on a corporation’s campus that provides 
primary care and wellness services to employees.  The clinic adds to the employee’s 
choice set a provider option with substantially lower time cost.  Thus, its entry can lead to 
business stealing, whereby patients substitute the worksite clinic’s services for care that 
was previously obtained from community-based providers, or to market expansion, 
whereby there is an increase in demand and new utilization of services.2  Using a novel 
data set, I empirically investigate whether these two effects occur.  I study how this 
positive shock to care access alters patient demand for various types of care, as well as 
determine the cost implications of such changes. 
 The first chapter of my dissertation contains preliminaries that prepare the reader 
for the empirical analyses that I later perform.  I start with a background on employer-
based health care so that the reader understands how worksite clinics have become an 
increasingly common player in markets for employees’ medical care and what the 
characteristics of this market entrant are.  Then I review prior literature on how the 
                                                 
1 There can also be cannibalization, whereby the entrant steals business from incumbents owned by the 
same firm.  I do not discuss cannibalization since it is not applicable to my context.  For further 
background, see Tirole (1988).   
2 One concern with market expansion is if patients consume medically-unnecessary care, and the additional 
spending negates any potential savings per visit.  We would then want to know how consumers value this 
excess utilization and the impact on health outcomes. 
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demand for medical care responds to changes in the nonmonetary and monetary costs of 
care.  I also briefly review the literature on convenient care and employer-based health 
care.  Next, I develop a theoretical model of patient decision making to show how 
patients might respond when a new provider enters the market for medical care and offers 
lower time cost.  In my model, a patient must decide whether or not to seek care when 
stricken by a particular illness.  If the patient does seek care, she chooses a provider by 
comparing the reduction in time cost offered by the entrant to the switching cost 
associated with changing providers.  I derive an interesting set of predictions from my 
model and later empirically test them. 
Wrapping up the first chapter, I describe my empirical setting, the novel data set 
utilized, and my primary empirical strategy.  To investigate patient response to the 
entrance of a low-time cost provider into the market for medical care, I study a large, 
self-insured corporation that opened a worksite primary care clinic on its California 
campus in 2013.  This corporation has another campus in Texas, which does not feature 
an onsite clinic.  For my empirical analysis, I utilize complete medical claims data, 
spanning 2011-2015, for all employees and family members who are covered under the 
corporation’s Aetna insurance plans.  This data offers a high level of detail on medical 
utilization, costs, and the providers who delivered services.  I construct a patient-level 
panel that covers roughly two years before and after the onsite clinic opening.  
Additionally, I leverage the fact that I have claims data for Texas-based employees, who 
did not have access to the onsite clinic, to form a suitable control group.  My primary 
empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences approach, and identification comes from 
comparing patients to themselves over time in California compared to Texas. 
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 The second chapter of my dissertation presents high-level analyses of how 
introduction of the worksite clinic impacts patient utilization and costs for various types 
of care.  These analyses utilize the full sample of continuously-enrolled patients, 
including both employees and covered dependents.  They are therefore meant to reveal 
what phenomena are broadly occurring across the whole patient population, on both the 
extensive and intensive margins.  I also present analyses that look just at patients with 
chronic conditions, as introduction of a low-time cost primary care provider might 
reasonably have a greater impact on those with worse underlying health.  Lastly, I 
perform a falsification test on covered dependents.  Family members are not regularly on 
campus, so the onsite clinic is not a convenient provider option for them.  Thus, we 
would not expect the clinic to significantly affect dependents’ utilization behavior. 
Finally, the third chapter of my dissertation explores potential mechanisms for the 
high-level findings.  Importantly, I determine if adoption and use of the onsite clinic’s 
services plausibly drive the suggested effects on utilization and costs.  I begin by 
describing the set of patients who visit the clinic and the types of onsite services they 
utilize over time.  I then investigate how employee preferences for providers closer to 
home versus closer to work affect the propensity to utilize onsite care.  I also test for 
evidence of a two-period model in which patients first utilize the onsite clinic for physical 
therapy or alternative medicine and then utilize onsite primary care later on, since they 
have already borne the switching costs.  Next, I perform a series of difference-in-
difference analyses to rigorously test if, after the onsite clinic opens, clinic users have 
differential utilization patterns and costs compared to non-users.  As a first pass, I 
compare California-based employees who are clinic users to California-based employees 
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who never use the clinic, thus ignoring concerns over endogeneity and self-selection into 
the clinic.  I then address the possibility of self-selection by utilizing my Texas control 
group, and I compare California-based employees who are clinic users to Texas-based 
employees.  Lastly, I perform a more robust version of this California versus Texas 
analysis.  I utilize coarsened exact matching to create a matched subsample of California-
based employees who are clinic users and Texas-based employees, and then I run 
difference-in-differences on this subsample.  In the end, the results from these analyses 
that compare clinic users to non-users allow me to determine whether entrance of the 
worksite clinic into the market for employees’ medical care led to substitution (i.e. 
business stealing) and/or new utilization (i.e. market expansion). 
 
2. Background on Employer-Based Health Care 
The earliest forms of employer-based health care appeared in the 1860s – small 
clinics set up in the railroad and mining industries to treat on-the-job injuries (Glabman 
2009).  During the early 1900s, worksite clinics were a common feature in manufacturing 
and heavy industry, and they were bare-bones operations only capable of handling 
occupational injuries.  One prominent example was the Henry Kaiser company clinic that 
treated shipyard workers in Richmond, California during World War Two, out of which 
spawned the future Kaiser Permanente system.  However, worksite clinics declined in 
popularity during the 1980s and 1990s, as better workplace precautions reduced 
occupational injuries and companies eliminated clinics to cut operating costs. 
Starting in the 2000s, interest in worksite clinics began to resurge, as employers 
sought innovative ways to address rising employee health care costs and wanted to more 
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directly engage in worker health.3  Clinics began to expand the range of services 
provided.  They evolved from simple operations focused on occupational health into 
primary care providers that could also deliver physical medicine and wellness services.  
Despite a slight slowdown during the 2007-2010 recession, the number of companies that 
feature employer-based health care has grown steadily in recent years.  In a 2014 survey 
of 595 employers with at least 1,000 employees, Towers Watson found that 32% of 
companies had onsite health services in place, with an additional 6% planning to offer 
worksite care by 2015.4  Mercer’s 2014 National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health 
Plans found that 29% of employers with 5,000 or more employees featured an onsite or 
near-site primary care clinic, which was up from 24% in 2013.5   
Elements of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) have encouraged recent take up of 
the workplace clinic model.  Facing the mandate to provide employees with insurance 
that satisfies affordability and coverage requirements, many employers hope that onsite 
clinics can help to better control employee health care cost growth.  Additionally, the 
ACA promotes implementation of employee wellness programs, which onsite clinics can 
run.  The legislation allows employers with group health plans to offer premium and cost-
sharing incentives to those employees who reach certain health goals or complete 
wellness programs.6 
                                                 
3 Fang and Gavazza (2011) argue that, given the US employer-based system of insurance provision, 
employee turnover can lead to an inefficiently low level of investment in worker health.  It can be argued 
that the worksite clinic model increases this level of investment. 
4 Towers Watson/NBGH 2013/2014 Employer Survey on Purchasing Value in Health Care.  
5 Mercer 2014 National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans. 
6 Pollitz, Karen and Matthew Rae. “Workplace Wellness Programs Characteristics and Requirements.” 
Kaiser Family Foundation Issue Brief. (2016). 
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 There are numerous reasons why a corporation might introduce an onsite health 
clinic.  Mercer found that the most commonly cited objectives for adopting the worksite 
clinic model were to better control employee health care costs and to reduce lost 
productivity due to absenteeism.7  Proponents have presented several theories as to why 
an onsite clinic might be able to achieve these objectives.  First, the clinic may be a more 
efficient provider of health care and dissuade excessive use of expensive specialist care.  
Second, if patients more frequently visit the clinic due to its convenience, the onsite 
medical staff may be able to catch or better manage conditions before they lead to 
intensive downstream care.  Third, having a nearby onsite clinic reduces the time that 
workers must spend away from work seeking care, which then increases productivity.  
Another driving force behind some employers’ decision to adopt the onsite clinic model 
is the desire to attract and retain top workforce talent.  Several high technology firms 
have even engaged in a “perks arms race,” and workplace clinics are viewed as an 
attractive employee fringe benefit.8 
Today, the typical onsite clinic offers primary care, wellness, and disease 
management services.  The exact scope and scale of offered services depend on the 
company’s needs and budget.  Clinics employ an array of health care professionals (e.g. 
nurse practitioners, physical therapists, nutritionists), but only a small percentage have 
physicians on staff.  On the simple end of the spectrum are small “minute clinics,” in 
which a nurse or nurse practitioner provides general health screenings and basic care for 
minor health issues.  On the other end of the spectrum is, for example, Toyota’s worksite 
clinic in San Antonio, Texas.  This 20,000-square-foot clinic boasts 22 exam rooms, 
                                                 
7 Mercer 2015 Survey on Worksite Clinics. 
8 Farr, Christina. “Silicon Valley takes benefits ‘arms race’ to health care.” Reuters. 2 Oct. 2014. 
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imaging and lab facilities, and an onsite pharmacy.  It is capable of delivering a 
comprehensive set of primary care, general dental, optometry, physical therapy, and 
wellness services (Glabman 2009).  Some worksite clinics even function as a patient-
centered medical home, fulfilling employees’ primary care needs and also coordinating 
their specialist and community-based care. 
Management and operation of worksite clinics follow three main models.  The 
“turnkey” model is the most common: The client company contracts with a dedicated, 
third-party vendor to operate, staff, and manage the onsite clinic (Tu et al. 2010).  The 
onsite clinic that I study in my dissertation is operated under this model.  Vendors range 
from large, nationwide players to small, regional companies.  Currently, the largest 
vendor in the market is Walgreens’ Take Care Health Systems, which operates 
approximately 400 worksite clinics across the nation (Glabman 2009).  Even insurers, 
like Cigna, have entered the market by creating specialized divisions that operate 
worksite clinics.  Under the second model, a company directly operates the onsite clinic 
and employs all necessary staff.  Boeing and Quad/Graphics are examples of a successful 
in-house approach (Tu et al. 2010).  However, direct operation is becoming increasingly 
uncommon; one challenge is employee reluctance to visit the clinic for fear that their 
employer can easily access medical and treatment records.9  The third model, which is 
also uncommon, involves a corporation contracting directly with local providers for 
services. 
Worksite clinics are primarily a feature of large, self-insured companies, 
particularly those with low employee turnover and a high concentration of their 
                                                 
9 This adds to the appeal of the turnkey model, as employees may feel more comfortable that a third party 
vendor, separate from their company, is running the clinic. 
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workforce on-campus (Tu et al. 2010).  It is more feasible for large employers to shoulder 
the sizeable startup and operating costs for an onsite clinic.  However, small- and 
medium-sized companies have recently begun to adopt the worksite health model by 
pooling financial resources and operating a shared near-site clinic. 
 
3. Literature Review 
The overarching goal of my dissertation is to determine how patient demand 
responds to entry of a worksite clinic, which offers lower time cost, into the market for 
medical care.  Therefore, it is important to review the diverse literature that studies how, 
in the context of medical care, consumers respond to changes in product prices.  I first 
discuss the literature that treats time and travel costs as key determinants of the demand 
for medical care.  I also review previous work on patient response to changes in the 
money price of services.  Next, I briefly discuss work that investigates topics around 
utilization of retail clinics, a form of convenient care related to worksite clinics.  Finally, 
I conclude with a review of the academic work on employer-based health care. 
 
3a. Time Cost in Medical Care 
To set a foundation, I first consider how economic theory treats and establishes 
the existence of time cost in the context of the demand for medical care.  A natural 
starting point is Becker (1965) and the theory of allocation of time.  Becker presents the 
idea that households combine inputs of market goods and time to produce basic 
commodities, and these commodities provide utility.  From his theory arise two relevant 
ideas: that the prices of commodities depend on their time inputs, and that patients must 
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decide how to allocate time between productive and consumption activities.  Grossman 
(1972) builds upon this framework in his model of demand for “good health,” whereby a 
time input is necessary to produce investments in health.  Another feature of his model is 
that illness and injury lead to time lost from market and nonmarket activities.  These 
seminal works touch on the important idea that patients actively consider time cost when 
making decisions about medical care.  Time cost is a salient nonmonetary price that 
affects whether or not patients seek care, how much care is utilized, and which provider 
is seen. 
Leveson (1970) discusses how time cost can conceptually influence the demand 
for ambulatory medical care.  He explains that distance acts as a price for care because 
traveling to see a provider entails time and direct monetary costs.  He further argues that 
distance may be a more important factor in the decision of whether or not to seek care 
than in the choice of provider.  In choosing a provider, time and convenience costs are 
just one of many influential factors.  Leveson emphasizes the need to also consider 
switching costs, which include the costs of disrupting continuity of care and of obtaining 
quality information for alternative providers.  These concepts are particularly relevant to 
my setting, and I incorporate them into my theoretical model. 
Acton (1975) provides both a theoretical and empirical consideration of how 
nonmonetary factors, including travel distance, affect demand for basic medical services.  
He argues that as insurance reduces the out-of-pocket price for a unit of medical services, 
demand becomes more elastic to time price.  Using data on patients who utilize free 
services from public outpatient departments in New York City, he estimates a negative 
elasticity of demand for care with respect to travel distance.  He also finds that working 
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people, who have a higher opportunity cost of time, have a lower demand for time-
intensive outpatient and hospital care and a higher demand for private physician care.  
This same point is also made by Holtmann (1972), who argues that because time cost can 
be thought of in terms of foregone income, higher-wage patients would prefer less time-
intensive forms of care. 
 
3b. Distance and Demand for Care 
 Travel distance to a provider can affect both the decision to seek care and where 
to go when care is sought.  Differential distance to providers is therefore a useful tool for 
patient choice models, in which patients are choosing between providers or treatments.  
In a study of how treatment intensity affects mortality in elderly patients with acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI), McClellan et al. (1994) utilize a patient’s differential 
distance to hospitals with certain characteristics as an instrumental variable that predicts 
intensity of treatment.  Their assumption is that patient location would, independent of 
health status, affect choice of hospital.  Kessler and McClellan (2000) again apply this 
idea that travel distance is a key determinant of hospital choice in their study of how 
hospital competition affects costs and health outcomes for Medicare AMI patients. 
  Einav, Finkelstein, and Williams (2016) study the welfare effects of a “top-up” 
health insurance policy if it were applied to breast cancer treatments, thereby requiring 
patients to pay the incremental price for lumpectomy over mastectomy.  Because 
lumpectomy requires a high frequency of radiation therapy, the authors utilize variation 
across patients in distance between their residence and the nearest radiation clinic as 
variation in the relative price of lumpectomy.  This allows them to estimate the demand 
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curve for lumpectomy.  Einav et al. convert distance into a money price by multiplying 
the distance, in terms of travel hours, to an assumed opportunity cost of time.  In the end, 
they find that women who live farther from a radiation facility at the time of diagnosis are 
more likely to choose mastectomy over lumpectomy.10  This finding supports the broader 
notion that the nature of treatment can determine how strongly time cost affects the 
demand for particular treatments. 
 Grabowski et al. (2013) investigate whether non-profit skilled nursing facilities 
provide higher quality care compared to for-profit facilities.  To address the endogeneity 
of ownership status and patient self-selection into facilities, the authors instrument for a 
patient’s entry into a non-profit facility by using the differential distance between non-
profit and for-profit nursing homes.  To construct the differential distance, the authors 
calculate the distance from the patient’s residence to the nearest non-profit minus the 
distance to the nearest for-profit.  Thus, this measure represents how much farther the 
patient would have to relocate in order to visit a non-profit nursing home.  Using their 
instrumental variables strategy, Grabowski et al. find that non-profit utilization was 
associated with fewer 30-day readmissions and greater improvement in functional status. 
 An extensive line of literature exists that investigates how distance to provider 
affects utilization decisions and health outcomes.  Currie and Reagan (2003) utilize 
children’s distance to a hospital as a proxy for access to medical services.  They find that 
for urban minority children, each additional mile from the hospital leads to a 3 percentage 
point decrease in the probability of having a preventive care checkup, relative to a mean 
likelihood of 74%.  Mooney et al. (2000) find that utilization of VA services declines as 
                                                 
10 Schroen et al. (2005) find a similar result in their work. 
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travel distance to the hospital increases, yet only up to 15 miles.  They also find that 
veterans over age 65, compared to younger veterans, are less sensitive to distance.  Other 
studies focus on distance to primary care physician, which is directly applicable to my 
work.  Ludwick et al. (2009) utilize data on pediatric patients covered by a Medicaid 
HMO in Pennsylvania to determine how distance from the child’s home to his/her 
primary care physician affects emergency department (ED) utilization.  They find that, 
compared to children who live within a mile from their primary care doctor, children who 
live 1.5 to 3 miles away have 13% greater ED usage.  Strauss et al. (2006) analyze data 
from the Vermont Diabetes Information System and find that increased driving distance 
from home to the site of primary care is associated with poorer glycemic control.  Billi et 
al. (2007) study enrollees in a private HMO in Michigan in 2001 and determine how 
distance from the patient’s residence to his/her primary care physician affects health care 
utilization and disease burden.  They find that per-member-per-year costs are nearly $300 
higher for patients who live more than 30 miles from their PCP, compared to patients 
who live within 10 miles.  They also find that distance is positively associated with 
disease burden, as measured using the Adjust Clinical Group system. 
 
3c. Demand Response to Changes in Money Price 
Although employer-based health care’s appeal lies in its reduction of the time 
price of care, it is important to also understand how patients respond to a change in the 
money price, as together they comprise the full cost of care to patients.  A clear starting 
point is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), which is summarized in Manning 
et al. (1987).  The authors find that exposure to higher levels of cost sharing significantly 
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reduces medical care utilization.  They produce an estimated price arc-elasticity of 
demand of -0.2. 
A thorough review of the work on how copayments impact utilization is available 
in a working paper by Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2008).  However, I highlight one 
particularly interesting study: Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight (2010) investigate the 
impact of copayment increases for physician office visits and prescription drugs, which 
affected elderly retired public employees in California covered under supplemental 
insurance to Medicare.  In response to these increases in cost sharing, patients reduce 
physician office visit and prescription drug utilization, and implied arc-elasticities are 
similar to those estimated in the RAND HIE.  Importantly, the authors detect significant 
offset effects, in the form of increased hospital utilization.  This offset is concentrated 
among chronically ill patients.  Lastly, Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight find evidence 
that while savings from reduced office visit and drug utilization are primarily enjoyed by 
the supplemental insurer, the costs of increased hospital utilization are borne mostly by 
Medicare.  
 
3d. Retail Clinics 
 While retail clinics and worksite health clinics differ in the scope of services that 
they can provide, both are forms of convenient care designed to improve patient access to 
basic primary and preventive care services.  In an unpublished manuscript, Parente and 
Town (2009) study the impact of retail clinics on patient utilization and costs using 
claims data for patients across the United States.  Their paper is novel in that it addresses 
the potential endogeneity of retail clinic utilization; the authors instrument for clinic 
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utilization using distance between the patient’s home and the nearest retail clinic.  They 
find that retail clinic utilization significantly reduces medical care expenditures for 
patients who have a low-severity condition that can be treated at a retail clinic.  They find 
no evidence that retail clinic use leads to increased subsequent ER use or hospital 
admissions.  In contrast to Parente and Town, Ashwood et al. (2016) find that retail clinic 
utilization is not a cost saver.  Using Aetna claims data for enrollees in 22 cities, they 
compare utilization and spending associated with 11 low-acuity conditions between retail 
clinic users and non-users.  From 2010 to 2012, clinic users increased their retail clinic 
usage and reduced physician and ED visits.  However, only 42% of these clinic visits 
represented substitution, while the remaining 58% was new utilization.  Thus, the 
increased spending from new utilization outweighed any savings from substitution. 
 While retail clinic usage might be able to substitute for a small set of ED visits 
(see Weinick et al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2010)), it is contested whether their use 
should substitute for primary care office visits.  Critics often argue that retail clinic 
utilization disrupts continuity of care, a point reinforced by Reid et al. (2012). 
 
3e. Employer-Based Health Care 
 There are several studies that look at trends in employer adoption of the worksite 
clinic model and clinic utilization by employees.  For example, Boukus and Tu (2012) 
analyze trends in US families’ usage of workplace clinics from 2007-2010.  They find 
that only about 4% of US families used a worksite clinic in the previous year, a result that 
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is unsurprising given that worksite clinics are unavailable to most US workers.11  Boukus 
and Tu further find that routine vaccinations and physical exams are the most commonly 
utilized services at worksite clinics, not chronic condition or primary care.  Convenience 
is cited as the most important factor that drove patients to use the clinic.  The authors 
caution that because worksite clinics can only reach a small portion of the US working 
population, the onsite health model is unlikely to provide a large scale solution to rising 
employee health care costs. 
 Other studies of employer-based clinics attempt to measure the return-on-
investment (ROI) following a clinic opening or discuss best practices for constructing 
ROI measures.  Sherman and Fabius (2012) provide a review of studies in this area.  
They contend that the most important measurement that employers should focus on when 
measuring the success of an onsite clinic is how much health care costs and lost 
productivity are reduced.  Examples of studies that calculate ROI are Tao et al. (2009) 
and Griffith and Strasser (2010); these two papers study clinics that opened in the bottling 
and manufacturing industries, respectively.   
 Only a handful of studies investigate how availability of onsite clinic services 
affects patient utilization decisions.  Tao et al. (2014) study non-admission ED visits 
among people employed at two hospitals in the Johns Hopkins Health System, one of 
which features a worksite primary care clinic.  They find that the worksite clinic is 
associated with significant reductions in ED visits and the number of employees who 
used the ED.  Krause et al. (2012) and Kindermann et al. (2014) compare health care 
                                                 
11 While worksite clinics are becomingly increasingly popular among large employers, it is still only a 
subset of large firms that have clinics.  Large employers are a further subset of all employers, so the actual 
number of US employees and families who have access to worksite health is limited. 
 
 
17 
 
utilization between patients who use onsite versus offsite chiropractic services.  Both 
papers utilize claims data for employees of Cerner Corporation, where onsite health 
centers deliver primary care, wellness, and chiropractic services.  However, neither 
research design accounts for the fact that patients self-select into receiving chiropractic 
care onsite versus offsite.  Both studies find that patients who use offsite chiropractic care 
have higher physical therapy, outpatient, and radiology utilization; Kindermann et al. 
additionally find that offsite patients have higher ED utilization.  Lastly, Krause et al. 
discover that onsite chiropractic use is associated with improved measures of 
musculoskeletal function.  
 
4. Theoretical Model 
It is important to have a conceptual framework that, in the context of medical 
care, maps out how consumers might respond when a new seller enters the market and 
offers products at a lower price.  Here, I develop a model of consumer decision-making 
in which a patient afflicted with an illness of a certain severity makes two decisions – 
whether or not to seek care, and which provider to visit if care is sought.  A new provider 
enters the market for medical care and offers a limited scope of services at a lower time 
cost.  First, I show how the addition of this provider to the patient’s choice set can alter 
the decision to seek care.  I then show how switching costs associated with changing site 
of care can determine the patient’s choice of provider.  The model produces an interesting 
set of predictions that ultimately guide my empirical work. 
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4a. Model Setup 
Consider a patient who with probability 𝜋𝜋 ∈ (0,1) becomes sick and with 
probability 1 − 𝜋𝜋 is healthy.  If the patient becomes sick, she is afflicted with a medical 
condition of varying severity 𝑠𝑠.  Assume 𝑠𝑠~𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠).  𝐹𝐹(𝑠𝑠) has support on 𝑆𝑆 = �𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠� ⊂  ℝ+, 
where 𝑠𝑠 < 𝑠𝑠, and strictly positive density f(𝑠𝑠) on 𝑆𝑆.12  For simplicity, we can think of the 
case when the patient is healthy as 𝑠𝑠 = 0.  The patient is able to perfectly observe 𝑠𝑠. 
A fixed set of providers currently exists in the market, and together they can treat 
the full range of possible severities.  The patient derives value from receiving medical 
care, and I model value as an increasing function of 𝑠𝑠.  This means that as the patient 
becomes more seriously ill, the value of care rises.  To receive treatment, the patient faces 
the cost of care.  I also model cost of care as an increasing function of 𝑠𝑠, so it is more 
costly to treat more complicated conditions.  Cost of care is comprised of monetary cost 
(e.g. patient cost-sharing amount) and nonmonetary cost.  I further break down 
nonmonetary cost into time cost and switching cost.  When I later introduce entry into the 
market, I will focus solely on changes to the nonmonetary cost.  I therefore make the 
simplifying assumption that the monetary cost of care is the same for incumbent 
providers and the future market entrant.  Lastly, I assume that the patient can perfectly 
observe the value and cost of care.  Illustration 1 shows the basic setup of the model. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This basic setup draws from parts of the moral hazard model developed in Baicker, Mullainathan, and 
Schwartzstein (2015).     
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𝐶𝐶0 (Cost of care) 
 
𝑠𝑠1∗ 
𝑉𝑉 (Value of care) 
Illustration 1 
   $ 
                                                                     
 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                Severity of illness (𝑠𝑠) 
 
The y-axis is dollars, and the x-axis is the range of possible illness severities (𝑠𝑠) that the 
patient can be stricken with.  Drawn in blue, 𝑉𝑉 plots the patient’s value (in dollars) from 
seeking medical care when afflicted with a given 𝑠𝑠, and 𝑉𝑉 is increasing in 𝑠𝑠.  I give 𝑉𝑉 a 
linear functional form and assume that the patient derives no value from care when she is 
healthy (i.e. 𝑠𝑠 = 0).  Drawn in red, 𝐶𝐶0 plots the cost of care to treat a given 𝑠𝑠.  Illustration 
1 shows the market before any entry has taken place, so all care is delivered by 
incumbent, community-based providers.  Thus, 𝐶𝐶0 represents the cost of care averaged 
across all of these providers.  I give 𝐶𝐶0 a nonlinear functional form and assume that 
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶0
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕
2𝐶𝐶0
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
> 0, meaning 𝐶𝐶0 is increasing and convex in 𝑠𝑠.  This means that as 𝑠𝑠 
increases, the cost to treat that illness rises at an increasing rate.  Recall that cost of care 
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is the sum of money cost, time cost, and switching cost.  I assume that time cost and 
switching cost can be monetized, so I express all costs in the common unit of dollars.13 
Note that my model is not deterministic, in the sense that I am not showing what 
every patient afflicted with a certain illness severity will definitively do.  Instead, I am 
depicting and explaining patient behavior on average.  I acknowledge that there can be 
heterogeneity across patients in how they individually value medical care and in their 
preferences over providers.   
 
4b. The Market Before Entry  
 I first consider patient decision-making before any entry of new providers occurs.  
This case is shown in Illustration 1.  Because all medical care is delivered by providers 
who are currently in the market, there are no new providers that the patient could switch 
to.  Thus, switching cost is zero in this first scenario. 
With probability 𝜋𝜋, the patient becomes ill, and then a severity ?̂?𝑠 is drawn from 
the distribution of possible severities.  The patient now suffers from an illness of severity 
?̂?𝑠 and must decide whether or not to seek medical treatment for that illness.  She 
compares the value of care for ?̂?𝑠 to the cost of care for ?̂?𝑠.  She will only seek care if the 
value is greater than or equal to the cost.  In Illustration 1, we look for the intersection 
point of 𝑉𝑉 and 𝐶𝐶0, and this occurs at severity 𝑠𝑠1∗.  This equilibrium severity is the patient’s 
threshold severity at which she decides whether or not to seek care.  In other words, her 
                                                 
13 Time cost can be monetized by multiplying it to the opportunity cost of time.  One way that this has been 
done in the literature is to measure time cost in hours and then multiply it to the worker’s hourly wage rate.  
Switching cost is less straightforward to monetize, as you would need some conversion factor between 
disutility from switching providers and dollars. 
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decision rule is: If ?̂?𝑠 ≥ 𝑠𝑠1∗, then she will seek treatment for her illness.  If ?̂?𝑠 < 𝑠𝑠1∗, then she 
will not seek treatment. 
If the patient decides to seek care, she visits one the existing providers in the 
market.  I remain agnostic about how this particular provider is chosen, since it is not 
central to my model.  In the following subsection, I will describe the choice of provider 
that is key: the choice between incumbent providers and a market entrant. 
 
4c. The Market After Entry 
 A new provider now enters the market for medical care.  This provider can only 
deliver a limited scope of services that treat lower severity conditions.  However, 
compared to incumbent providers, the entrant offers its services at a significantly lower 
time cost to consumers.  My empirical analogue to this entrant is the worksite clinic on 
Firm A’s California campus.  The clinic offers primary care, physical therapy, alternative 
medicine, and wellness services to employees, but it cannot treat more serious conditions 
that would require specialized or emergency care.  While on campus, employees can 
conveniently walk to the clinic and need only take an hour of their workday to receive 
treatment.  Compared to community-based care, onsite care requires much less time spent 
traveling, waiting, and away from work. 
Illustration 2a depicts the case in which our low-time cost provider has entered 
the market.  I assume that there is no difference in the money price for care between 
incumbent providers and the entrant. 
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𝐶𝐶0 
𝑠𝑠1∗ 
𝑉𝑉 
𝐶𝐶1 (Cost of care for the entrant)    
 
?̃?𝑠 
∆𝑡𝑡 
Illustration 2a 
 
   $ 
                                                                     
  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                Severity of illness (𝑠𝑠) 
 
𝐶𝐶1 is the cost curve for care delivered by the entrant.  I do not include switching cost for 
now, but I will update 𝐶𝐶1 to include switching cost shortly.  Compared to incumbent 
providers, the entrant lowers the time cost of care by a constant amount ∆𝑡𝑡.  This is a 
fixed reduction in cost of care across all severities that the entrant can possibly treat, 
leading to an intercept shift of ∆𝑡𝑡  downward from 𝐶𝐶0.  The entrant has a limited scope of 
practice and is only able to treat lower severity conditions.  For example, the worksite 
clinic can treat a common cold, but it is not equipped to treat stroke or AMI.  I therefore 
denote the maximum severity of illness that the entrant can treat as ?̃?𝑠.  𝐶𝐶1 kinks and goes 
to +∞ at ?̃?𝑠, illustrating the point that if ?̂?𝑠 ≥ ?̃?𝑠, then the cost of care for the entrant is 
undefined because ?̂?𝑠 is beyond the entrant’s scope of practice.  In other words, there is a 
capacity constraint for the entrant (i.e. worksite clinic) that binds starting at ?̃?𝑠.  If ?̂?𝑠 ≥ ?̃?𝑠, 
the patient must go to an incumbent (i.e. community-based/offsite) provider for 
treatment. 
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Next, I introduce switching cost into the entrant’s cost of care.  If the patient 
wishes to switch her site of care from incumbent providers to the entrant, she bears a 
switching cost associated with changing providers.  I model switching cost as a function 
of 𝑠𝑠, and it increases in 𝑠𝑠.  The conceptual motivation is that the entrant has a limited 
scope of practice and is a more appropriate site of care for lower severity conditions.  The 
entrant’s machinery (e.g. onsite medical staff and equipment) is not well-suited to 
efficiently and effectively treat more complicated conditions.  Meanwhile, the array of 
incumbent providers – from primary care physicians to specialist physicians to acute care 
hospitals – is able to treat the full range of severities.  Thus, as 𝑠𝑠 increases, it becomes 
costlier for the patient to switch to the entrant because an incumbent would be the more 
medically-appropriate site of care.  Applying this concept to my empirical setting, a 
patient can receive effective onsite treatment for a sore throat.  However, for chest pain, 
the onsite physician is unable to render much treatment and refers the patient to a 
cardiologist in the community.  The patient would be more efficiently treated by a 
cardiologist in the first place, so she faces a high switching cost to seek onsite care for 
this higher severity condition.  Illustration 2b now shows the complete story in which 
cost of care includes both components of nonmonetary cost. 
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𝐶𝐶0 
𝑠𝑠1∗ 
𝑉𝑉 
𝐶𝐶1  
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𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑠𝑠) 
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Illustration 2b 
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                Severity of illness (𝑠𝑠) 
 
Drawn in solid green, 𝐶𝐶1 is now the entrant’s cost curve including both time and 
switching costs.  The entrant offers a lower time cost that is shown as a fixed reduction of 
∆𝑡𝑡 in the cost of care.  Switching cost, denoted as 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, is increasing in 𝑠𝑠.  Thus, the 
switching cost generates a cost increase that offsets the reduction in time cost, and this 
offset grows in magnitude as 𝑠𝑠 increases.  In other words, as the patient’s illness becomes 
more severe, the difference in cost of care between incumbents and the entrant shrinks.  
In Illustration 2b, the dotted green line shows the entrant’s cost curve without switching 
cost (as was drawn in Illustration 2a).  One can clearly see how the reduction in time cost 
and increase in switching cost counteract each other across the set of severities that the 
entrant can treat, thereby producing the final cost curve 𝐶𝐶1.  While the fixed reduction in 
time cost causes an intercept shift, the inclusion of switching cost as an increasing 
function of 𝑠𝑠 adds a slope change relative to 𝐶𝐶0.  Illustration 2c shows a cleaner version 
of Illustration 2b. 
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                Severity of illness (𝑠𝑠) 
 
We now have a market with both incumbent providers (i.e. community-based 
providers) and a new, low-time cost provider (i.e. worksite clinic).  I next explain how, 
under this new scenario, a patient decides whether or not to seek care and how this 
compares to the case without the entrant.  Again suppose that a patient falls ill with a 
condition of severity ?̂?𝑠.  Rather than looking just at 𝐶𝐶0, she now also looks at 𝐶𝐶1 when 
comparing the cost to the value of care for ?̂?𝑠.  In Illustration 2c, we look for the 
intersection of 𝐶𝐶1 and 𝑉𝑉 and find that the new equilibrium severity occurs at 𝑠𝑠2∗.
14  
Introduction of a more convenient provider option has lowered the threshold severity at 
which the patient seeks care.  The patient’s new decision rule is: If ?̂?𝑠 ≥ 𝑠𝑠2∗, then she will 
seek treatment for her illness.  If ?̂?𝑠 < 𝑠𝑠2∗, then she will not seek care.  The patient is now 
willing to obtain medical care for a wider set of severities.  More specifically, the patient 
seeks care any time 𝑠𝑠2∗ ≤ ?̂?𝑠 < 𝑠𝑠1∗, and this is a range of severities for which she would not 
                                                 
14 Although the graph shows an additional intersection at ?̃?𝑠, this point is irrelevant because it is outside of 
the entrant’s scope of practice. 
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have sought treatment if the low-time cost provider was not in the market.  This generates 
the first prediction of the model: 
Prediction 1: After entry of a low-time cost provider into the market, there will be market 
expansion, as patients seek care for a wider range of illness severities.  This means that 
after the worksite clinic becomes available, a patient’s overall likelihood to utilize care 
and level of utilization should both rise. 
After the low-time cost provider enters the market, patients become open to seeking care 
for illnesses with 𝑠𝑠2∗ ≤ 𝑠𝑠 < 𝑠𝑠1∗.  Thus, the predicted increase in demand should be 
specifically for services used to treat conditions within this severity range.  The best 
proxy for these services is the set of services that the entrant can provide, since the range 
𝑠𝑠2∗ ≤ 𝑠𝑠 < 𝑠𝑠1∗ falls perfectly within its scope of practice.  This leads to the second 
prediction: 
Prediction 2: After the worksite clinic opens, there should be increased demand for the 
types of services that the clinic can provide.  More specifically, I expect to see an 
increase in the utilization of primary care office visits, physical therapy, acupuncture, 
and chiropractic. 
 
4d. Choice of Provider 
After deciding to seek care, the patient must then choose to visit either an 
incumbent (i.e. community-based provider) or the entrant (i.e. worksite clinic).  This 
choice process only occurs when ?̂?𝑠 < ?̃?𝑠, as the patient will always go to a community-
based provider for more serious conditions.  I therefore restrict the following discussion 
to cases with 𝑠𝑠2∗ ≤ ?̂?𝑠 < ?̃?𝑠.  The relevant types of care to consider are those offered by the 
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worksite clinic.  These services treat conditions within the specified severity range and 
are also offered by community-based providers, thereby presenting patients with a choice 
to make.  I now explain how the patient chooses between the worksite clinic and an 
offsite provider when seeking primary care, physical therapy, acupuncture, or 
chiropractic.  
First, it is important to note that this choice differs substantively depending on the 
type of care sought.  To show this, I split the services of interest into two groups.  The 
first group is physical therapy, acupuncture, and chiropractic.  These services similarly 
treat low severity conditions, require a high frequency of treatment, and can be a hassle to 
schedule into one’s work day.  The second group is primary care, which treats higher 
severity conditions, is often procedurally more intensive, and is utilized relatively 
infrequently.  Beyond the aforementioned differences, there is one key distinction 
between these two groups of services that I wish to highlight: Continuity of care and 
having a standing relationship with your provider is more important for primary care than 
it is for physical therapy, acupuncture, or chiropractic.  Familiarity and having a strong 
relationship with your PCP is important because the provider better understands your 
medical history, can tailor treatments, and can more effectively manage your conditions 
(e.g. diabetes or hypertension) over time.  Disrupting this continuity of care by switching 
PCPs is costly.  In contrast, for physical therapy and alternative medicine, developing a 
relationship with your provider does not have as significant an impact on treatment of 
such low severity conditions.  Conceptually, this translates into a higher switching cost to 
move from offsite to onsite primary care, compared to switching from offsite to onsite 
physical therapy or alternative medicine. 
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$ $ 
Relationship stock (𝑟𝑟) Relationship stock (𝑟𝑟) 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 
To formally model this distinction, I introduce a measure called relationship stock 
(𝑟𝑟), which measures the strength of a patient’s relationship with incumbent, community-
based providers prior to entry of the worksite clinic.  For example, a patient who has 
visited the same primary care physician regularly for several years will have high 
relationship stock.  On the other hand, a patient who has never utilized primary care 
before or who switches providers frequently would have low relationship stock.  
Previously, I defined switching cost as a function of illness severity (𝑠𝑠).  I now add 
relationship stock (𝑟𝑟) into that function.  Thus, switching cost is also a function of 𝑟𝑟, and 
it increases in 𝑟𝑟.  While relationship stock does matter for both groups of services, it has a 
stronger effect for primary care.  Thus, as 𝑟𝑟 increases, switching cost will increase at a 
faster rate for primary care than it will for physical therapy or alternative medicine.  
Illustration 3 shows a side-by-side comparison of switching costs (as a function of 𝑟𝑟) for 
physical therapy/alternative medicine versus primary care. 
 
Illustration 3 
    Physical therapy/alternative medicine                                 Primary Care                                        
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I denote the switching cost for physical therapy/alternative medicine as 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and the 
switching cost for primary care as 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃.  For both types of care, I assume that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 takes 
on a nonlinear functional form, is convex, and is increasing in 𝑟𝑟.  The average switching 
cost across all values of 𝑟𝑟 is clearly higher for primary care than it is for physical 
therapy/alternative medicine.  Additionally, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 and 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
> 𝜕𝜕
2𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
.  These 
conditions allow relationship stock to have a stronger positive effect on switching cost for 
primary care.   
Now that I have formally defined switching cost as an increasing function of both 
severity of illness and relationship stock, I can return to the question of how the patient 
chooses a provider.  The patient seeks care for her illness of severity ?̂?𝑠, where 𝑠𝑠2∗ ≤ ?̂?𝑠 < ?̃?𝑠.  
The optimal site of care is that which minimizes her cost to treat ?̂?𝑠.  Therefore, she 
compares the cost of care between the worksite clinic and community-based providers 
and chooses the provider with lower cost.   
Though seemingly simple, this comparison involves several moving parts.  The 
patient is seeking services to treat ?̂?𝑠, and she has a certain level of relationship stock (?̂?𝑟) 
with community-based providers that can deliver those services.  Assuming that the 
money price of care is the same between the worksite clinic and community-based 
providers, the clinic’s cost of care will differ on time cost and switching cost.  The clinic 
is attractive because it offers a fixed reduction in time cost, and this increased 
convenience alone will drive some substitution away from offsite providers and towards 
the clinic.  However, the clinic’s cost also includes a positive switching cost, whose 
magnitude will depend on ?̂?𝑠 and ?̂?𝑟.  The distinction between primary care and physical 
therapy/alternative medicine now becomes salient.  For physical therapy/alternative 
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medicine, the magnitude of the switching cost will be small on average.  This is because, 
given the nature of those services, ?̂?𝑠 will be low and ?̂?𝑟 will have a blunted effect on 
switching cost.  Therefore, it is likely that the switching cost will not completely offset 
the time cost reduction, making 𝐶𝐶1(?̂?𝑠, ?̂?𝑟) < 𝐶𝐶0(?̂?𝑠, ?̂?𝑟).  Under this condition, the patient 
switches away from offsite providers and instead utilizes the lower-cost worksite clinic.  
Conversely, the magnitude of the switching cost will be large, on average, for primary 
care.  Primary care treats a higher ?̂?𝑠, and there is a stronger positive effect of ?̂?𝑟 on 
switching cost.  Thus, it is more likely that the switching cost outweighs the reduction in 
time cost, making 𝐶𝐶1(?̂?𝑠, ?̂?𝑟) > 𝐶𝐶0(?̂?𝑠, ?̂?𝑟).  The patient is less likely to substitute onsite 
primary care in place of community-based primary care.  This leads to the following set 
of empirical predictions:   
Prediction 3: For the types of services that the worksite clinic offers, some degree of 
business stealing is predicted to occur.  In other words, patients will move some care 
away from community-based providers and towards the worksite clinic. 
Prediction 4: The average switching cost associated with changing primary care 
providers is greater than the average switching cost associated with changing providers 
for physical therapy or alternative medicine.  Therefore, I predict that substitution is 
more likely for physical therapy, acupuncture, and chiropractic than for primary care. 
 
4e. Two-Period Model for Clinic Utilization 
 There is a potential mechanism by which a patient can become more likely to 
switch from community-based primary care to onsite primary care.  I develop a simple 
two-period model to show how this can occur.  As explained above, the main barrier to 
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switching primary care providers is the high average switching cost.  My model will 
show that the switching cost for primary care can be lowered if the patient first utilizes 
other onsite services. 
 In time period 𝑡𝑡 = 0, a patient chooses to receive low severity care from the 
worksite clinic, rather than from a community-based provider.  This care might include 
such services as physical therapy, acupuncture, chiropractic, immunizations, or a health 
screening.  When the patient utilizes these services at the clinic, she incurs the cost of 
onsite care, which includes the switching cost associated with substituting away from 
community-based providers.  In the next time period 𝑡𝑡 = 1, the patient requires higher 
severity care and is choosing between community-based physicians and the worksite 
clinic.  Because she used onsite services in the prior period (𝑡𝑡 = 0), she has already born 
part of the switching cost associated with migrating care to the worksite clinic.  For 
example, the patient has gained familiarity and comfort with the clinic by first using it for 
less intensive, lower severity care.  This in turn lowers the switching cost that the patient 
faces to utilize the worksite clinic for higher severity care, like primary care.  In 
Illustration 3, a decline in the switching cost for primary care can be drawn as an 
intercept shift downward in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃.  After this broad reduction in switching cost, there is a 
higher probability that the cost of onsite primary care will be less than the cost of 
community-based primary care.  Thus, the patient is more likely to substitute away from 
community-based PCPs and towards the worksite clinic.  This leads to the final empirical 
prediction of my model: 
Prediction 5: If a patient first utilizes the worksite clinic for lower severity care (i.e. 
physical therapy, acupuncture, chiropractic, immunizations, or testing), she then 
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becomes more likely to switch from community-based primary care to onsite primary 
care later on.  Thus, for patients who utilize both types of onsite care, the most likely 
sequence of onsite adoption is other services (i.e. low-severity care) first and primary 
care second. 
 
5. Empirical Setting 
5a. Overview of the Client Corporation 
 My empirical setting is a large, self-insured high-technology corporation that has 
its headquarters in California and additional campuses in other states, including Texas.  
For simplicity, I refer to this corporation as “Firm A” hereafter.  Firm A’s largest and 
second-largest campuses are in California and Texas, respectively.  Their operations in 
other states are on a much smaller scale.  My analysis focuses just on employees from the 
California and Texas sites.  The employees based at these two campuses perform similar 
types of work: research and development, engineering, manufacturing, and some sales 
and human resources.  Thus, they tend to come from technical or professional 
backgrounds and have similar skill levels.  There are roughly 3,100 employees and 6,000 
dependents in California, and roughly 2,000 employees and 4,000 dependents in Texas. 
Firm A’s workforce is heavily male-dominated.  On the California campus, over 
70% of employees are male.  The average employee age at both sites is mid-40s, and only 
15% of employees are in their 20s.  Given their older average age, sedentary lifestyle and 
being overweight are fairly common among workers.  This differs from the general trend 
in the high-technology industry, which tends to have a young and healthy workforce.  
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However, the average age of Firm A’s employees is not far off from what is seen in many 
industries in the United States.15 
 
5b. Employee Insurance Offerings 
 Firm A is self-insured and offers a menu of insurance options that has remained 
fairly stable over the 2011-2015 time frame of my analysis.  Employees can receive 
either individual or family coverage.  In California and Texas, employees have the 
following plan options: Aetna consumer-directed health plan (CDHP) with a health 
savings account (HSA), Aetna preferred provider organization (PPO) plan, and Cigna 
international plan for foreign employees.  California-based employees also have the 
option of a Kaiser Permanente health plan, though only about 10-15% choose the Kaiser 
plan.  Dental coverage was provided by Aetna until December 2012.  In January 2013, 
Delta Dental became the new dental insurance provider. 
 As I will describe thoroughly in Section 6, my data are complete medical claims 
for employees (and their covered dependents) who are enrolled in Aetna insurance plans.  
I do not have information on plan characteristics or medical claims data for patients 
covered under Kaiser or Cigna plans.  However, Kaiser only covers a small percentage of 
California-based employees, and the Cigna plan is uncommon at both campuses.  Aetna 
is the dominant insurer for Firm A’s employees, so I am confident that I can still achieve 
a representative picture of the workforce’s medical utilization behavior. 
 Plan characteristics, such as deductible level, out-of-pocket limit, coinsurance 
rates, and types of services covered, remain fairly stable over my 2011-2015 study 
                                                 
15 I make this judgement using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ most recent figures from the Current 
Population Survey. 
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period.  There are only a few slight adjustments between years.  For example, between 
2014 and 2015, the CDHP plan deductible increases by $50 for individuals and $100 for 
families, and habilitation services become covered.  The coverage period runs from 
January 1 to December 31 of a calendar year, so the plan year coincides with the calendar 
year.  Firm A’s Aetna plans do not utilize copayments.  Instead, they implement patient 
cost-sharing through a deductible and coinsurance.  Using 2015 benefits as an example, 
the CDHP has a yearly deductible of $1,300 for individuals and $2,600 for families, with 
out-of-pocket limits of $3,600 for individuals and $7,200 for families.  The PPO plan has 
a yearly deductible of $500 for individuals and $1,500 for families, and the out-of-pocket 
limit is $2,000 for individuals and $4,000 for families.  For both plans, specialist referrals 
are not required.  Both plans charge 10% coinsurance in-network and 30% coinsurance 
out-of-network for primary care visits, specialist visits, diagnostics and imaging, 
outpatient surgery, urgent care, hospital stays, and delivery and inpatient services for 
pregnant women.  Patients face 10% coinsurance both in- and out-of-network for ER 
services, though non-emergency use is not covered.  Preventive care, screenings, and 
immunizations are free of charge.  Lastly, both plans feature the same level of cost-
sharing for prescription drugs: 20% coinsurance with a $10 maximum for generic drugs, 
20% coinsurance with a $50 maximum for preferred brand drugs, and 30% coinsurance 
with a $100 maximum for non-preferred brand drugs.  The CDHP also features an 
incentive whereby the deductible does not apply to certain drugs prescribed to prevent 
chronic conditions like hypertension, heart disease, and diabetes. 
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5c. The Worksite Clinic 
 In August 2013, Firm A opened a worksite clinic on its California campus.16  The 
clinic is operated by a third-party vendor, and all onsite medical providers are employees 
of the vendor.  The clinic provides primary care, basic diagnostic laboratory services, 
physical therapy, chiropractic, acupuncture, behavioral health, wellness programs, and 
lifestyle coaching.  While all employees and their covered family members can use the 
onsite clinic, only Aetna insurance plans cover the full range of services delivered by the 
clinic.  Kaiser patients can, for example, visit the clinic for a free health screening.  
However, all other services would have to be paid fully out-of-pocket by the patient.  
Employees make up most of the onsite clinic’s patient volume, as spouses and children 
only comprise about 8-10% of volume.  This is not surprising because dependents are 
generally not on campus, so the clinic is not a convenient care option for them.17  While 
Firm A’s employee population is predominantly male, the onsite clinic’s patient 
population is fairly evenly split between males and females.  The average age of clinic 
patients is in the 40s, which is similar to the average employee age.  Interestingly, 
younger workers do not have a higher propensity to use the clinic. 
 The worksite clinic is located one half-mile from the center of Firm A’s main 
campus, in a building that also houses the gym.  Clinic hours are Monday through Friday, 
8AM to 5PM.  Afterhours, an on-call physician team is available.  Patients sign up for an 
online account that gives them access to the scheduling system, and appointments are 
                                                 
16 Technically, the onsite clinic opened at the very end of July 2013.  However, operations were limited 
during these few days, and the clinic only saw three patients in my sample.  Services really got underway 
starting in August 2013.  Thus, I use August 2013 as the effective opening date.   
17 Onsite daycare is not offered at Firm A, which contributes to the low utilization of the onsite clinic by 
employees’ children. 
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usually available the same or next business day.  Inside the facility, the clinic features 
primary care examination rooms, a physical therapy room, a small lab, and dedicated 
rooms for massage therapy, chiropractic, and acupuncture.  The onsite medical staff is 
comprised of two primary care physicians, a registered nurse, two physical therapists, a 
chiropractor, an acupuncturist, and a wellness coach.  
A typical primary care appointment lasts 30 minutes, which includes an 
opportunity for the provider (physician or nurse) to discuss the patient’s recent lab 
results, medical history, or management of chronic conditions.  While very basic blood 
tests, such as a metabolic panel, can be run at the clinic, more complicated blood work 
must be sent out to laboratories.  Lab test and biometric screening results can be viewed 
by patients on their online account, and they can also communicate with providers 
through secure messaging.  The clinic does not have a pharmacy, but providers are able 
to directly dispense generic versions of ten commonly-prescribed primary care 
medications (e.g. antibiotics, antihistamines, antifungals).  The clinic charges $90 for a 
primary care office visit before the patient’s deductible has been met and $9 thereafter 
(based off a 10% coinsurance rate).  Generic drugs are dispensed at a flat $10 fee.  When 
patients require specialist care, they are referred to outside specialist physicians who 
belong to an exclusive network of providers defined by the vendor.  The vendor 
explained that these physicians are chosen primarily because they are rated as “high-
quality” in patient satisfaction reviews.  Based on feedback from patients, the vendor 
periodically updates membership in the specialist network.   
Physical therapy and alternative medicine are very popular among Firm A’s 
employees, and the onsite clinic’s slots for these services are generally full.  Physical 
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therapy appointments last 45 minutes, and patients are charged $40 per visit, subject to 
deductible and coinsurance provisions.  Behavioral health, mental health, wellness, and 
lifestyle coaching sessions are offered for free. 
The vendor was unable to disclose much detail about the reimbursement rates 
negotiated with Aetna for delivery of clinic services or about the nature of their operating 
contract with Firm A.  The negotiated fee schedule for primary care services is roughly 
based off the Medicare physician fee schedule.  All operating costs are passed directly 
onto Firm A. 
There is no onsite clinic on the Texas campus.  Firm A’s leadership decided to 
test the worksite clinic model at its California headquarters first.  They wanted to see how 
well-received the clinic would be among employees and how well it would perform on 
utilization and cost measures.18  Importantly, the decision to open an onsite clinic in 
California, and not in Texas, was not due to California having a uniquely unhealthy 
population.  In other words, there is not a reason to believe that a significant difference in 
underlying health exists between California- and Texas-based employees. 
 
6. Data 
 I utilize the complete set of medical claims data for all employees and covered 
family members who are enrolled in Firm A’s Aetna insurance plans.  No prescription 
drug claims data is available, though I hope to gain access to this data for future 
                                                 
18 Based off the current performance and reception of the CA onsite clinic, Firm A’s leadership does have 
future plans to open a clinic in TX. 
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research.19  Dental claims data is only available until December 2012, as Firm A 
switched dental coverage away from Aetna in January 2013.   
This particular medical claims data set offers several advantages for my study.  
First, the data is not restricted to employee claims.  I am able to see utilization by 
dependents as well, which allows me to perform falsification tests later on.  Second, the 
data provide useful information about patients and the employee under whom they are 
covered.  This includes patient and employee date of birth and gender, the patient’s 
relationship to the employee, and the employee’s ZIP code and state of residence.  I use 
the employee’s ZIP code and state of residence as a proxy for the patient’s residence 
location, which is reasonable since the patient is either the employee him/herself or an 
immediate family member.  Later on, I use this proxy of residential location to analyze 
the impact of patient preferences for providers closer to home versus closer to work on 
propensity to use the onsite clinic.  Third, claims data provide a high level of detail on 
medical utilization.  I am able to see every medical procedure that was billed for during 
visits to both the onsite clinic and all community-based providers.  Each billing item 
includes the date the service started and stopped, CPT procedure code, and ICD-9 
diagnosis codes.  Each billing item also lists the patient copayment, deductible, and 
coinsurance amounts; the amount paid by the insurer20; and the total amount paid for the 
service (i.e. the sum of patient out-of-pocket payments and the insurer’s contribution).  
Additionally, there is detailed information about the provider who delivered the service: a 
unique numerical identifier; provider type (e.g. physician, multi-provider group, acute 
                                                 
19 The vendor stated that, for Firm A, 70% of employee health care costs are due to medical claims, and 
only 30% are due to pharmaceutical costs. 
20 The insurer’s payment includes the amount paid both by the HSA (if the patient is enrolled in the 
CDHP) and by the base medical plan. 
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short term hospital); specialty (e.g. cardiology, family practice, chiropractor); and their 
city, state, and ZIP code.  The provider ID allows me to separately identify services 
delivered by the onsite clinic from those delivered by community-based providers. 
The original data set contains 2,057,800 billing items that span August 2002 to 
June 2015.  However, the data is incomplete in earlier years, and I determine that it can 
be reliably used starting in April 2011.21  I only keep billing items with service start dates 
from April 1, 2011 to June 30, 2015.  Also, the original data set contains billing items for 
all US-based employees of Firm A.  I restrict the data just to those billing items for 
patients who are covered under an employee with a home address in California or Texas, 
since my empirical strategy compares patients in California to those in Texas.  Billing 
items for dental procedures are only available until December 2012, and dental care is 
outside of the scope of services that the onsite clinic can provide or reasonably impact.  I 
therefore drop all dental billing items. 
I broadly categorize patients as employees, child dependents, and spouses.  While 
there is a variable in the data that records the relationship of the patient to the covering 
employee (e.g. patient is the employee him/herself, child, wife, etc.), the variable’s values 
switch between two sets of definitions without warning and make it difficult to 
distinguish children from spouses.  I do my best to accurately identify child dependents 
and spouses by using the relationship variable in conjunction with the age difference 
between a patient and their covering employee.  I assume that an age difference greater 
than or equal to 20 years would make the patient a child dependent, while an age 
                                                 
21 To determine an appropriate starting point for which to use the data, I plotted the total number of billing 
items per month, over time.  The number of billing items per month is extremely low from 2002-2010 and 
suddenly shoots up in 2011.  It reaches a stable and comparable number to later monthly figures starting in 
April 2011. 
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difference less than 20 years would make the patient a spouse.  In the end, I find that this 
method is fairly reliable. 
I create indicators to identify whether a patient has the following chronic 
conditions: diabetes mellitus, hypertension, coronary artery disease (CAD), 
hyperlipidemia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), or chronic kidney 
disease (CKD).  These conditions are more prevalent in and medically-complicating for a 
working-age population.22  To identify whether a patient suffers from any of the above 
conditions, I utilize her first available year of claims data and check if she ever received a 
diagnosis related to the particular condition.  If so, I label the patient as having that 
particular chronic condition.23  In Appendix Table A-1, I outline which ICD-9 diagnosis 
codes I attribute to each condition.  In an alternate and more flexible specification, I label 
a patient as having a particular chronic condition if she received an indicative diagnosis 
any time before the onsite clinic opened.  Appendix Table A-2 shows the number of 
patients identified as having any of the chronic conditions. 
To facilitate analysis of medical service utilization, I group billing items into four 
services categories using the CPT procedure code: primary care office visit, physical 
therapy, acupuncture, and chiropractic.  These are the set of services that the onsite clinic 
delivers and can substitute for community-based care.  In Appendix Table A-3, I outline 
which CPT codes I used to group billing items into service categories.  Additionally, I 
utilize each billing item’s place of service indicator to categorize the item as an ER, 
                                                 
22 I thank Amol Navathe for offering his clinical opinion on relevant chronic conditions to consider. 
23 I acknowledge that this is a messy way to identify whether or not a patient has a chronic condition, yet 
this is the best I can do with the available data.  A better way would be to use pharmaceutical data to 
determine whether patients are taking drugs to manage particular conditions.  Unfortunately, 
pharmaceutical data is not available. 
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inpatient hospital, office, or outpatient-based service.  To measure a billing item’s out-of-
pocket cost, I sum the copay, coinsurance, and deductible amounts.  The data already 
includes a measure of the amount paid by the insurer.  To obtain the total cost for a 
billing item, I look at the item’s covered expense, which sums the patient and payer 
contributions.24 
Data at the billing item-level is difficult to analyze.  Aetna groups billing items 
together into a claim when the services are jointly submitted by a provider for 
reimbursement.  For the most part, these services are medically related and are delivered 
during the same visit to a provider.  For my dissertation, I utilize claims as the grouping 
mechanism for billing items since claim IDs are readily available.  There are, however, 
some drawbacks to this method.  Claims are ultimately an administrative grouping and 
can be somewhat arbitrary.  Also, it is possible for a claim to span several visits.  For 
example, one claim could be for six physical therapy sessions that occur over three 
months.  In future work, I plan to improve upon this method by grouping services 
delivered by a particular provider on a given day into a visit or medical encounter.   
After grouping billing items into claims, I collapse the data down to the patient-
claim level.  I indicate that a claim is, for example, a primary care office visit claim if at 
least one of its constituent billing items has an office visit CPT procedure code.  A 
claim’s total cost is the sum of its constituent billing items’ costs.  Next, I only keep 
observations for those patients who have at least one claim in the period before the onsite 
                                                 
24 The alternative would be to use the allowed amount, which is the portion of the provider-submitted 
amount that is eligible for benefit determination; some of this amount might not be covered if, for example, 
the patient exceeded the maximum benefit for a plan year.  Generally, the allowed amount and covered 
expense are equal.  However, Aetna’s data dictionary states that covered expense is a more reliable 
measure of the total cost of a billing item, and that is should be used for all non-HMO cases. 
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clinic opened (April 2011 – July 2013) and at least one claim in the period after the onsite 
clinic opened (August 2013 – June 2015).  I do this for two reasons.  First, I wish to 
compare a patient’s outcomes in the post-clinic period to her outcomes in the pre-clinic 
period.  Thus, I want a panel of patients who are present in the data during both time 
periods.  Second, I want to ensure that a patient is continuously enrolled in insurance 
throughout the study period.  Because I do not have insurance enrollment data for Firm 
A’s employees, I use the fact that a patient has at least one claim in both the pre- and 
post-clinic periods as a proxy for continuous enrollment.25 
After restricting my sample to continuously enrolled patients, I collapse the data 
down to the patient-month level.  I produce monthly counts of claims for each of my four 
service categories and four sites of care (e.g. total number of claims in a given month, 
number of primary care claims in a given month, number of inpatient claims in a given 
month).  I also calculate amounts of monthly spending26 broken out by service category 
and site of care (e.g. total monthly spending, total monthly spending on physical therapy, 
total monthly spending on ER services).  I then create binary indicators for whether the 
patient has a nonzero number of claims or amount of spending in a given month. 
To create a patient-month level data set that is ready for analysis, I complete two 
more steps.  Given the nature of claims data, a patient does not show up in the data if she 
does not have any utilization.  However, patients will certainly have times when they do 
not utilize medical care, and these periods of zero utilization must be added to the data.  
                                                 
25 I acknowledge that this is a strong assumption.  However, without insurance enrollment data, this is the 
best that I can do. 
26 There are a handful of strange observations with negative spending. This could occur if the patient or 
insurer overpaid, and therefore a refund (negative spending) was issued.  I change these occurrences to 0 
spending. 
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Therefore, I fill in zeroes for all utilization and cost measures when the patient does not 
use medical care.  Second, I construct a time frame for which each patient is plausibly 
continuously-enrolled in insurance.  In the absence of enrollment data, I perform the 
following procedure: I allow a patient’s data to start in January of the calendar year for 
which she first has a claim and end in December of the calendar year for which she last 
has a claim.  If a patient’s first claim is in 2011, then her data starts in April 2011, and if a 
patient’s last claim is in 2015, then her data ends in June 2015.  Thus, the longest period 
for which a patient can have data is April 2011 to June 2015.27 
Finally, I scan the data for outliers.  I first identify observations with extreme 
values for the utilization and spending measures.28  I then look at scatter plots for each 
measure to identify observations that depart substantially from the general mass of points.  
In the end, I identify and drop 11 outlier observations that have abnormally high levels of 
total claims and total spending in the month.29   
 
7. Empirical Strategy 
7a. Econometric Model 
 For most of the analyses, I utilize panel data at the patient-month level.  There are 
several key features of the data that facilitate analysis.  First, claims are available for all 
sites of care, and I can readily distinguish between services that are delivered by the 
onsite clinic and services that are delivered by community-based providers.  Second, the 
data span roughly two years before and two years after the onsite clinic enters the market.  
                                                 
27 It turns out that the majority of patients are present for the longest possible time frame. 
28 This is done using the user-written package “extremes” in Stata. 
29 Dropping these 11 outliers only affects the means slightly, so they do not have high leverage. 
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Third, claims are available for patients in both California and Texas.  Employees in 
California are exposed to an exogenous shock to primary care access when the onsite 
clinic opens in August 2013.  Meanwhile, employees in Texas do not have access to an 
employer-based clinic on their campus at any point during the study period.  This creates 
a nice natural experiment: I can compare patient-level outcomes between California-
based patients, who are exposed to the treatment of a worksite clinic entering the market 
for medical care, and Texas-based patients, who do not have such exposure and thus form 
a suitable control group.   
Given this setup, my primary empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences 
approach.  Identification comes from comparing patients in the post-clinic period to 
themselves in the pre-clinic period, in California compared to Texas.  My basic 
estimating equation is: 
(1)         𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡)𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡)𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖                                     
+ 𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 +
𝑖𝑖
𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑌 is an outcome variable for patient 𝑖𝑖 in state 𝑠𝑠 in month 𝑡𝑡.  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is an indicator that 
equals 1 if the patient lives in California and 0 if the patient lives in Texas.30  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 is an indicator for January 2014 to June 2015.  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 is an indicator 
for August 2013 to December 2013.  Although the onsite clinic opened in August 2013, I 
separate the post-clinic period into washout and post-washout periods for the following 
reason: The clinic experienced problems with claims submission in the months 
immediately following launch, so data for onsite claims is not entirely reliable until 
                                                 
30 Because it was required that the claims data be de-identified to a certain level, I do not have the patient’s 
actual address.  I only have residential ZIP code and state for the employee who provides coverage to the 
patient.  The patient is therefore either the employee him/herself or a dependent.  I assume that the patient 
and covering employee live in the same place.  
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January 2014.  I therefore treat August 2013 to December 2013 as a washout period, and 
January 2014 onward forms the post-washout period.  𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡ℎ is a set of month fixed 
effects to control for trends over time.  𝑿𝑿 is a vector of patient-specific characteristics.  It 
includes the patient’s age, age squared, an indicator for female gender, an indicator for 
having any chronic conditions, and an indicator for being an employee.  𝜀𝜀 is the error 
term. 
The coefficients of interest are 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾.  𝛽𝛽 measures the impact of the worksite 
clinic on the particular outcome in the post-washout period.  In other words, it measures 
the change in the outcome between the post-washout period and pre-clinic period, in 
California relative to Texas.  Similarly, 𝛾𝛾 measures the impact of the worksite clinic on 
the particular outcome in the washout period.  For proper identification, the following 
assumption must hold: After August 2013, no factors other than entrance of the worksite 
clinic differentially affect California compared to Texas. 
To measure the worksite clinic’s full impact across the entire post-clinic time 
period, I also estimate an alternate specification of (1) which simply combines the 
washout and post-washout periods into a single post-clinic period.  That estimating 
equation is: 
(2)         𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼′ + 𝛽𝛽′(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌′𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕 + �𝜃𝜃′𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 +
𝑖𝑖
𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿′ + 𝜀𝜀′𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 is an indicator for August 2013 to June 2015.  Here, 𝛽𝛽′ measures the 
clinic’s effect on the outcome in the full post-clinic period.  
 The difference-in-difference analyses that I perform in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
all utilize the basic estimating equations (1) and (2).  Depending on the objective of the 
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specific analysis, there are changes to the patient sample and slight modifications to the 
explanatory variables.  However, the general structure of (1) and (2) is left intact. 
 
7b. Extensive Margin Analysis – Models 
On the extensive margin, I wish to know how introduction of the onsite clinic 
affects a patient’s likelihood to have any claims or any spending in a given month.  Using 
the framework of (1) and (2), 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 becomes a binary indicator that equals 1 if patient 𝑖𝑖 in 
state 𝑠𝑠 has a nonzero/positive number of claims or amount of spending in month 𝑡𝑡, and 0 
otherwise.  The left hand side of (1) and (2) therefore 
becomes Pr (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠).  Linear probability model (LPM) is my 
preferred specification for these binary outcomes.  Coefficients are readily interpreted as 
the marginal effects of the regressors on the likelihood of the outcome equaling one.  
Also, it is straightforward to implement the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure on linear 
models, which I will discuss in detail below. 
To ensure robustness to model specification, I try two things.  First, I re-estimate 
the LPM models and include patient fixed effects.  This is another advantage of using 
LPM, as it is more straightforward to include unit fixed effects than it is for nonlinear 
models.  Patient fixed effects will control for all patient-specific, time-invariant 
characteristics, so I drop any time-invariant explanatory variables.  Thus, the only 
variables that remain are the difference-in-differences interaction terms of interest, 
patient age and age squared, and month fixed effects.  Second, I estimate (1) and (2) 
using probit models and then calculate marginal effects. 
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7c. Intensive Margin Analysis – Models 
 On the intensive margin, I want to determine how introduction of the onsite clinic 
impacts the number of claims or level of spending that a patient incurs in a given month.  
When analyzing utilization, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 is the number of claims for a particular service category 
or site of care that patient 𝑖𝑖 in state 𝑠𝑠 has in month 𝑡𝑡.  I first run OLS on all observations 
(i.e. including observations with zero utilization) and on the subset of observations where 
the number of claims (across all services) in the month is positive.  Then I run OLS on 
the subset of observations where the particular outcome of interest is positive.  This is the 
second part of a two-part model and estimates the impact of the worksite clinic opening 
on 𝑌𝑌, conditional on 𝑌𝑌 > 0.  In addition to OLS, I also estimate count data models, since 
my outcome variables are discrete counts of claims per month.  I estimate negative 
binomial and zero-inflated negative binomial models, which are appropriate because the 
outcomes exhibit a high frequency of zeroes.31 
 When analyzing spending, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖 is the amount of spending for a particular service 
category or site of care that patient 𝑖𝑖 in state 𝑠𝑠 incurs in month 𝑡𝑡.  I follow advice from 
econometric literature on the analysis of health expenditures by using natural log-
transformed spending; this transformation helps to deal with the high frequency of zeroes 
and positive skewness in my expenditure measures.  I again follow the second part of a 
two-part model and use OLS to estimate the effect of explanatory variables on ln (𝑌𝑌), 
                                                 
31 The utilization outcomes display over-dispersion, and thus the Poisson model is inappropriate.  Also, by 
using the user-written Stata package “countfit,” I determine that the negative binomial and zero-inflated 
negative binomial models are the most appropriate count data models to use.  I specifically utilize the 
negative binomial 2 model, which assumes that the variance is a quadratic function of the mean of Y.  For 
the zero-inflated negative binomial model, I use a less flexible specification whereby the splitting 
mechanism for users and non-users depends on a constant rather than a set of explanatory variables.  I do 
this because the zero-inflated model is frequently unable to converge when the mechanism is a function of 
the explanatory variables. 
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conditional on 𝑌𝑌 > 0.  I also use OLS to estimate the effect on untransformed spending 
and run the analysis with all observations, observations where 𝑌𝑌 > 0, and observations 
where total monthly spending is positive.  Another model that I estimate is the one-part 
generalized linear model (GLM), which I run on untransformed spending and all 
observations (i.e. including zeroes).  Finally, to obtain a more complete picture of 
spending effects, I utilize quantile regression to estimate (1) and (2).  Quantile regression 
is able to describe the relationship between explanatory variables of interest and the 
outcome at different points in the outcome’s conditional distribution.  It is also more 
robust to outliers than OLS/mean regression. 
 
7d. Clustering and Problems with Few Clusters 
Because my primary empirical strategy is difference-in-differences with 
identifying variation at the state-time level, there are some precautions that I take.  
Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron and Miller (2015) warn that default standard errors in 
difference-in-differences applications become severely downward biased due to two 
reasons.  First, model errors for a given individual may be correlated over time, though 
we assume that errors across different individuals are uncorrelated.  Second, given that 
observations can be clustered in a natural way, the difference-in-difference regressor of 
interest often exhibits little variation within a cluster.  Thus, Bertrand et al. (2004) and 
Cameron and Miller (2015) recommend using cluster robust standard errors, clustering at 
the state level and assuming that errors are independent across states. 
A challenge in my study setting is that I only have two states to cluster on: 
California and Texas.  I therefore run into the problem of having few clusters, which 
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causes standard errors clustered on state to be badly downward-biased and leads to over-
rejection of the null hypothesis.  Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), hereafter CGM, 
recommend a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure to generate more reliable p-values when 
the number of clusters is small.  Webb (2014) elaborates on CGM’s procedure, showing 
that when the number of clusters is very small (e.g. less than 10), the p-values are not 
point identified.  He therefore proposes using a six-point weight distribution, as opposed 
to CGM’s two-point Rademacher weight distribution.  In Monte Carlo simulations, Webb 
shows that this modified wild cluster bootstrap procedure performs well when there are 
fewer than 10 clusters.  While the wild cluster bootstrap can only be applied to linear 
models, Klein and Santos (2012) develop the score wild cluster bootstrap for nonlinear 
cases. 
In light of the aforementioned issues, I provide several sets of standard errors and 
significance tests for my empirical results.  I present inferences based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, cluster-robust standard errors clustered on state, 
and wild cluster bootstrap p-values clustered on state.  When patient fixed effects are 
included, I additionally present inferences based on default standard errors and cluster-
robust standard errors clustered on patient.   
It is important to note that the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure is not a panacea.  
MacKinnon and Webb (2016) warn that, based on Monte Carlo simulations, the wild 
cluster bootstrap procedure can severely under-reject when only a few clusters are 
treated.  They argue that inferences can be misleading when fewer than four clusters are 
treated.  In my case, only one cluster (i.e. California) is treated.  With only one treated 
cluster, their simulation results find severe under-rejection with the wild cluster bootstrap 
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and severe over-rejection with cluster-robust standard errors.   I have not found a better 
solution despite an exhaustive review of the literature.32  There is not one ideal method 
for determining the significance of my detected effects, and so I present and consider 
inferences under several different standard error assumptions.  The truth is somewhere in 
between these methods and requires a judgement call.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 I thank Sayeh Nikpay for her assistance on this issue. 
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CHAPTER 2 – HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSES 
 
In Chapter 2, I perform high-level analyses to first determine what broad effects 
are occurring within the full sample of continuously-enrolled patients.  This sample 
includes all CA- and TX-based employees and covered dependents deemed to be 
continuously-enrolled in insurance, according to the inclusion criteria that I outlined 
earlier.  For the following analyses, I utilize a patient-month level panel data set with 
372,169 observations.  Across both states, this data set represents utilization and costs for 
8,371 unique patients.33  All tables and figures are included at the end of the dissertation.   
 
8. Summary Statistics and Raw Data Trends 
Summary Table 1 summarizes the available demographic and health 
characteristics for the full sample of continuously-enrolled patients.  The average patient 
age is slightly lower in TX (29.56 years) than in CA (32.15 years).  In both states, the 
observations are fairly evenly split between male and female patients.  The average age 
of employees under whom the patients are covered is mid-40s, and these employees are 
mostly male.  This is consistent with the overall demographic makeup of Firm A’s 
workforce.  21.8% of patient-months in CA and 20.6% of patient-months in TX are for 
patients who have at least one chronic condition.  This seems reasonable given that Firm 
A’s workforce is older on average, and overweight issues are not uncommon.  CA and 
TX have similar breakdowns in terms of the percentages of observations that correspond 
to patients who are employees, dependents, or spouses.  35.2% of observations in CA and 
32.4% of observations in TX are for patients who are employees.  Thus, non-employees 
                                                 
33 These patients are covered under the insurance plans of 3,188 unique employees. 
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have a considerable amount of utilization in the data.  Lastly, about 56% of observations 
are for CA-based patients while 44% are for TX-based patients.  This is expected, as 
there are more employees on the CA campus. 
I now discuss graphs that plot and compare monthly utilization and spending 
levels for various types of services across CA and TX.  Figure 1 plots the total number of 
claims (for all services) per month.  I separate claims for CA-based patients into all 
claims and claims for community-based/offsite providers only.  These two CA trend lines 
split once the onsite clinic opens in August 2013, and the space in between the lines 
represents utilization that occurs at the worksite clinic.  This provides a sense of the 
magnitude of onsite utilization over time.  Figure 1 also shows that, in the pre-clinic 
period, CA and TX follow nearly parallel trends in the total number of claims per month.  
Except for immediately after the clinic opening, the trends in CA and TX track each other 
closely throughout the post-clinic period, which is a bit surprising. 
Figure 2 plots the number of onsite clinic claims per month, and Figure 3 shows 
the number of patients that utilized the clinic each month.  As expected, both graphs 
show that utilization of the worksite clinic by TX-based patients is essentially zero.  Any 
utilization that is seen may be due to TX-based employees who visit the clinic while on a 
business trip to the CA campus.  Figures 2 and 3 both show a large spike in utilization 
immediately after the clinic opens, followed by a sharp drop.34  However, clinic 
utilization figures for the months following launch should be interpreted with caution due 
to the messiness of the data.  During the first few months of operation, the worksite clinic 
                                                 
34 There is a tiny bump in onsite utilization for CA-based employees in July 2013.  Recall that this is 
because the onsite clinic had some limited operations at the end of July 2013.  The effective opening date is 
still August 2013. 
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encountered numerous problems with claims submission, so its claims are somewhat 
unreliable during this time period.  Data for November 2013 are particularly problematic: 
No onsite primary care office visits were properly recorded.  Fortunately, these 
submission errors were mostly resolved by January 2014.  Another issue is downward 
bias in the number of onsite claims because testing done at the clinic no longer shows up 
after October 2013.  The spike in utilization for September and October 2013 is mostly 
driven by testing (e.g. glucose blood test, AST/ALT test, lipid panel).  This is because, 
around that time, Firm A introduced an incentive whereby patients could receive an 
insurance premium discount if they completed a health risk assessment and biometric 
screening.  The onsite clinic offered these health screenings for free and thereby attracted 
substantial business.  However, the clinic stopped billing directly for tests in October 
2013.  Instead, Quest Diagnostics – a private company that provides laboratory services – 
took over billing for all tests.  Thus, from November 2013 onward, I am unable to track 
onsite testing.  There is not a direct way to determine whether tests billed by Quest are 
performed by the worksite clinic or by a community-based provider.35 
Figure 4 shows the number of primary care office visit claims per month.  The 
trends in CA and TX track each other closely during both the pre- and post-clinic time 
periods.  The only aberration occurs in January and February 2013, when there is a 
sudden spike in primary care utilization in TX only.36  Figure 5 shows the number of 
physical therapy claims per month.  Physical therapy utilization in CA shows substantial 
                                                 
35 One idea is to look at patients who visited the onsite clinic for a primary care office visit and then check 
if the patient had any testing billed by Quest within 5 days after the visit.  I would then assume that this 
testing was performed during the onsite primary care visit.  
36 I have not been able to determine what caused this spike, and Firm A confirmed that is was not due to 
any insurance-related primary care incentive. 
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fluctuation, while utilization in TX is fairly flat over time.  Figures 6 and 7 show 
acupuncture and chiropractic utilization over time, respectively.  It is interesting to see 
that acupuncture is rarely used in TX, which may reflect differing preferences for and 
opinions toward alternative medicine across the two states.  Figures 8 and 9 show trends 
over time in ER and inpatient hospital utilization, respectively.  Both graphs are very 
noisy, though there is consistently higher ER usage in TX compared to CA.  Figure 10 
shows the number of office-based claims per month.  This graph closely resembles the 
graph of total claims per month, and it is striking how closely the trends across CA and 
TX track each other over the full time frame.  Figure 11 shows the number of outpatient 
claims per month, which is fairly noisy for both states. 
Finally, Figures 12, 13, and 14 show out-of-pocket (OOP), insurer, and total 
spending per month, respectively.  Monthly OOP spending shows clear seasonality.  
Since the insurance plan year is the calendar year, the patient’s deductible resets in 
January, which causes the spikes seen in the graph.  The insurer and total spending 
graphs look fairly similar to each other and are noisy.  Neither graph displays seasonal 
effects. 
Overall, these graphs of raw data do not clearly indicate that a differential effect 
between CA and TX exists after the clinic opens.  For several of the outcomes studied, it 
is surprising how closely the trends across the two states track each other in both the pre- 
and post-clinic time periods.  Some graphs are noisy and difficult to interpret.  Thus, in 
the following section, I turn to regression analysis to see if a differential effect between 
CA and TX is detected. 
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9. Regression Analysis – Full Continuously-Enrolled Sample 
I first perform high-level analyses to measure the broad effects of entry of the 
worksite clinic on the extensive and intensive margins of care.  These analyses utilize the 
full sample of continuously-enrolled patients, which includes CA and TX-based 
employees and family members.  Analyzing the extensive margin of care will reveal how 
introduction of the worksite clinic impacts a patient’s likelihood to have any utilization or 
spending during the month.  The intensive margin analysis will then measure the impact 
on the levels of monthly utilization and spending.   Tables of summary statistics and 
regression coefficients can be found at the end of the dissertation.  To infer significance 
of point estimates, I provide heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, cluster-robust 
standard errors (CRSEs) with clustering at the state level, and p-values from wild cluster 
bootstrap hypothesis testing. 37  As I explained in my empirical strategy section, the 
statistical literature warns that when there are few clusters, inference based on CRSEs 
and wild cluster bootstrap p-values can be misleading.  To determine the statistical 
significance of point estimates, I consider the results under all three types of standard 
error assumptions, but I rely most heavily on robust standard errors. 
 
9a. Extensive Margin Analysis 
 Summary Table 2 provides summary statistics for the extensive margin outcomes; 
these are binary measures of whether or not a patient has any claims or spending during 
                                                 
37 The tables have a column that contains the p-value from wild cluster bootstrap hypothesis testing.  The 
null hypothesis is that the coefficient on the corresponding difference-in-differences interaction equals 0.  
My bootstrap procedure utilizes Webb (2014) weights and clustering on state. 
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the month.  I break out the statistics across state (CA versus TX) and across time (pre-
clinic period versus post-clinic period). 
 I first investigate how entry of the worksite clinic affected a patient’s likelihood to 
have any claim in the month, which is a measure of overall utilization.  As Table 1 
shows, I find positive and significant effects in both the post-washout and washout 
periods.  During the post-washout period, the onsite clinic led to an estimated 0.655 
percentage point increase in the likelihood to have any claim in the month – an increase 
of 1.8% of the CA pre-clinic mean likelihood (36.1%).  This is a very small magnitude 
effect and only significant at the 10% level.  However, it suggests that some degree of 
market expansion in overall care utilization occurred.  
 I then look at the impact on primary care utilization, and the results are presented 
in Table 2.  I do not find significant effects in either the post-washout or washout period.  
This is an interesting result, since one would expect that patients respond to the worksite 
clinic’s lower time cost for primary care.  However, only a small group of patients 
actually utilized onsite primary care, so any effects on primary care may be diluted within 
the full sample.  In Chapter 3, I shed light on this issue by specifically comparing clinic 
users to non-users. 
 Physical therapy, acupuncture, and chiropractic are the other services that the 
worksite clinic provides at a lower time cost.  Table 3 shows the results for physical 
therapy.  I find positive and strongly significant effects in both the post-washout and 
washout periods.  In the post-washout period, the likelihood that a patient has a physical 
therapy claim during the month increased by 0.557 percentage points.  Relative to a CA 
pre-clinic mean likelihood of 6.84%, this is an 8.1% increase.  Turning to alternative 
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medicine, Table 4 shows that entry of the worksite clinic led to a significant increase in 
the likelihood to have an acupuncture claim during the month.  In the post-washout 
period, there was an estimated 0.855 percentage point increase in likelihood – a 24.7% 
increase relative to the CA pre-clinic mean of 3.46%.  On the other hand, for chiropractic 
services, I find no significant post-washout period effect (see Table 5). 
 Next, I examine how entry of the worksite clinic impacted utilization across 
different sites of care.  As Table 6 shows, I find that introduction of the clinic led to a 
significant decline in the likelihood to have an ER claim during the month.  There was an 
estimated 0.164 percentage point decline in likelihood during the post-washout period, a 
20.7% decrease relative to the CA pre-clinic mean of 0.793%.  The worksite clinic did 
not have a significant post-period effect on inpatient hospital utilization (see Table 7).  
For office-based claims, I find a strongly significant and positive post-period effect (see 
Table 8).  In the post-washout period, the worksite clinic led to a 1.04 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of having an office-based claim during the month.  This is an 
increase of about 3% of the CA pre-clinic mean likelihood (34.1%).  The final site of care 
I study is the outpatient setting.  As Table 9 shows, I find strongly significant and 
negative effects in the post-period.  During the post-washout period, introduction of the 
worksite clinic led to an estimated 1.34 percentage point decline in the likelihood of 
having an outpatient claim during the month.  This is 15.5% of the CA pre-clinic mean 
likelihood (8.67%).  Taken together, these results suggest that some substitution across 
sites of care may have occurred after the worksite clinic opened.  More specifically, it 
appears that patients shifted care away from the ER and outpatient setting, which was 
offset by an increase in likelihood to utilize care in office-based settings.     
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 Finally, I examine how entry of the worksite clinic impacted a patient’s likelihood 
to incur spending for various types of services.  Table 7 shows the results for out-of-
pocket, insurer, and total monthly spending across all services.  Interestingly, I do not 
find any significant post-period effects for out-of-pocket or total monthly spending.  This 
is surprising given the earlier evidence that overall likelihood to utilize care significantly 
increased, though the effect was very small in magnitude.  During the post-washout 
period, there is evidence that the worksite clinic led to a significant increase in the 
likelihood to incur monthly insurer spending.  I estimate a 1.02 percentage point increase 
in the likelihood to have positive insurer spending during the month, a small increase of 
3.3% relative to the CA pre-period mean (31.2%).  In unreported regressions, I also 
analyze how introduction of the clinic affected a patient’s likelihood to incur total 
spending for each of the aforementioned service categories and sites of care (e.g. 
likelihood to have positive total spending on primary care or outpatient claims during the 
month).  As expected, these results match those obtained earlier when analyzing a 
patient’s likelihood to have the particular type of claim during the month.  The 
coefficients’ signs and significance are the same, and the magnitudes of effects across 
specifications are similar.       
To ensure that my extensive margin findings are robust to model specification, I 
perform two checks.  First, I rerun all the LPM models and include patient fixed effects.  
I obtain very similar findings.  Second, I estimate probit models and calculate marginal 
effects after estimation.  Again, the results are consistent with those obtained using LPM. 
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9b. Intensive Margin Analysis 
 I now turn to an analysis of how entry of the worksite clinic impacted the 
intensive margin of care, meaning the number of claims and amount of spending during 
the month.  Summary Table 3a presents summary statistics for the utilization and 
spending outcomes, considering all observations (i.e. including zeroes).  Summary Table 
3b shows summary statistics for the same outcomes, conditional on the outcome being 
nonzero (i.e. positive).  I should first warn that the following regression results are 
difficult to interpret.  The results are sensitive to choice of model and which observations 
to include.  For some outcomes, the results across different models contradict each other, 
or I find effects of nonsensically large magnitude.  I do the best I can to obtain a 
consistent estimate of the treatment effect.  Still, the intensive margin results are 
presented primarily for completeness. 
 As I discuss in detail in my empirical strategy section, I utilize a variety of OLS 
and count data model specifications in order to analyze the clinic’s impact on level of 
utilization.  I consider the results from all of these specifications in order to comment on 
what effects are detected.  For brevity, the tables included at the end of the dissertation 
highlight the results obtained using OLS (only on observations with 𝑌𝑌 > 0) and zero-
inflated negative binomial (ZINB).38  A limitation of the OLS analysis is that it may be 
underpowered to detect small magnitude effects for rarer outcomes (e.g. ER and inpatient 
hospital claims), since the sample size drops sharply. 
 I first examine the effect of clinic entry on the number of claims (across all 
services) per month.  Table 11 shows these results.  Using OLS with robust standard 
                                                 
38 When presenting ZINB regression results, I also present the exponentiated coefficients.  These are also 
known as the incidence rate ratios.  I do this for ease of interpretation. 
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errors and the wild cluster bootstrap procedure, I do not find a significant post-washout 
effect.  However, the ZINB model suggests that the onsite clinic led to a statistically 
significant 4.1% increase in the number of claims per month.  Both models detect a 
significant and positive effect over the full post-clinic time period.     
I then analyze the impact on utilization of specific service categories.  As Table 
12 shows, I find a significant and positive effect in the post-washout period when using 
both OLS and ZINB.  OLS suggests that, conditional on having primary care claims 
during the month, the number of primary care claims rose by 0.0342 claims.  ZINB 
suggests that the effect was a 4.6% increase, relative to the mean number of primary care 
claims per month in CA.  I did not find that introduction of the worksite clinic had a 
significant effect on the likelihood to utilize primary care during the month.  However, 
the results from this intensive margin analysis suggest that patients who were already 
using primary care increased their level of utilization.  Table 13 shows the results for 
physical therapy utilization.  Under both OLS and ZINB, I find that introduction of the 
onsite clinic led to a significant increase in the number of physical therapy claims per 
month.  For example, the estimated effect under OLS is an increase of 0.188 claims, 
conditional on the patient having physical therapy utilization during the month.  In 
unreported regressions, I do not find any significant effects of clinic entry on the levels of 
acupuncture and chiropractic utilization. 
I now turn to utilization of care at different sites.  For the number of ER claims 
during the month, the results are sensitive to model specification and are generally not 
significant.  The same issue occurs with the number of inpatient claims during the month.  
While OLS using only observations with 𝑌𝑌 > 0 detects a significant and positive post-
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washout effect, this result is not significant under other OLS specifications and the count 
data models.  Table 14 reports the results for the number of office-based claims during 
the month.  Across the various models, I consistently find that the onsite clinic led to a 
significant increase in the number of office-based claims.  Under ZINB, for example, I 
estimate a 9.8% increase in the CA mean.  Lastly, Table 15 presents the results for 
utilization of outpatient services.  The OLS and count data model results do not agree, so 
it is difficult to determine if clinic entry had a significant effect on the number of 
outpatient claims during the month.        
 To analyze the effect of clinic entry on the amount of monthly spending, I utilize 
a variety of OLS specifications – with both untransformed and natural log transformed 
spending – and GLM.  Difficulty in interpreting the results continues to be an issue, since 
the results can be highly sensitive to model specification.  I first examine spending 
aggregated across all services.  Monthly out-of-pocket spending is one of the few 
spending outcomes that show more consistent results across models.  Table 16 shows 
these results.  Under OLS (using natural logged spending and observations with 𝑌𝑌 > 0) 
and GLM, I find that the worksite clinic led to a statistically significant decline in the 
amount of monthly out-of-pocket spending.  The estimated decline is between 7.4-8.8% 
of the CA mean, so about $13.39  The results are unclear for monthly insurer spending 
and monthly total spending.  For these two outcomes, a significant and negative post-
washout effect is detected only under OLS with natural logged spending and observations 
with 𝑌𝑌 > 0.  For all other OLS specifications and GLM, no significant effects are found.   
                                                 
39 I calculate this based on the mean monthly out-of-pocket spending for patients in CA, conditional on 
having positive OOP spending during the month. 
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 I also examine spending broken out across service categories (e.g. total monthly 
spending on physical therapy or total monthly spending on ER services).  Unfortunately, 
these results tend to be very messy and difficult to interpret.  For instance, estimated 
effects sometimes have contradictory signs across specifications, or they are unbelievably 
large in magnitude.  Interestingly, the results sometimes point in the opposite direction to 
findings obtained when looking at the impact on number of claims.  For example, I find 
strong evidence that, following entry of the worksite clinic, the number of physical 
therapy claims per month increased.  However, my analysis of total monthly spending on 
physical therapy suggests that there were sizeable declines in spending.             
 For my final spending analysis, I utilize quantile regression to estimate the impact 
of clinic entry on monthly total spending.  Quantile regression allows me to capture 
subtleties in the clinic’s effect on spending, as I can estimate the treatment effect at 
different points in the conditional distribution of monthly total spending.  For this 
analysis, I include all observations (i.e. including zeroes).  Table 17 shows the value at 
different quantiles of the monthly total spending distribution.  There are clearly a lot of 
zeroes in the data, as the first nonzero quantile occurs at the 64th percentile.  I perform 
quantile regression within a difference-in-differences framework, utilizing robust 
standard errors.40  Table 18 shows the estimated coefficients at various points in the 
distribution of monthly total spending.  Figure 15 provides a visual representation of 
these results.41  For the two difference-in-difference interaction terms of interest, it plots 
their coefficients over the range of quantiles.  The grey area represents 95% confidence 
intervals for the quantile regression coefficients.  The dashed line is the OLS estimate, 
                                                 
40 More specifically, I estimate equations (1) and (2) using Stata’s qreg command. 
41 I utilize the Stata user-written package grqreg to create these plots. 
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and the dotted lines represent its 95% confidence interval.  The post-washout effect is 
positive and significant between the 70th and 85th percentiles.  For patients at the 75th 
percentile of total monthly spending ($141.40), entry of the worksite clinic is associated 
with a $12.42 increase in total monthly spending during the post-washout period.  
Interestingly, the post-washout effect is significant and negative for the 95th and 99th 
percentiles.  The huge magnitude effect at the 99th percentile is likely driven by a handful 
of observations with extreme spending during the month.  The non-monotonic pattern of 
the coefficients across quantiles is interesting.  This suggests that for low spenders (i.e. 
patients with monthly total spending in the lower nonzero quantiles), entry of the 
worksite clinic led to a small increase in spending.  However, for high spenders, 
introduction of the clinic may have led to a decrease in monthly total spending. 
 
9c. Discussion 
 Overall, the high-level analyses show that entry of the worksite clinic into the 
market of interest did not lead to substantial changes in patient utilization behavior, 
except for specific types of services.  For these services, the extensive margin analyses 
prove to be more insightful than the intensive margin analyses.  I do find evidence that 
the overall likelihood to utilize care increased after clinic introduction, though this effect 
is only weakly significant and very small in magnitude.  Still, this suggests that some 
degree of market expansion occurred, which was the first prediction of my theoretical 
model.  It appears that this market expansion was specifically driven by increases in the 
demand for physical therapy, acupuncture, and office-based services.  These particular 
types of services represent low-severity care that can be delivered by both community-
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based providers and the worksite clinic, and my model predicted that such increases in 
demand might occur.  However, I did not find any significant changes in patient 
likelihood to utilize primary care office visits, which is contrary to my model’s 
prediction.  This is interesting because the worksite clinic’s main appeal to employees is 
that it lowers the time cost for primary care.  There are two potential explanations.  First, 
any effect on primary care utilization may be small in magnitude and concentrated among 
employees who actually use the clinic.  In this case, the effect would not be detected in a 
high-level analysis that includes all patients, regardless of whether or not they are 
employees or even used onsite care.  This is an issue that I address in Chapter 3.  Second, 
non-response to the availability of onsite primary care is certainly possible.  As I 
described in my model, relationship stock has a stronger effect on switching costs for 
primary care than for physical therapy or alternative medicine.  Patients may have 
generally had a strong preference to continue seeing their community-based PCPs, so 
they did not switch to the onsite option.  On the other hand, switching to onsite physical 
therapy and acupuncture was far less costly and therefore took place. 
 Another interesting result is the detected decline in patient likelihood to utilize ER 
and outpatient services.  Taken together with the finding of a significant increase in 
likelihood to utilize office-based care, these results suggest that some business stealing 
may have occurred.  After entry of the worksite clinic, patients may have shifted care 
away from the ER and outpatient settings and towards office-based settings.  Though the 
high-level results for ER, outpatient, and office-based care would be consistent with this 
story, it is important to think about whether this type of substitution is realistic. 
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The ER is able treat a wide range of illness severities, but it is a more appropriate 
and effective site of care for high severity and emergency conditions.  If patients are 
substituting onsite and office-based care for ER services, they must be doing so for low-
severity, uncomplicated conditions.42  However, I find that the increase in office-based 
utilization is primarily driven by increases in demand for physical therapy and 
acupuncture.  It does not seem likely that the types of low-severity conditions that 
patients present to the ER with would be alternatively treated with office-based physical 
therapy or acupuncture.  Instead, such conditions would plausibly be treated with office-
based primary care, but I do not find a significant post-period effect on primary care 
utilization.  Thus, it is a bit hard to argue that a shift from ER-based care to office-based 
care actually occurred.  On the other hand, it is plausible that the detected decline in 
likelihood to utilize outpatient care was offset by the increase in likelihood to utilize 
office-based care.  There is greater overlap in service offerings between outpatient and 
office-based settings.  Since both sites can deliver physical therapy and alternative 
medicine, a shift from outpatient to office-based care is defensible. 
 There are clear limitations to the high-level analyses.  Although entry of the 
worksite clinic did not have wide-spanning effects, I did find significant effects on 
specific sets of services.  It is crucial to study the mechanisms for these detected effects 
and understand which patient groups are driving the results.  There is substantial 
heterogeneity across patients, such as in health status and in adoption of onsite services.  
The high-level analyses are not able to show how clinic introduction impacts behavior 
differentially across patient groups.  I first attempt to address the importance of patient 
                                                 
42 This would be efficiency-improving, as the ER would be left with more complicated cases, for which it 
is the appropriate provider type. 
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heterogeneity by analyzing how clinic entry affected patients with chronic conditions – a 
group that can greatly benefit from increased primary care access.  I then dedicate 
Chapter 3 to a comprehensive analysis of patients who actually adopt the worksite clinic 
as a site of care.  I will compare clinic users to non-users and determine what effects – 
whether predicted in my theoretical model or detected in the high-level analyses – are 
concentrated among clinic users. 
 
10. Chronic Condition Subgroup Analysis 
Patients with chronic conditions are a specific subgroup that might plausibly 
respond to introduction of a new provider that offers primary care, physical therapy, and 
alternative medicine at a lower time cost.  Effective management of chronic conditions is 
crucial to averting acute complications, costly downstream care (e.g. ER visits and 
inpatient hospitalization), and onset of secondary conditions.  Because the onsite clinic 
increases access to care, especially for primary care, patients with chronic conditions 
should theoretically increase their demand for services.  For example, these patients can 
now more easily obtain treatment for symptom flare-ups and attend regular check-ups 
with primary care providers to ensure proper management of their conditions.  I expect to 
see substitution across sites of care as well, as patients move some of their care away 
from community-based settings and towards the more convenient worksite clinic. 
 The following analyses focus just on the subsample of continuously-enrolled 
patients who have been identified as having at least one chronic condition, based on 
diagnoses from their first available year of claims data.  My primary empirical strategy is 
to again estimate equations (1) and (2), but specifically on the subsample of patients with 
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chronic conditions.  Within the difference-in-differences framework, the treated group is 
comprised of CA-based patients with chronic conditions, and the control group is 
comprised of TX-based patients with chronic conditions.  I still include both employees 
and dependents.  Summary Table 4 provides summary statistics for the chronic condition 
subsample.  There are a total of 79,192 patient-month observations for 1,738 unique 
patients in this data set.  Patients and the employees that provide coverage are slightly 
older in CA than in TX.  58.9% of observations in CA and 56.2% of observations in TX 
belong to patients who are employees, so the chronic condition subsample is capturing 
mostly employees. 
 
10a. Extensive Margin Analysis 
 Summary Table 5 presents summary statistics for the extensive margin binary 
outcomes, which measure the likelihood that a chronic condition patient has any claims 
or spending during the month.  Compared to the full continuously-enrolled sample, 
patients with chronic conditions are more likely to use some type of care during the 
month.  They are also more likely to have a primary care office visit claim during the 
month.  This makes sense, since we would expect patients with chronic conditions to 
utilize care more frequently due to their worse underlying health.  I now turn to the 
results from regression analysis. 
I find that clinic entry did not significantly affect the likelihood to have any claim 
during the month (Table 19).  Thus, for patients with chronic conditions, there does not 
appear to be market expansion in terms of overall demand for medical care.  Similarly, I 
do not find any significant post-period effects on the likelihood to utilize primary care.  
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Table 20 shows these results.  This finding is a bit surprising because it runs counter to 
the expectation that patients with chronic conditions would take advantage of increased 
access to primary care.  I provide possible explanations for this in the discussion. 
 It does appear that introduction of the worksite clinic had a significant impact on 
utilization of low-severity care, specifically physical therapy and alternative medicine.  
Table 21 shows that during the post-washout period, the clinic led to a 1.13 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood to utilize physical therapy during the month.  This is a 
14.5% increase from the CA pre-period mean likelihood of 7.80%.  Clinic entry also 
significantly increased the likelihood to utilize acupuncture and chiropractic.  During the 
post-washout period, there was a 1.11 percentage point increase in the likelihood to have 
an acupuncture claim during the month, and a 0.603 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood to have a chiropractic claim during the month.  Tables 22 and 23 show the 
estimated effects on acupuncture and chiropractic utilization, respectively.         
 Entry of the worksite clinic did not have much effect on the utilization of care 
across different sites.  I find no significant post-period effects on either the likelihood to 
have an ER claim during the month (Table 24) or the likelihood to have an inpatient 
claim during the month (Table 25).  Surprisingly, I also do not find any significant post-
period effects on the likelihood to utilize office-based care during the month (Table 26).  
Patients with chronic conditions did not seem to increase their demand for office-based 
services in response to a reduction in the time cost of care.  Availability of the clinic did, 
however, have a significant impact on outpatient utilization (Table 27).  In the post-
washout period, the clinic led to a 1.45 percentage point decline in the likelihood to have 
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an outpatient claim during the month.  This is a 10% decrease relative to the CA pre-
period mean likelihood of 14.5%. 
 Consistent with the finding that entry of the worksite clinic generally had a zero 
effect on utilization, I find no significant post-period effects on a chronic condition 
patient’s likelihood to incur out-of-pocket, insurer, or total spending during the month.  
Table 28 shows the results for total spending across all services. 
 
10b. Intensive Margin Analysis 
 Next, I investigate how introduction of the worksite clinic impacted the levels of 
utilization and spending for patients with chronic conditions.  Summary Table 6a 
provides summary statistics for the number of claims and amount of spending per month, 
using all observations for the chronic condition subgroup.  Summary Table 6b presents 
summary statistics for these same outcomes, but only considering observations where the 
outcome is nonzero. 
To analyze the impact on amount of utilization (i.e. number of claims), I employ a 
variety of OLS specifications and count data models.  The results are messy and can be 
difficult to interpret.  For example, when I analyze the effect on number of physical 
therapy claims per month, OLS conditional on a nonzero outcome yields negative point 
estimates of the treatment effect, while the count data models yield positive point 
estimates.  Also, the post-washout effect on number of physical therapy claims is 
significant under certain OLS specifications but not significant under other OLS models 
or under zero-inflated negative binomial.  Estimated effects can also point in opposite 
directions depending on the model used.  For example, when looking at the impact on 
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number of outpatient claims per month, I find a negative treatment effect when using 
count data models but a positive effect when using OLS.  Despite these confusing results, 
I generally find that entry of the worksite clinic did not significantly impact the amount 
of post-period utilization across different types of services. 
 To analyze the impact on amount of spending, I use several OLS specifications 
and GLM.  Again, the results are messy.  For example, when looking at monthly insurer 
spending and monthly total spending, I find a significant negative post-washout effect 
when using OLS with log-transformed spending.  However, when using GLM, I find a 
significant positive post-washout effect.  It is difficult to reconcile and make sense of 
these findings. 
I should caution that for certain outcomes, such as ER and inpatient utilization, 
some of my tests are underpowered to detect small magnitude effects because I run them 
only on the subset of observations where the outcome is nonzero.  I compensate for this 
by also trying other models that are better suited for highly-skewed data or data with a 
large number of zeroes.  Still, despite trying a variety of models, the regression results for 
utilization and spending can be difficult to interpret.  However, I am able to glean one 
prevailing result: Overall, introduction of the worksite clinic did not appear to 
significantly affect the intensive margin of care for patients with chronic conditions. 
 
10c. Discussion 
 Overall, the extensive and intensive margin analyses reveal that, for patients with 
chronic conditions, entry of the worksite clinic into the market for medical care did not 
significantly change their utilization behavior or associated costs.  This zero effect, 
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particularly on the extensive margin of care, does not support my earlier prediction that 
chronically ill patients would increase their overall demand for medical care.  Market 
expansion for primary care also did not occur, unlike my original expectation.  I did, 
however, find evidence that chronically-ill patients increased their demand for physical 
therapy, acupuncture, and chiropractic services.  At the same time, these patients also 
decreased their demand for outpatient care.   
There are three key takeaways from these findings.  First, it is important to 
understand why patients with chronic conditions might not change their utilization of 
primary care but do increase their use of physical therapy and alternative medicine.  In 
my theoretical model, I presented switching cost as an increasing function of relationship 
stock.  I also claimed that relationship stock has a stronger positive effect on switching 
cost when the patient is seeking primary care, as opposed to lower-severity physical 
therapy and alternative medicine.  The link between switching cost and relationship stock 
can help to explain my empirical findings.  Before the worksite clinic entered the market, 
patients with chronic conditions likely already had an established relationship with a 
community-based primary care physician.  They likely visited their PCP regularly 
regarding management of their conditions.  By seeing the same patient repeatedly over 
time, the physician gained knowledge of the patient’s medical history and understanding 
of the patient’s needs and preferences.  Therefore, when the worksite clinic becomes 
available, chronically-ill patients already have, on average, a high value of relationship 
stock.  This translates into a high switching cost to substitute onsite primary care for 
community-based primary care; these patients then have a low probability of changing 
their site of care or utilization behavior.  On the other hand, relationship stock does not 
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have a strong effect on switching costs for physical therapy and alternative medicine, so 
substitution towards these onsite services occurs at low cost. 
Second, I found in my high-level extensive margin analyses that, following clinic 
introduction, demand increased for physical therapy and acupuncture but decreased for 
outpatient services.  I find these same effects in the chronic condition subgroup.  This 
suggests that chronically-ill patients are a patient group in which those particular high-
level effects are concentrated. 
 Third, while I did find a significant decline in the likelihood that a chronically-ill 
patient utilized outpatient care, I did not find an offsetting effect in another site of care.  
For example, I did not find an offsetting increase in the likelihood to utilize office-based 
care, which I did in the full sample.  It is interesting that I do not see evidence of business 
stealing or substitution across sites of care.  Chronically-ill patients may have reduced 
their utilization of outpatient care in isolation.  However, the more likely result is that my 
analyses are unable to pick up the substitution behavior that did occur.  This would be a 
limitation of my study. 
 While this subgroup analysis on patients with chronic conditions is conceptually 
interesting, I do not find that much occurred.  In the end, the analysis offers only limited 
insight into the mechanisms that might be driving the high-level effects.  The key 
question of whether or not these effects are concentrated among patients who actually 
utilized and adopted the onsite clinic’s services still remains.  I now move onto Chapter 3 
of my dissertation and shift the investigation towards carefully answering that question. 
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CHAPTER 3 – EXPLORATION OF MECHANISMS AND CLINIC UTILIZATION 
 
11. Falsification Test Using Covered Dependents 
 The high-level analyses in Chapter 2 capture the broad effects of clinic 
introduction on the full patient sample, which includes both employees and covered 
dependents.  However, in thinking about how demand might respond to entry of this new 
provider, the distinction between employees and dependents is actually important.  When 
the worksite clinic enters the market, it only lowers the time cost of care for employees, 
since they are on campus daily and in close proximity to the clinic.  The worksite clinic 
should not affect the time cost faced by non-employees.  In other words, for family 
members, the clinic is not a convenient provider option and does not improve their access 
to basic care.43  Therefore, availability of the worksite clinic should not lead to significant 
changes in their utilization patterns or subsequent costs.  To see if this claim holds, I run 
a falsification test on covered spouses and children, checking for any post-period effects 
on the extensive margin of care. 
 I first restrict the data to non-employees.  244,037 patient-month observations 
remain, which represent claims for 3,036 CA-based patients and 2,438 TX-based 
patients.  I then estimate equations (1) and (2), comparing pre- and post-period outcomes 
for CA-based non-employees versus TX-based non-employees. 
 Overall, I find that entry of the worksite clinic did not significantly impact the 
likelihood that CA-based family members utilized care or incurred costs during a given 
                                                 
43 Through their Aetna plans, dependents have coverage for onsite care.  However, they make up less than 
10% of the worksite clinic’s patient volume and primarily utilize physical therapy.  Firm A does not have 
onsite daycare, so it is unlikely that children would already be on campus and have easy access to the 
clinic. 
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month.  This supports the above theory that introduction of the clinic should not affect 
demand for patients who do not experience a reduction in time cost.  While this zero 
effect holds for most of the services that I analyze, I do come across two anomalous 
results.  I find that, during the post-washout period, introduction of the onsite clinic is 
associated with a significant increase in the likelihood to utilize office-based care and a 
significant decrease in the likelihood to utilize outpatient care.  These two effects are 
similar in magnitude, and their statistical significance is robust to inclusion of patient 
fixed effects.44  This suggests that, for family members, there was a decline in outpatient 
utilization that was offset by an increase in office-based utilization.  Under the 
assumption that entry of the worksite clinic should not affect utilization behavior for non-
employees, it is difficult to explain why substitution across these two sites of care may 
have occurred.  I do observe some utilization of onsite physical therapy and alternative 
medicine by covered dependents.  However, it is unlikely that such limited onsite 
utilization by a small group of family members would drive statistically significant 
substitution effects in the overall non-employee sample. 
 As a follow up to the falsification test, I try re-running the extensive margin 
analyses on the sample of employees only.45  These results match those obtained for the 
full sample of continuously-enrolled patients.  This suggests that the detected high-level 
effects are concentrated among employees – a result that makes sense since employees 
are the ones who directly observe a reduction in the time cost of care.  The next step I 
                                                 
44 Under my primary OLS specification, the estimated increase in likelihood to utilize office-based care is 
0.926 percentage points.  The estimated decrease in likelihood to utilize outpatient care is -1.27 percentage 
points.   
45 For this analysis, N = 128,132 patient-months.  This data represents claims for 2,897 unique patients: 
1,710 CA-based employees and 1,187 TX-based employees.  
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take is to thoroughly investigate onsite clinic utilization, focusing on the differences 
between employees who switch to onsite care and employees who never use the clinic. 
 
12. Utilization of the Worksite Clinic 
12a. Onsite Service Utilization 
 General background on the types of services offered by the worksite clinic and its 
operational model are provided in Chapter 1 Subsection 5c.  Included at the end of the 
dissertation, Figure 2 plots the number of onsite claims per month and Figure 3 plots the 
number of patients with an onsite claim each month; both figures depict clinic utilization 
within the full continuously-enrolled patient sample.  These figures provide a broad view 
of what clinic utilization looked like over time.  I now provide a detailed look at the 
specific medical services that patients received and describe their onsite utilization 
patterns over time.    
 To obtain granular detail about onsite clinic utilization, I look at billing item-level 
data for the full continuously-enrolled patient sample.46  I identify a total of 10,119 
billing items that were delivered by the onsite clinic between late-July 2013 and late-June 
2015.  Figure 16 plots the number of onsite billing items, by service category, per month.  
I group the billing items into four service categories: physical therapy (PT), acupuncture, 
chiropractic, and primary care office visit.  Appendix Table A-4 displays all the 
individual services that were billed by the worksite clinic, as well as their associated CPT 
codes and frequencies of occurrence.     
                                                 
46 For this data set, N = 1,097,088 billing items. 
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The clinic saw its first patients on July 29, 2013.  For the three days in July 2013 
that it was open, the clinic provided physical therapy, chiropractic, and primary care 
services to only three patients.  During the first five full months of operation (August 
2013 – December 2013), the Aetna data underreport clinic utilization due to technical 
problems with claims submission.  However, the data still reveal that a high level of 
diagnostic testing took place, especially in September and October 2013.  The motivating 
factor behind this spike in testing in the months immediately following clinic launch was 
Firm A’s rollout of an incentive whereby employees could receive an insurance premium 
discount if they completed a health screening.47  Health screenings were administered for 
free at the onsite clinic, thereby attracting a substantial amount of early business.  The 
typical testing regimen included a lipid panel, glucose blood test, aspartate 
aminotransferase (AST) test, and alanine aminotransferase (ALT) test.  Although there 
was a surge in testing during the first few months of clinic operation, I am unable to see 
onsite testing performed after November 2013.  As I explained previously, processing of 
the clinic’s tests was completely transferred over to Quest Diagnostics, so tests were no 
longer billed under the clinic’s provider ID. 
 Figure 16 and the claims data show that patients primarily visited the onsite clinic 
for physical therapy.  Physical therapy was consistently the most popular service and by a 
substantial margin.  However, the claims data show that the amount of PT utilization 
began to decline after March 2014.  The second most-commonly utilized onsite service 
was primary care office visits.  We see severe underreporting of primary care visits in 
2013, due to the clinic’s technical difficulties with office visit claims submission.  
                                                 
47 The premium discount incentive was offered to employees in 2013 and 2015, but not in 2014.   
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Through 2014 and the first half of 2015, the average number of primary care office visits 
per month was about 43.  After primary care, chiropractic and acupuncture were the third 
and fourth most popular types of services, respectively.48  
 In addition to these four service categories, the worksite clinic also provided 
immunizations and a limited amount of mental health services.  However, the claims data 
do not fully report this utilization.  Immunizations only appear in the data starting in 
October 2014.  While immunizations were administered in the months prior, the clinic 
was operating under a different contract whereby immunization claims were submitted 
elsewhere and not to Aetna.  Onsite mental health claims are underreported across the 
entire time frame.  This is due to an agreement between the clinic and Firm A’s 
leadership to protect mental health care confidentiality.          
 To supplement the Aetna claims data, I also look at the clinic’s proprietary 
scheduling data.  This data provides detailed information on all scheduled appointments 
between July 29, 2013 and June 5, 2015, including the type of care requested, length of 
appointment, and assigned provider.49  The scheduling data is advantageous in that it 
records health screenings, immunizations, lab visits, and behavioral health visits; these 
are services that are either not recorded or underreported in the claims data.  The onsite 
utilization patterns that I see in the claims data are confirmed in the scheduling data.  
Health screenings are the most utilized service, followed by physical therapy sessions.  
Together, these two services make up roughly 40% of scheduled visits.  30-minute 
                                                 
48 Chiropractic and acupuncture were utilized less frequently likely because of the general lack of public 
awareness, acceptance, or taste for alternative medicine. 
49 For this data, N = 23,448.  Each observation is not a visit, but rather a “schedule type.”  For example, a 
single primary care office visit may include three observations: one for a “30-minute visit,” one for an 
“office visit,” and one for a “lab draw.”  
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primary care office visits with the clinic’s physician are the next most utilized service.  
Alternative medicine then trails behind, with very low scheduled use of acupuncture. 
It is interesting that Firm A’s employees see the worksite clinic more as a 
convenient provider of physical therapy, and they utilize onsite primary care to a lesser 
degree.  This was not the original intention of Firm A or the operating vendor, which both 
wanted the clinic to be an attractive primary care provider first.  My theoretical model 
may help to explain employees’ revealed preference to use the clinic for lower-severity 
physical therapy over higher-severity primary care.  Due to the strong effect of 
relationship stock on the switching cost for primary care, many patients may find it too 
costly to switch to onsite primary care.  These patients would prefer to seek care from 
their regular, community-based PCP, for whom they have known information on quality.  
On the other hand, having an existing relationship with a physical therapist does not 
strongly impact the switching cost.  Physical therapy can also be a hassle to schedule into 
one’s work day, making convenience particularly important.  Thus, patients are more 
likely to utilize and switch to onsite physical therapy.  This is anecdotally supported, as 
the operating vendor stated that primary care has been tougher to sell to employees than 
other onsite services. 
 
12b. Identifying Clinic Users and Non-Users 
 Before I can perform any analyses, I must first identify patients who utilize onsite 
clinic services and distinguish them from patients who do not use onsite care.  To capture 
as many patients as possible who adopt onsite services, have exposure to the clinic, or 
switch to using onsite care at some point in time, I form a broad definition of clinic user: 
 
 
79 
 
A clinic user is a patient who has at least one billing item where the servicing provider is 
the worksite clinic.  Conversely, I define a clinic non-user as a patient who does not have 
a billing item for the onsite clinic at any point in time.  This creates a user group with any 
exposure to the onsite clinic and a non-user group with no exposure at all – two very 
distinct groups.  In future work, I plan to create other definitions of users and non-users, 
and I will see if the results are sensitive to this definition.  One idea, for example, is to 
determine whether a patient obtains the majority of their post-period primary care visits 
at the onsite clinic. 
 To create an analytical sample of clinic users and non-users, I start with my full 
sample of continuously-enrolled patients.  After applying my definition of users, I 
identify a total of 654 clinic users.  637 of these users are CA-based patients, while 17 are 
TX-based patients.  Furthermore, of the 637 CA-based clinic users, 581 are employees 
and 56 are spouses or dependents.  I identify 4,109 CA-based patients who are non-users, 
meaning they never utilized the onsite clinic’s services.  Of these CA-based non-users, 
1,082 are employees and 3,027 are spouses or dependents.  This means that roughly 35% 
of my CA-based employee sample actually utilized medical care at the worksite clinic at 
some point in time.  Although these employees were all exposed to the “treatment” of a 
convenient health clinic entering the market and being available to them at the workplace, 
take-up was modest. 
 Following up on this finding, I look more closely at the amount of services 
utilized and the duration of use for CA-based clinic users.  In months where clinic users 
visited the onsite clinic, they most commonly had only one onsite claim during the 
month.  This may be reasonable if the patient is utilizing onsite primary care, since 
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primary care visits tend to be infrequent.  However, it is a bit surprising for patients who 
utilize onsite physical therapy or alternative medicine, since these treatments generally 
recur within a short time span.  I also find that almost half of the 637 CA-based clinic 
users only utilize the clinic for one month and then do not return.  Roughly 16% of these 
users utilize the clinic for two months, and about 10% utilize the clinic for three months.  
This suggests that, over the course of almost two years of post-period data, there is not a 
lot of repeat business for the onsite clinic.  There appears to be a fair number of patients 
who utilize a few onsite services once (e.g. health screening) and then do not return. 
There are several potential explanations for why the clinic’s take-up rate was not 
higher.  First, visiting the clinic requires a 10- to 15-minute walk from the center of Firm 
A’s campus.50  Utilization might be higher if the clinic were situated right in the middle 
of campus.  Second, it is unclear how well Firm A publicizes the availability of the clinic 
to employees.  In September and October 2013, Firm A did a good job of alerting 
employees to the premium discount incentive and free health screenings offered at the 
clinic.  As a result, we see a sharp spike in utilization immediately following clinic 
launch that is driven by testing.  However, this incentive was not offered again in 2014, 
and it is unclear if employees were made aware of the clinic again.  Third, Firm A’s 
employees may, on average, just have a strong preference to seek care at their 
community-based providers.  If sick, some employees may decide to take the day off and 
see their regular PCP, rather than staying at work and visiting the onsite clinic.  Despite 
these factors that may have deterred utilization, it is important to keep in mind that a 
modest number of employees still visited the clinic at some point in time. 
                                                 
50 One complicating factor is that Firm A’s workforce does not have a “walking culture.”  This is unlike 
other high-technology firms with younger employees.  
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13. Impact of Distance on Use of the Worksite Clinic 
13a. Empirical Predictions 
When patients search for a medical provider in the local market, they are attracted 
to the worksite clinic because its offers care at a lower time cost compared to community-
based competitors.  For employees, convenience is the main appeal of employer-based 
health care.  However, it is important to think about heterogeneity across patients in how 
much the worksite clinic actually reduces the time cost of care compared to other 
providers. 
To approach this empirically, we can use the distance that patients travel to obtain 
care as a measure of time cost.  I demonstrated in my literature review that distance to 
provider is a key determinant of a patient’s choice of provider.  In the context of my 
study, patients travel to their provider either from home or work.  Before the worksite 
clinic enters the market, patients choose from available providers in the community.  
They choose a provider based on their individual preference for seeing providers that are 
closer to home or providers that are closer to work.  This preference can differ across 
patients, introducing another form of heterogeneity.  Then the worksite clinic enters the 
market, and it essentially reduces the travel distance between work and provider down to 
zero.  Now the question is whether or not patients will choose to visit the worksite clinic 
for their medical care, or if they will continue to receive care in the community.  The 
answer depends on the relative convenience of the clinic compared to community-based 
providers, while also considering the patient’s underlying preference for providers that 
are close to home or close to work. 
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I now derive a set of empirical predictions for how distance to provider and 
preferences over this distance might affect a patient’s likelihood to utilize the onsite 
clinic.  I focus just on providers that deliver the same set of services that the worksite 
clinic offers, so that the choice of provider is between plausible substitutes.  These 
services are primary care, physical therapy, and alternative medicine (i.e. acupuncture 
and chiropractic). 
Prediction 1: Patients who prefer to see providers that are closer to work should have a 
higher likelihood of utilizing the clinic, compared to patients who prefer to see providers 
that are closer to home. 
The worksite clinic reduces the work-to-provider distance to zero, and this presents the 
highest possible level of convenience to patients who prefer to seek care that is near their 
workplace.  Thus, these patients should be more likely to adopt onsite care. 
 When forming preferences for providers that are closer to home versus closer to 
work, there can be a substantive difference depending on the type of care that is sought.  
It is reasonable to consider primary care separately from physical therapy and alternative 
medicine.  Patients seek primary care for higher-severity conditions, which generally 
occur infrequently, and they may just take the day off to seek treatment and recover.  
Also, the patient’s family members may visit the same primary care physician.  
Therefore, I believe patients are more likely to prefer primary care providers that are 
closer to home.  On the other hand, physical therapy and alternative medicine involve 
low-severity, recurring treatment that can be difficult to fit into one’s work schedule.  A 
priori, I expect that patients are more likely to prefer a physical therapy or alternative 
medicine provider that is closer to work.  This leads to the next set of predictions. 
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Prediction 2: Patients are more likely to prefer a primary care physician that is closer to 
home.  Conversely, patients are more likely to prefer a physical therapy or alternative 
medicine provider that is closer to work. 
Prediction 3: Assume that Prediction 2 holds.  Because it is more important that the 
provider be closer to work for physical therapy and alternative medicine, it is more likely 
that Prediction 1 will hold for these types of care than for primary care. 
 Another important margin to consider is the distance that patients must travel to 
get to work.  If patients live close to work, then providers will be near both home and 
work.  In this case, they may not be able to form distinct preferences for providers that 
are closer to home versus closer to work.  These preferences may matter more as patients 
live farther away from work, since there will be greater variation in differential distance 
to provider.  This leads to my final prediction. 
Prediction 4: Prediction 1 is more likely to hold for patients that live far away from work. 
 
13b. Calculating Distances in the Data 
 Starting with my full sample of continuously-enrolled patients, I cut down the 
data to CA-based employees.  This is the relevant group to study, since employees who 
work on the CA campus have direct access to the worksite clinic and must make a 
decision on where to seek care.  I further restrict the sample to employees who utilized 
primary care, physical therapy, acupuncture, or chiropractic services during the pre-clinic 
period.51  This allows me to observe a patient’s revealed preference for providers that are 
closer to home or closer to work, prior to the worksite clinic entering the market.  For a 
                                                 
51 I accomplish this by making sure that, during the pre-clinic period, each patient has at least one billing 
item for any of the four service categories. 
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given patient, I identify which provider she visited for primary care or which provider she 
visited for physical therapy, acupuncture, or chiropractic.  If the patient saw multiple 
providers during the pre-clinic period, then I identify the provider that she visited closest 
in time to the worksite clinic’s opening (i.e. August 2013).  I am interested in this 
particular provider because I assume that after the clinic opens, the patient chooses 
between staying with the community-based provider she most recently visited or 
switching to the newly-available clinic. 
I then calculate three sets of distances for each patient: home to work, home to 
provider, and work to provider.  In my claims data, I have the patient’s residential ZIP 
code and the servicing provider’s ZIP code.  I also have the ZIP code for Firm A’s 
California campus, and the worksite clinic shares the same ZIP code.  In the economics 
literature, it is common to use the distance between ZIP code centroids.  This distance 
can be calculated using several methods.  One common procedure, as is done in 
Grabowski et al. (2013), is to calculate a great-circle distance between latitude and 
longitude coordinates.  The great-circle distance, which is calculated using a geometric 
formula, is the shortest distance between two points on the surface of a sphere, and it 
measures distance “as the crow flies.”  Another method is to determine the actual driving 
distance between two points, and this can be done by programs that query online 
mapping applications (e.g. Google Maps and Bing Maps).  I could not obtain driving 
distance because all the programs that I tried were rendered nonfunctional by the new, 
more restrictive terms of use for mapping applications.  Instead, I rely on the great-circle 
distance, which is still a good approximation of distance between two geographic points. 
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Calculating great-circle distances proved to be a challenge.  It was not possible to 
directly obtain latitude and longitude coordinates for the centroids of ZIP codes in my 
claims data, again due to the restrictions on mapping programs.  Instead, I utilize NBER’s 
ZIP code distance database, which contains the distance (in miles) between all ZIP Code 
Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) in the United States.  These are great-circle distances between 
ZCTA internal points, calculated using the Haversine formula (which performs well for 
small distances).52  Specifically, I use NBER’s 2015 distance file for ZCTAs that are 
within 100 miles of each other; this file pulls ZCTAs from the 2015 US Census Bureau 
Gazetteer File.53  An additional challenge is that ZIP codes and ZCTAs are not always a 
direct geographic match, and ZCTAs may be comprised of one or more ZIP codes.  To 
convert the ZIP codes in my data to ZCTAs, I utilize the UDS Mapper 2015 ZIP code to 
ZCTA crosswalk.54  In the end, for each patient, I am able to obtain great-circle distances 
from residence ZCTA to servicing provider ZCTA, residence ZCTA to work ZCTA, and 
work ZCTA to servicing provider ZCTA. 
 
13c. Testing Predictions in the Data 
I perform separate analyses for likelihood to use onsite primary care and 
likelihood to use onsite physical therapy or alternative medicine.  Table 29 shows the 
                                                 
52 The US Census Bureau calculates an internal point (in latitude and longitude coordinates) for each 
ZCTA, and this is at or near the geographic center of the ZCTA.  For more information, see 
http://data.nber.org/ distance/internal_point.txt. 
53 I only care about distances that are short, since long distances suggest that something is not right.  
Employees should live fairly close to work and to their providers, so if any of my distances of interest are 
over 100 miles, it suggests that the employee should not be included in the analysis.  Also, using the NBER 
files for distances over 100 miles is too cumbersome due to data size. 
54 The UDS Mapper crosswalk is available at http://udsmapper.org/zcta-crosswalk.cfm.  The US Census 
Bureau does not release an official crosswalk. 
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results for primary care, and Table 30 shows the results for physical therapy and 
alternative medicine.    
I split patients into three groups: prefer a provider that is closer to home, prefer a 
provider that is closer to work, and indifferent.  Patients are categorized as indifferent if 
they live and work in the same ZCTA, so the distance from home to provider equals the 
distance from work to provider.  To assign patients to the other two categories, I do the 
following: For a given patient, I have identified the primary care or physical 
therapy/alternative medicine provider that she visited in the pre-clinic period.  If the 
distance between the patient’s residence and the provider is less than the distance 
between work and the provider, then I label her as preferring a provider that is closer to 
home.  If the distance between the patient’s residence and the provider is greater than the 
distance between work and the provider, then I label her as preferring a provider that is 
closer to work.  In essence, I use the location of the provider, who is chosen before the 
onsite clinic opens, to determine the patient’s preferences. 
 For the patients within each preference group, I separate out patients who use the 
onsite clinic for the service category of interest from those who do not use the clinic for 
that service.55  I then report the percentage of users within each preference group.  I also 
provide the p-value from a two-tailed hypothesis test of whether the proportion of clinic 
users among the “prefer provider closer to home” group equals the proportion of users 
among the “prefer provider closer to work” group.  I perform this analysis for patients 
who live all distances away from work, and then I repeat it for patients who live ≤10 
                                                 
55 A patient is classified as a clinic user if she has at least one billing item for the service category of 
interest with the onsite clinic as the servicing provider.  A patient is classified as a non-user if she has no 
onsite billing items for the service category of interest. 
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miles from work and patients who live >10 miles from work.  I do this to test if 
preferences matter more when patients live farther away from Firm A’s campus. 
 For both primary care and physical therapy/alternative medicine, there is no 
significant difference in the percentage of clinic users between the two preference groups.  
Even when I separate patients according to how far they live from work, I do not find a 
significant difference for either the >10 miles group or the ≤10 miles group.  Prediction 1 
does not hold; in no case is the propensity to utilize the clinic significantly higher for the 
“prefer provider closer to work” group.  In fact, for both service categories, there is a 
higher raw percentage of clinic users among patients who prefer a provider that is closer 
to home.  The only exception is for patients who live more than 10 miles from work and 
are using primary care.  In this case, there is a higher percentage of clinic users among 
the “prefer PCP closer to work” group, but the difference is not significant.   
 Predictions 3 and 4 also do not hold.  For both primary care and physical 
therapy/alternative medicine, I do not find that preferences over provider location 
significantly affect propensity to utilize onsite care.  Also, regardless of whether the 
patient lives close to or far from work, I find no significant difference in propensity to use 
the clinic. 
Prediction 2 does hold when based on the raw numbers of patients that are sorted 
into each group.  For primary care, more patients prefer a PCP that is closer to home, and 
this holds regardless of how far the patient lives from work.  For physical therapy and 
alternative medicine, the numbers are close.  When looking at patients who live more 
than 10 miles from work, a larger number prefer a provider that is closer to work. 
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13d. Discussion 
 In my empirical setting, distance to provider does not appear to be a useful 
predictor of propensity to use the worksite clinic.  For employees who prefer to see a 
medical provider that is closer to their workplace, the onsite clinic offers a high level of 
convenience and large reductions in time and travel costs.  A priori, we expect that these 
employees will benefit from and take advantage of the clinic’s availability.  However, I 
do not find that these patients are more likely to utilize the onsite clinic for any of its 
offered services.  In summary, patients who used to visit providers close to work and 
patients who used to visit providers close to home respond similarly to the clinic opening; 
they do not differ in their propensity to utilize onsite care.   
 There are several potential reasons for why, in this exercise, distance is not a 
significant predictor of onsite utilization.  Admittedly, the distance measures that I 
calculate are noisy.  Distance by road would provide a more realistic measure of the 
patient’s travel cost.  More importantly, I am unable to observe certain aspects of 
provider choice that are related to distance.  For example, I cannot observe the paths that 
people take to get to various places.  A patient may visit a particular provider not because 
he is near home or work, but because he is conveniently on the way to work, to a 
spouse’s workplace, or to a child’s school.  Another explanation is tied to the fact that 
Firm A’s CA-based employees live and work in an urban area with a high density of 
providers.  The differential distance to a provider from home versus work may not be that 
large to begin with, meaning preferences for provider location do not really matter.  
Lastly, the theory behind my analysis assumes that people follow a systematic decision-
making process when choosing a provider.  Patients calculate distances to providers, form 
 
 
89 
 
preferences over these distances, compare providers on distance, and then minimize their 
time and travel costs.  In reality, the process of choosing a provider may not be so 
mechanistic. 
 
14. Evidence of the Two-Period Model for Clinic Utilization 
In this section, I investigate the timing of onsite clinic utilization for different 
types of services.  As I describe in my theoretical model, assume that a patient utilizes the 
worksite clinic for low-severity care during an earlier time period.  She bears the 
switching cost associated with utilizing the clinic for this care and substituting away from 
community-based providers.  In a later time period, she must choose a provider for 
higher-severity primary care.  Because she has already born part of the switching cost, 
she is more likely to switch to and utilize onsite primary care.  I therefore predict that the 
most likely sequence of onsite adoption is low-severity care first and primary care second 
(see Prediction 5 of my theoretical model).   
Patients can utilize the onsite clinic for primary care, physical therapy, 
acupuncture, chiropractic, and other basic office-based services.  My theory is that 
patients are likely to first utilize the clinic for simple, low-severity care (physical therapy, 
alternative medicine, immunizations, and testing).  After having this initial exposure to 
the clinic, patients gain familiarity and comfort with the onsite providers and facility.  It 
then becomes more likely that they will return to try onsite primary care, which involves 
more intensive treatment, at a later time. 
I use the claims data to test my empirical prediction.  I start off with billing-item 
level data for the full sample of continuously-enrolled patients.  I then restrict the sample 
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to patients who utilized both onsite primary care and onsite low-severity care (physical 
therapy, acupuncture, chiropractic, immunizations, or testing).  The final sample contains 
185 patients.56  For each patient, I identify the date on which she first utilized the 
worksite clinic for low-severity care.  I also identify the date on which she first utilized 
onsite primary care.  To compare the timing of utilization for these two types of care, I 
plot each patient’s date of first onsite low-severity care use against her date of first onsite 
primary care use.  Figure 17a shows the results using the exact dates of first utilization.  
First use of low-severity care is plotted on the y-axis and first use of primary care is 
plotted on the x-axis.  Patients who fall on the 45-degree line utilized onsite low-severity 
care and onsite primary care on the same date.  The majority of patients clearly lie below 
the 45-degree line, indicating that onsite primary care utilization came after the patients 
had already utilized the clinic for low-severity services.  The table below Figure 17a 
shows how many patients fall above, on, and below the 45-degree line.  60% of my 
sample utilized the clinic for low-severity care first and primary care later on.  I also 
calculate the average difference (in days) between the date of first onsite primary care use 
and date of first onsite low-severity care use.  The average difference is 207 days, or 
roughly seven months.  Figure 17b shows that I obtain the same results when using 
months of first utilization, rather than exact dates. 
 The empirical evidence in figures 17a and 17b supports Prediction 5 and my two-
period model.  It appears that a timing story does occur.  Patients first utilize the onsite 
clinic for low-severity care and are channeled into onsite primary care later on.  This 
                                                 
56 Of the 185 patients, 174 are employees, 2 are child dependents, and 9 are spouses.  There are also 2 TX-
based patients that utilized the clinic for both types of care. 
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bolsters the argument that first using the clinic for other types of care lowers the 
switching cost for onsite primary care, thereby facilitating patients to make this switch. 
 It is interesting that the average lag time between first use of low-severity care 
and first use of primary care is nearly seven months.  There are a few potential 
explanations for this seemingly long delay.  Between August 2013 and December 2013, 
there was severe underreporting of onsite primary care office visits.  The clinic 
experienced technical problems with claims submission, and many visits are missing 
from the data.  It is possible that patients visited the clinic right after launch for simple 
care, such as a health screening, and returned for primary care before the end of 2013.  
However, there is a high likelihood that these visits are missing from the data.  Since 
primary care is utilized infrequently, I may not catch their date of first onsite primary care 
use until much later on.  This mechanism would introduce upward bias in the average lag 
time.  I currently do not know if such a story occurs, or how common it might be.  In 
future work, I may be able to use the clinic’s proprietary scheduling data to shed light on 
this issue.  Another possible explanation is that patients experience greater inertia when it 
comes to changing primary care providers.  This relates to the idea that relationship stock 
has a greater impact on switching cost for primary care.  Patients prefer to see their 
community-based PCP, with whom they have an established relationship, for higher-
severity care.  Thus, it may take repeated interaction with the clinic over time before 
patients are willing to try onsite primary care. 
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15. Regression Analysis – CA Clinic Users vs. TX Non-Users 
 I now turn to a series of regression analyses that compare pre-post changes in 
outcomes between CA-based employees who adopt the onsite clinic’s services and TX-
based employees.  These difference-in-differences analyses will reveal whether the high-
level effects detected in Chapter 2 are concentrated among clinic users, which would 
suggest that the mechanism for those effects is utilization of the onsite clinic. 
CA-based employees have the option of using the worksite clinic for basic 
medical care, since the clinic is available to them on campus.  These employees self-
select into using onsite care.  In other words, the decision of whether or not to utilize the 
clinic is endogenous.  Thus, a comparison of CA-based employees who use the clinic to 
their officemates who never visit the clinic is potentially biased.  It is not entirely clear 
how to sign this bias, a priori.  Still, I circumvent this potential source of endogeneity by 
using TX-based employees to construct a control group.  Throughout the study time 
frame, TX-based employees do not have access to a worksite clinic on their campus, so 
their status as non-users of the CA clinic is not by choice. 
To construct my analytical sample, I start with the full sample of continuously-
enrolled patients.  I then restrict the sample to employees only, since this the relevant 
population for which the worksite clinic can reduce the time cost of care.  I identify CA-
based employees who have at least one billing item where the servicing provider is the 
worksite clinic.  These patients form my CA clinic user (or treatment) group.  I then 
identify TX-based employees who never utilized the onsite clinic; this is not all TX-based 
employees, since a small number did utilize onsite care, likely when they were on a 
business trip to the CA campus.  I additionally require that TX non-users have at least 
 
 
93 
 
one claim in the post-clinic period for primary care, physical therapy, acupuncture, 
chiropractic, or office-based care.  I do this to counteract the mechanical relationship that 
exists between a patient being a CA clinic user and particular extensive margin outcomes 
necessarily equaling one in the post-clinic period.  Because a clinic user will have at least 
one claim for onsite care, she will then have at least one post-period claim for a service 
that the clinic offers.  I counteract this effect by requiring non-users to also have at least 
one post-period claim for any of the services provided by the clinic.  TX-based 
employees who satisfy the aforementioned criteria form my TX non-user (or control) 
group.   
 I first perform a set of analyses on the full sample of CA clinic users and TX non-
users.  The full sample contains 581 users and 1,139 non-users.  I then perform a second 
set of analyses on a matched subsample of CA clinic users and TX non-users.  I utilize 
coarsened exact matching on the patient’s age, gender, chronic condition status, and 
various pre-period spending measures to create this matched subsample, which contains 
399 users and 967 non-users.  The second set of analyses provides a robust difference-in-
difference on a subsample of patients that have similar demographics and spending 
patterns in the pre-clinic period.  Finally, I thoroughly discuss the results from these 
analyses. 
  
15a. Full Sample Analysis 
15a i. Summary Statistics and Graphs 
 The analytical data set for the full sample of CA clinic users and TX non-users 
contains 77,379 patient-months, representing utilization for 581 users and 1,139 non-
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users.  Summary Table 7 provides summary statistics for patient characteristics.  The 
average patient age for both CA users and TX non-users is 45 years old, and there is a 
fairly high prevalence of chronic conditions among both groups.  This is consistent with 
Firm A’s older workforce demographic.  TX non-users are substantially more likely to be 
male. 
 Figure 18a plots the total number of claims per month for CA clinic users and TX 
non-users.  I further break out CA users’ claims into offsite and total claims, so that the 
area in between represents onsite utilization.  For clinic users, onsite utilization drives a 
clear spike in the total number of claims immediately following clinic opening.  The two 
groups’ trends in overall utilization track each other well during the pre-clinic period, as 
well as from mid-2014 onward.  Figure 19a plots total spending (across all services) per 
month.  The trend lines for both groups are noisy.  For CA clinic users, the sharp spike in 
October 2012 is due to extreme levels of spending by three patients; during that month, 
one patient had a high level of inpatient spending, and two patients had high levels of 
outpatient spending.  These three patients are removed when I perform my matched 
subsample analysis.  Figures 20a and 21a show primary care utilization and spending per 
month, respectively.  In the plot of primary care claims per month, there are times when 
the trends for CA users and TX non-users track each other (e.g. mid-2014 onward).  The 
plot of monthly primary care spending is fairly noisy.  Figures 22a and 23a display 
physical therapy utilization and spending per month, respectively.  In Figure 22a, we see 
a large increase in the number of PT claims per month after clinic opening.  Interestingly, 
an accompanying rise in monthly PT spending is not seen during that time period.  Other 
than an anomalous spike in late-2011, PT spending for CA users looks fairly stable over 
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time, as does spending for TX non-users.  Monthly utilization and spending for 
acupuncture are plotted in Figures 24a and 25a, respectively.  Throughout the entire study 
period, acupuncture is sparingly used by TX-based patients.  For CA-based patients, 
acupuncture utilization and spending peak during the washout period and then decline 
over the post-washout period.  Figures 26a and 27a display monthly chiropractic 
utilization and spending, respectively.  Both graphs are noisy, and it is difficult to tell if 
any differential effect occurs during the post-clinic period. 
 I then plot monthly utilization and spending for care at different sites.  Monthly 
ER utilization and spending are shown in figures 28a and 29a, respectively.  For both CA 
users and TX non-users, there is substantial inter-month fluctuation in the levels of ER 
use and spending.  Similarly, monthly inpatient hospital utilization (Figure 30a) and 
spending (Figure 31a) are noisy.  In Figure 31a, we see several sharp spikes for both 
clinic users and non-users; these occur when a few patients have unusually high levels of 
inpatient spending during those months.  For example, a single CA clinic user had 43 
claims and nearly $290,000 of inpatient spending in October 2012.  Patients with 
abnormally high pre-period inpatient spending are removed when forming my matched 
subsample (see Figure 31b).  Figures 32a and 33a plot monthly office-based utilization 
and spending, respectively.  The pre-period trends look similar across CA users and TX 
non-users.  CA users experience a sharp increase in the number of office-based claims 
immediately following clinic launch.  This is due to the large number of tests and health 
screenings that CA-based employees utilized in response to Firm A’s premium discount 
incentive.  These services were offered for free at the worksite clinic, which is why we do 
not see an accompanying surge in office-based spending during the washout period (see 
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Figure 33a).  Finally, figures 34a and 35a show monthly outpatient utilization and 
spending, respectively.  The CA user and TX non-user trend lines for number of 
outpatient claims per month track each other fairly well over the full time frame; it is 
difficult to tell if there is a differential post-clinic effect.  Figure 35a shows that monthly 
outpatient spending is noisy for both groups.  For CA users, the tallest spike occurs in 
October 2012, when two patients each incurred over $100,000 in outpatient spending.  
These patients are dropped from my matched subsample, as can be seen in Figure 35b.                 
 
15a ii. Extensive Margin Analysis  
 Utilizing my full sample of CA clinic users and TX non-users, I now investigate 
how entry of the worksite clinic into the market impacted the extensive margin of care for 
users.  Summary Table 8 provides summary statistics for the outcomes of interest.  These 
binary outcomes measure the likelihood that, during a given month, a patient had any 
utilization or spending for various types of care.  In Summary Table 8, two particular pre-
post changes stand out: For CA clinic users, the likelihood to have any claims in the 
month increased by over eight percentage points, and the likelihood to have any spending 
during the month increased by over seven percentage points.  While patients in TX also 
experienced increases in these average likelihoods, the changes were much smaller in 
magnitude.  Thus, the raw averages suggest that utilization of the clinic may have led to 
an increase in the overall demand for medical care.   
I perform difference-in-differences analyses to more rigorously determine what 
the effects of clinic entry actually were.  Referring back to my empirical strategy in 
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Chapter 1 Section 7, I estimate equations (1) and (2) with some conceptual changes.57  
The treated group is now CA-based employees who utilize and adopt the onsite clinic’s 
services, rather than all CA-based patients.  The control group is TX-based employees 
who never utilize the onsite clinic, rather than all TX-based patients.  Thus, the CA state 
indicator in equations (1) and (2) now becomes an indicator for the patient being a CA 
clinic user. 
 I first analyze the impact of clinic entry on a patient’s overall likelihood to utilize 
care.  Table 31 reports these results.  I find strong evidence that utilization of the clinic 
led to a significant increase in a patient’s likelihood to have any claims during the month.  
More specifically, during the post-washout period, the clinic led to a 4.61 percentage 
point increase in likelihood; this is a 12.4% increase relative to the pre-period mean 
likelihood for CA clinic users (37.2%).  Similarly, during the post-washout period, the 
average likelihood to incur any spending during the month significantly increased by 4.66 
percentage points.   This is roughly a 12.7% increase relative to the pre-period mean for 
CA clinic users (36.8%).  These results suggest that adoption of the onsite clinic is the 
mechanism driving the broader finding of market expansion (i.e. increased demand for 
medical care).  Prediction 1 from my theoretical model is supported. 
 I then investigate the impact on utilization and spending for services that can be 
delivered by both the worksite clinic and community-based providers.  Table 32 shows 
the results for primary care office visits.  I find significant positive effects on both the 
likelihood to have primary care utilization and the likelihood to have primary care 
spending during the month.  In the post-washout period, the clinic led to a 2.47 
                                                 
57 The indicator for the patient being an employee is dropped, since all patients in my current sample are 
employees. 
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percentage point increase in the likelihood to have primary care claims during the month.  
This is a 12.3% increase relative to the pre-period mean likelihood of 20.1% among clinic 
users.  As expected, clinic utilization led to a similarly-sized effect on likelihood to have 
any monthly primary care spending.  Turning to lower-severity forms of care, I also 
detect significant and positive post-period effects on physical therapy utilization.  Table 
33 presents these results.  During the post-washout period, the clinic led to a 2.37 
percentage point increase in the likelihood to have any PT claims during the month and a 
2.59 percentage point increase in the likelihood to have any PT spending during the 
month.  These effects are increases of roughly 20% of their respective pre-clinic means 
among CA clinic users.  There was also a significant and positive post-period effect on 
acupuncture utilization (Table 34).  I estimate that, during the post-washout period, the 
clinic led to a 1.91 percentage point increase in the likelihood to have any acupuncture 
claims during the month.  This is a 34.6% increase from the pre-clinic mean likelihood 
among CA clinic users (5.52%).  As expected, the impact on acupuncture spending is 
very similar in magnitude.  Finally, I do not find any significant effects on chiropractic 
utilization and spending.  This is the only service type that is offered by both the worksite 
clinic and community-based providers where I do not see a significant post-period effect.  
Thus, Prediction 2 does not hold for chiropractic.  However, it does appear to hold for 
primary care, physical therapy, and acupuncture; these are services where I do find 
evidence of significant increases in demand.     
 Next, I look at the impact on utilization and spending across different sites of 
care.  I do not find any significant effects on a patient’s likelihood to have ER claims or 
spending during the month (Table 36).  There does not appear to be substitution of care 
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away from the ER.  Interestingly, I find significant increases in the likelihood to have any 
inpatient utilization and any inpatient spending (Table 37).  I estimate that, in the post-
washout period, the likelihood to have any inpatient claims during the month increased 
by 0.219 percentage point.  This would constitute a large increase relative to the pre-
period mean, since inpatient utilization is a rare occurrence.  It is not easy to reconcile 
this result with my high-level analyses, where I do not find any significant effects on 
inpatient utilization.  Table 38 shows the results for office-based utilization and spending.  
In the post-washout period, the clinic led to a statistically significant 5.23 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood to have office-based utilization during the month.  This 
constitutes a 14.9% increase from the pre-period mean likelihood among CA clinic users 
(35.0%).  Again, the impact on likelihood to incur office-based spending is significant 
and very similar in magnitude.  Lastly, Table 39 presents the results for outpatient 
utilization and spending.  I find significant and negative post-period effects on both 
measures.  In the post-washout period, clinic adoption is associated with a 1.89 
percentage point decline in the average likelihood to have any outpatient claims during 
the month.  This is a roughly 19% decline from the pre-period mean likelihood among 
clinic users (9.96%).  Taken together, these results suggest that the decline in outpatient 
utilization was offset by increases in office-based and inpatient utilization.  The story of 
substitution across sites of care, which was presented in Prediction 3, makes sense if 
clinic users replaced outpatient care with office-based services.  However, the increase in 
likelihood to utilize inpatient care is difficult to explain under business stealing.  I will 
return to this issue in my discussion section. 
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 For all extensive margin analyses, I check the robustness of my results to model 
specification.  I rerun the primary LPM specification and include patient fixed effects.  I 
also try a probit model and estimate marginal effects.  In the end, I obtain very similar 
results under these alternate model specifications. 
 
15a iii. Intensive Margin Analysis 
 Next, I investigate how adoption of the onsite clinic’s services affected the 
intensive margin of utilization and spending for various types of care.  In Summary Table 
9a, I present summary statistics for the utilization and spending outcomes that I analyze, 
considering all observations (i.e. including zeroes).  Summary Table 9b then displays the 
summary statistics conditional on the particular outcome being positive.   
For each outcome, I utilize a variety of statistical methods to try to understand 
what effects are occurring.  To estimate the impact of clinic utilization on the number of 
claims, I employ several OLS specifications, as well as negative binomial and zero-
inflated negative binomial models.  To estimate the effect on amount of spending, I run 
OLS on both untransformed and log-transformed spending, and I also try GLM.  Lastly, I 
use quantile regression to estimate the impact of clinic utilization at different points in the 
total spending distribution.   For more detail on these methods, please see my empirical 
strategy section (Chapter 1 Subsection 7c). 
 Again, I warn that these regression results can be sensitive to the choices of model 
and included observations.  This is especially the case when analyzing spending 
measures.  I collectively consider the results from all models to arrive at the conclusions 
discussed below.  For brevity, I only report the results from select models in my included 
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tables; additional results are available upon request.  For utilization measures, I report the 
results from one OLS specification (the impact on 𝑌𝑌, conditional on 𝑌𝑌 > 0) and one 
count data model (zero-inflated negative binomial or ZINB).  For spending measures, I 
report the results from one OLS specification (the impact on ln (𝑌𝑌), conditional on 𝑌𝑌 > 0) 
and GLM.  For types of care that are rarely utilized, regressions that only include the 
subset of observations where the outcome is positive are likely underpowered.  I run into 
this problem for ER and inpatient care. 
 I begin by looking at utilization and spending for services that can be delivered by 
both the worksite clinic and community-based providers.  Table 40 presents the results 
for primary care utilization.  Across both reported and unreported models, I consistently 
find that clinic adoption led to a significant increase in the number of primary care office 
visit claims per month.  For example, under ZINB, I estimate that the average number of 
primary care claims per month increased by 16.1% during the post-washout period; this 
amounts to an increase of about 0.05 claim per month, based off the pre-period mean 
number of primary care claims among CA clinic users.  Table 41 shows the results for 
total monthly spending on primary care visits, which are sensitive to model choice.  
Using OLS and a log-transformed outcome, I estimate that primary care spending 
significantly decreased by 9.4% during the post-washout period.  However, under GLM, 
the point estimates are positive and not statistically significant.  It is difficult to ascertain 
what effects are actually manifesting.  A significant decline in monthly primary care 
spending seems unlikely though, since I find consistent evidence that clinic entry led to 
an increase in utilization; this would only occur if the unit price for a primary care office 
visit dropped dramatically during the post-period, which I do not believe was the case. 
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 Tables 42 and 43 present the results for physical therapy utilization and spending, 
respectively.  I find that clinic use led to a significant increase in PT utilization, though 
the evidence is only stronger under count data models.  For example, under ZINB, I 
estimate that the average number of PT claims per month increased by 25.1% (≈ 0.09 
claim) during the post-washout period.  The effect on total monthly spending for PT is 
ambiguous.  I detect a significant decline in spending under OLS, conditional on the 
patient having nonzero utilization during the month.  However, the results are not 
statistically significant under GLM, even under the severely downward-biased clustered 
standard errors.  
 The results for acupuncture are ambiguous (Table 44 and Table 45).  Under OLS 
specifications, I find no significant post-period effects on the number of acupuncture 
claims per month.  However, under ZINB, I detect a large-magnitude, significant increase 
during the post-washout period; the estimated increase is 170% from the pre-period mean 
among CA clinic users, which is 0.186 claim per month.  For monthly spending on 
acupuncture, I find no significant post-washout effect when using OLS.  However, under 
GLM, I find that clinic utilization led to a 347% increase in spending, which is significant 
at the 1% level.  For both level of utilization and amount of spending, it is not clear how 
to reconcile the results between OLS and alternate models.  Interestingly, the count data 
model and GLM results are consistent.  Even though these models yield results that are 
surprisingly large in magnitude, they might not be too unreasonable.  For example, if a 
patient took advantage of the clinic’s convenience and increased acupuncture usage from 
one to three times a month, it would reflect very large magnitude increases in utilization 
and spending.  
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 Tables 46 and 47 show the results for chiropractic utilization and spending, 
respectively.  I find that clinic utilization did not significantly affect the average number 
of chiropractic claims per month.  Interestingly, I find consistent evidence across models 
that clinic use led a significant decline in the amount of monthly spending on 
chiropractic.  Thus, while I did not find an effect on the level of chiropractic utilization, I 
detected declines in the amount of chiropractic spending.  This suggests that the unit 
price of chiropractic care dropped during the post-washout period.   
 Next, I examine the intensive margin results for care obtained at different sites.  
Tables 48 and 49 show the results for ER-based care.  I find that clinic utilization had no 
significant effect on either the number of ER claims or the amount of ER spending per 
month.  The OLS specifications are likely underpowered to detect small-magnitude 
effects.  However, even under alternate models that use the full set of observations, I still 
do not detect any significant effects.  Tables 50 and 51 present the results for inpatient 
hospital care.  For both inpatient utilization and spending, OLS specifications that 
condition on the patient having some inpatient use during the month are underpowered.  
Thus, I focus on the results obtained under alternate models.  I find weak evidence that, 
during the post-washout period, clinic utilization led to a significant increase in the 
number of inpatient claims per month.  Similarly, there is some evidence that monthly 
inpatient spending increased during the post-washout period.  If these effects are indeed 
present, they would be consistent with my earlier finding of a small magnitude increase 
in the likelihood to utilize inpatient care. 
  Tables 52 and 53 present the results for office-based utilization and spending, 
respectively.  Across the various models, I find consistent evidence that clinic utilization 
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led to a significant increase in the number of office-based claims per month.  For 
example, under OLS and conditional on the patient having office-based utilization during 
the month, the estimated increase is 0.226 claim.  The clinic’s impact on office-based 
spending, on the other hand, is not straightforward to interpret.  Under OLS, I detect a 
significant 18% decline in monthly spending during the post-washout period.  Under 
GLM, however, the point estimate of this effect is positive and not statistically 
significant.  While it is not clear which set of results to follow, it is harder to make the 
case that office-based spending declined when I find strong evidence that utilization 
concurrently increased.   
I then examine the clinic’s impact on outpatient utilization and spending.  As 
Table 54 shows, the results for outpatient care use are sensitive to model specification.  I 
find no significant post-period effects when using OLS, but I do find significant effects 
under count data models.  For example, under ZINB, I estimate that onsite clinic adoption 
led to a 21% decline in the average number of outpatient claims per month.  I do not, 
however, find an accompanying decline in spending (Table 55).  Regardless of the model 
that I utilize, I do not find that clinic adoption led to a significant change in the amount of 
monthly spending on outpatient care. 
Finally, I analyze how clinic adoption impacted the total number of claims and 
total amount of spending across all services.  Interestingly, when running OLS 
conditional on the patient having nonzero utilization, I find that using the clinic did not 
lead to a significant post-washout effect on the total number of claims per month (Table 
56).  This effect is only significant under count data models.  When using ZINB, I 
estimate that the average number of claims per month increased by 13.8% (≈ 0.18 claim) 
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during the post-washout period, and this effect is significant at the 1% level.  The effects 
on total monthly spending also are not consistent across models (Table 57).  When using 
GLM, I obtain a positive but statistically insignificant point estimate of the post-washout 
effect.  However, when using OLS, I find a strongly significant, negative post-washout 
effect; the estimated effect is a 19.8% decline in average monthly total spending.  This 
finding under OLS is a bit surprising, and it is difficult to reconcile with my earlier 
findings that the likelihood of having any utilization and likelihood of having any 
spending during the month both increased significantly. 
To gain a better understanding of what effects on total spending might be 
occurring, I try quantile regression within a difference-in-differences framework.  In 
Table 58, I outline what the distribution of total monthly spending looks like.  For the 
sample of CA users and TX non-users, there are a lot of months with zero spending; the 
first nonzero quantile does not occur until the 63rd percentile.  I perform quantile 
regression with robust standard errors, and I present the estimated coefficients in Table 
59.  Figure 36 provides a visual representation of these coefficients.  The post-washout 
effect is positive and significant for patients with monthly total spending between the 63rd 
and 75th percentiles.  For example, for patients with monthly spending at the 75th 
percentile of the distribution ($140), clinic utilization is associated with a $20.83 increase 
in monthly total spending during the post-washout period.  The estimated post-washout 
effects are not significant once we move beyond the 75th percentile of monthly spending.  
Thus, it seems like the clinic did not have a significant impact on spending for patients 
who normally utilize a lot of care or expensive care.  However, for lower-spending 
patients, clinic adoption led to a small magnitude increase in monthly total spending.  
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What might be a story that can explain this increase in spending?  These lower-spending 
patients are probably healthier and generally utilize a small amount of care.  However, 
once the onsite provider option becomes available, they can conveniently visit the clinic 
and increase their consumption of low-severity care (e.g. primary care checkups or 
physical therapy sessions).  Such behavior is consistent with what I observe empirically, 
and it would drive a small increase in monthly total spending for these low-spending, 
CA-based clinic users.  Overall, the quantile regression results align better with my 
findings on the extensive margin of care, unlike my earlier OLS finding of a negative 
effect on spending. 
 
15b. Matched Subsample Analysis 
 So far, the analyses in Chapter 3 have compared pre-post changes in outcomes 
between all CA-based clinic users and all TX-based non-users that satisfy my inclusion 
criteria.  I did not require that included patients look similar on specific observable 
characteristics.  In my difference-in-differences analyses, I only relied on the average 
change in outcomes for TX non-users to correctly represent the counterfactual change for 
CA clinic users.  The obtained results are central to my understanding of how market 
entry by the worksite clinic impacted employees’ care utilization patterns and costs.  
Thus, it is important to check the robustness of these results.  In this subsection, I rerun 
the analyses on a matched subsample of patients.  I match CA clinic users to TX non-
users on available demographics and various measures of pre-period spending.  I then run 
robust difference-in-differences analyses using the newly-constructed treated and control 
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groups, which look more similar on observables.  Lastly, I discuss how the results from 
this matched subsample analysis clarify my earlier findings. 
 
15b i. The Impact of Matching 
I utilize coarsened exact matching (CEM) to produce a matched subsample of CA 
clinic users and TX non-users.  Blackwell, Iacus, King, and Porro (2009) provide 
background on CEM and its implementation in Stata.  CEM, which is a monotonic 
imbalance bounding method, reduces the imbalance in covariates between the treated and 
control groups.  I choose CEM because it has attractive statistical properties (e.g. less 
reliance on modeling assumptions) and is computationally efficient, even when run on a 
large data set. 
 To perform the matching procedure, I start with my full sample of CA-based 
employees who are clinic users and TX-based employees who have never utilized the 
clinic.  I create a patient-level data set that contains available demographic characteristics 
and measures of spending during the pre-clinic period, which proxy for underlying 
health.  I then use CEM to match CA clinic users and TX non-users on gender, age, 
chronic condition status, and total spending during the pre-period on all services, primary 
care, physical therapy, acupuncture, chiropractic, ER care, inpatient care, office-based 
care, and outpatient care.  I match on spending rather than number of claims because I 
feel that spending better captures the intensity of medical resource utilization.58  CEM 
sorts treated and control units into strata based on coarsened values of their matching 
variables, and it drops strata that do not contain at least one treated and one control unit.  
                                                 
58 I tried numerous iterations of the matching procedure before deciding which covariates were best to 
match on. 
 
 
108 
 
Because CEM cuts both treated and control units, the upcoming regression analyses 
specifically measure the treatment effect in the matched subsample.  After running CEM, 
I obtain a matched subsample of 399 CA clinic users and 967 TX non-users.  A total of 
1,366 patients are matched, down from the 1,720 patients that made up my full sample.  
Lastly, I create a patient-month level analytical data set for the matched subsample.  For 
this data set, N = 60,450 patient-months (17,232 observations for CA clinic users and 
43,218 observations for TX non-users). 
 For the covariates that I match on, Table 60 compares patient-level means 
between CA clinic users and TX non-users.  I also provide the t-stat and p-value from a 
two-tailed hypothesis test of the mean for CA clinic users equaling the mean for TX non-
users.  I present the comparisons before and after matching.  Before matching, the means 
for numerous covariates are significantly different between CA clinic users and TX non-
users.  After running CEM, several of these differences are no longer significant at the 
5% level.  Specifically, CA clinic users and TX non-users in the matched subsample no 
longer differ significantly on mean likelihood to have a chronic condition, pre-period 
total spending on all services, pre-period total spending on chiropractic, and pre-period 
total spending on outpatient care.  While CEM is not able to eliminate all significant 
differences in covariate means between the treated and control groups, Table 60 shows 
that it still does a decent job. 
 The effects of matching are also evident in graphs that compare trends in 
outcomes over time between CA clinic users and TX non-users.  Figures 18b through 35b 
plot my outcomes of interest for the matched subsample.  For comparison, the 
corresponding graph for the full sample of CA users and TX non-users is displayed 
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above.  Figure 19b shows that, after matching, the treated and control groups have fairly 
similar levels of total spending during the pre-clinic period; also, pre-period outliers in 
CA have been eliminated through matching.  In the matched subsample, the trends across 
CA and TX in pre-period spending on primary care track each other fairly well (Figure 
21b).  For physical therapy and acupuncture, CEM clearly brings together the two 
groups’ trend lines for number of claims per month and total spending per month.  These 
effects are seen in figures 22b and 23b for physical therapy and figures 24b and 25b for 
acupuncture.  CEM eliminates some extreme spenders and helps to make the trends in 
chiropractic spending look more similar during the pre-clinic period (Figure 27b).  For 
total monthly spending on ER care, matching eliminates outlier observations and 
substantially helps to bring together the levels between CA clinic users and TX non-users 
(Figure 29b).  CEM has this same effect on total monthly spending for inpatient hospital 
care (Figure 31b).  In Figure 33b, we see that CEM has selected treated and control 
observations with lower levels of monthly spending on office-based care, and the pre-
period levels and trends look fairly similar between CA and TX.  Lastly, Figure 35b 
shows how matching has helped to make the treated and control groups look more 
homogenous in terms of pre-period monthly spending on outpatient care.  CEM drops 
several high spending observations and pulls the levels of outpatient spending close 
together throughout the pre-clinic period. 
 CEM successfully produces a matched subsample of CA clinic users and TX non-
users that are more homogenous on a variety of demographic characteristics and pre-
period spending measures.  Table 60 and figures 18 – 35 illustrate this point.  Next, I 
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perform regression analyses on the matched subsample to again determine how clinic 
adoption impacted the extensive and intensive margins of care. 
 
15b ii. Comparison of Extensive Margin Results 
Summary Table 10 provides summary statistics for patient characteristics in the 
patient-month level analytical data set.  Summary Table 11 displays summary statistics 
for the extensive margin outcomes that I analyze, broken out between CA clinic users and 
TX non-users and also between pre- and post-clinic time periods. 
 The results are very similar between the full sample and matched subsample.  In 
both samples, I find that clinic utilization led to significant increases in the likelihood to 
have any claim, any primary care claim, any physical therapy claim, any acupuncture 
claim, any inpatient claim, and any office-based claim during the month.  I also detect 
significant increases in the likelihood to incur monthly spending for each of the 
aforementioned services.  The magnitudes of the effects are slightly larger in the matched 
subsample.  Also, in both the full sample and matched subsample, I find that clinic 
adoption is associated with a significant decline in likelihood to have any outpatient 
claim or any outpatient spending during the month.  The magnitude of this decline is 
slightly smaller in the matched subsample. 
 The only outcomes for which I find a differing result are likelihood to have any 
chiropractic claim and likelihood to have any chiropractic spending during the month.  In 
the full sample, I do not detect a significant post-washout effect for either outcome (Table 
35).  However, as Table 61 shows, I find a significant and positive post-washout effect 
for both outcomes in the matched subsample.  In the matched subsample, I estimate that 
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clinic adoption led to a 1.41 percentage point increase in the likelihood to have any 
chiropractic claims during the month.  This is a large, 84.4% increase relative to the pre-
period mean likelihood among CA clinic users in the matched subsample (1.67%).  The 
estimated effect on the likelihood to have any chiropractic spending during the month has 
the same magnitude.  Thus, in the matched subsample, there is evidence of market 
expansion for chiropractic services.         
 The results from extensive margin analyses performed on the matched subsample 
are consistent with and support my earlier findings for the full sample of CA clinic users 
and TX non-users.  In other words, the full sample findings are robust and hold up even 
when the treated and control groups are altered so as to look more similar on observable 
characteristics. 
 
15b iii. Comparison of Intensive Margin Results 
 Summary Table 12a provides summary statistics for the number of claims and 
amount of spending per month for each of the services that I analyze; these figures are 
calculated based on all observations (i.e. including zeroes).  Summary Table 12b then 
provides summary statistics conditional on the outcome being nonzero.  Overall, the 
regression results are very similar between the full sample and matched subsample.  The 
matched analysis supports the robustness of my earlier intensive margin findings. 
One analysis that I do wish to discuss in detail is the quantile regression for total 
spending across all services.  Table 62 shows the values at different points in the 
distribution of monthly total spending for matched CA clinic users and TX non-users.  
Compared to the full sample, we are capturing lower-spending patients in the matched 
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subsample.  For example, the estimated value of monthly total spending at the 75th 
percentile for the full sample is $140, compared to $89.71 in the matched subsample. 
To analyze the clinic’s impact on monthly total spending, I perform quantile 
regression within a difference-in-differences framework and utilize robust standard 
errors.  Table 63 reports the estimated coefficients at different quantiles, and Figure 37 
provides a visual representation of these estimates.  I find that, during the post-washout 
period, clinic utilization had a significant and positive effect on monthly total spending 
across all nonzero percentiles of the distribution; the effect’s magnitude monotonically 
increases as the patient falls into higher parts of the spending distribution.  This differs 
from my full sample findings, where I only detect significant positive effects for the 63rd 
through 75th percentiles, and the effect decreases in magnitude. 
 The quantile regression results suggest the following: For patients in the matched 
subsample, clinic utilization drove an increase in monthly total spending during the post-
washout period.  This increase was greater in magnitude when the patient was a higher 
spender.  What might be a story to explain these findings?  Overall, I find that CA-based 
clinic users end up consuming more care in the post-period, especially services that are 
also available onsite.  This is a rational response to an increase in basic care access and 
convenience.  Because utilization increases for these clinic users, quantile regression 
picks up the accompanying increases in their monthly total spending.  The increasing 
magnitude of this effect as the patient’s overall spending level rises may be tied to 
underlying health and consequent utilization of care.  Low-spending patients may be 
healthier and only utilize the clinic periodically for low-severity, low-cost care (e.g. 
immunizations or primary care checkups).  On the other hand, high-spending patients 
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may have worse underlying health and therefore visit the clinic for higher-severity care or 
frequent treatment (e.g. chronic condition management or recurring physical therapy).  
This could explain why we see spending increase more for patients who are found in the 
higher end of the total spending distribution.   
 While there are differences in the quantile regression results between the full 
sample and matched subsample, both analyses still tell the same overarching story: Clinic 
utilization is significantly associated with an increase in monthly total spending.  It is also 
important to remember that the matched subsample analyses only estimate the treatment 
effect within that specific subsample.  The results should therefore be seen more as 
evidence supporting the robustness of my full sample findings. 
 
16. Discussion 
16a. Summary of User vs. Non-User Analysis 
 The above analyses, which compare pre-post changes in outcomes between CA 
clinic users and TX non-users, are important because they reveal what effects are tied not 
only to the timing of clinic entry, but also to actual utilization of the clinic’s services.59  
The effects that I find on the extensive and intensive margins of care are consistent across 
the full sample and matched subsample analyses.  Overall, I find that clinic users 
increased their demand for services that are available at the onsite clinic and engaged in 
some substitution between types of care.  These patients responded as economic theory 
                                                 
59 I do try an extensive margin analysis comparing CA-based employees who utilized the onsite clinic to 
their CA-based colleagues who never visited the clinic.  I identify 581 CA-based clinic users and 1,082 
CA-based non-users.  The patient-month level analytical data set contains 72,975 patient-months.  As a 
caveat, this analysis ignores endogenous self-selection into adopting the clinic’s services.  Interestingly, the 
results match up to those obtained when comparing CA clinic users to TX non-users.  The only differing 
result is that for this CA-only analysis, I find no significant post-period effects on likelihood to utilize 
outpatient care. 
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would predict when a new seller enters the market and offers a limited set of products at a 
lower time cost. 
It is important to review the individual findings that comprise this overarching 
conclusion.  First, the user versus non-user analysis reveals that clinic utilization led to a 
significant increase in overall utilization of care.  In other words, clinic entry and 
subsequent adoption of its services drove an increase in the overall demand for medical 
care.  Digging further, I find that this broad effect was specifically driven by increased 
demand for primary care office visits, physical therapy, and alternative medicine.  Thus, 
market expansion specifically occurred for services that are available at the onsite clinic.  
These findings are consistent with our expectation of how patients would behave when a 
new provider option becomes available and offers a limited set of services at lower time 
cost.  The empirical results support Prediction 1 and Prediction 2 from my theoretical 
model.   
I find evidence that substitution across sites of care occurred, which was predicted 
in my theoretical model.  Specifically, I find that clinic availability led to a significant 
decline in outpatient utilization, which was offset by an increase in office-based 
utilization.  ER utilization was not significantly affected.  Interestingly, I detect a small-
magnitude increase in inpatient hospital utilization among California-based clinic users – 
an effect that I did not pick up in my high-level analyses.  It is a bit tricky to explain why 
inpatient utilization might have increased for clinic users.  A substitution effect would not 
make sense, since the inpatient setting provides care that does not overlap with office-
based or outpatient services.  Instead, the detected increase likely represents new 
utilization by certain clinic users.  One possible story is that a patient visits the onsite 
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primary care physician and is diagnosed with a condition that she was previously 
unaware of.  She then receives inpatient care to address this condition.  If this new 
utilization does represent patients becoming aware of conditions through interaction with 
onsite providers and consequently obtaining appropriate inpatient care, we may not 
necessarily have an unfavorable result.  Still, this is a perplexing empirical finding that 
deserves further investigation in the future. 
While estimates of the impact on spending are sensitive to model choice, I find 
evidence that clinic utilization led to a small-magnitude increase in total spending per 
month.  This is a reasonable result given my finding that overall utilization of care 
increased during the post-clinic period.  One common result across the quantile 
regressions for the full sample and matched subsample is that spending increased slightly 
for patients who generally did not utilize much care.  As I claimed earlier, this might 
occur if healthier patients responded to the clinic’s convenience and increased their 
consumption of low-severity, low-cost care. 
 
16b. Considering All Results Together 
 In Chapter 2, I performed high-level analyses and found that clinic introduction 
led to significant effects only in certain service and spending categories.  Then in Chapter 
3, I investigated whether actual adoption of the clinic’s services was the mechanism 
driving the high-level effects.  Performing both sets of analyses provided me with a 
clearer picture of how employees responded when an employer-based health clinic 
entered the market and offered a limited set of services at lower time cost.  I now 
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consider both sets of results together and discuss their implications for patient demand 
and cost of care. 
 Overall, the high-level and user-level analyses reveal that clinic introduction only 
had a significant impact on utilization and costs for the narrow set of services that could 
be provided by the onsite clinic.  Additionally, these effects were concentrated among 
employees who actually utilized the onsite clinic (i.e. clinic users).  There was evidence 
of substitution away from outpatient care and towards office-based care.  Beyond this, 
however, clinic entry and subsequent adoption of onsite services led to an overall 
increase in the demand for medical care.  This market expansion was specifically driven 
by new utilization of primary care, physical therapy, and alternative medicine.  
Consequently, this consumption of new services led to a small increase in spending for 
clinic users.     
           I first look at the evidence of market expansion more closely.  In both the high-
level and user-level analyses, I consistently find that overall utilization of care increased 
during the post-clinic period.  Thus, the overarching result that patients increased their 
consumption of medical care can be tied to both the timing of clinic entry and actual 
utilization of onsite care.  Digging further, I find that this broad increase was specifically 
driven by growth in the demand for primary care, physical therapy, acupuncture, and 
office-based care.  The clinic’s effects on physical therapy, acupuncture, and office-based 
utilization and spending are significant in both the high-level and user-level analyses.  
Interestingly, the increase in primary care utilization and spending is only significant in 
the analysis of clinic users.  Market expansion in primary care is therefore isolated to 
employees who utilized the onsite clinic.  For these patients, the two-period model of 
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onsite adoption, which I found empirical evidence supporting, is likely at play.  These 
employees would have utilized low-severity onsite care first and then later returned for 
onsite primary care, having already born part of the switching cost.   
The key takeaway from the above findings is that, after clinic entry, patients 
specifically increased their utilization of services that were available at the onsite clinic.  
These effects are concentrated among patients who adopted the onsite clinic’s services.  
These results were predicted in my theoretical model.  Ultimately, the observed increase 
in demand for primary care, physical therapy, and acupuncture is a rational response by 
consumers, as introduction of the worksite clinic substantially lowered the time cost for 
these particular types of care.  
 Related to this discussion of market expansion, there are two effects that are not 
significant in the high-level analyses but are significant in the user-level analyses.  First, I 
generally do not find that clinic introduction significantly impacted chiropractic 
utilization or spending.  This is an interesting result because chiropractic is one of the 
main services that the worksite clinic offers.  The only population where I find a 
significant effect is the matched subsample of CA clinic users and TX non-users.  
However, the estimated increases in chiropractic utilization and spending are technically 
isolated to clinic users who comprise the matched subsample.  Thus, I cannot confidently 
say that market expansion in chiropractic care broadly occurred after clinic introduction.  
Second, in the high-level analyses, I do not find that clinic introduction significantly 
impacted inpatient utilization or spending.  However, in both the full sample and matched 
subsample analyses comparing CA clinic users to TX non-users, I find that clinic 
utilization led to a significant, small-magnitude, and positive effect on inpatient care use.  
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It is interesting to find a slight increase in inpatient utilization concentrated among clinic 
users.  If viewed through the lens that onsite care is supposed to improve worker health 
and prevent costly downstream care, this may seem like an undesirable outcome.  
However, this new utilization of inpatient care could represent appropriate care for 
patients who only become aware of underlying conditions after interacting with onsite 
providers.  If such a story occurs, the detected result may actually be welfare-improving 
for patients.  
 In addition to market expansion, I also find evidence that clinic introduction led to 
some degree of business stealing.  In the high-level analyses, I find that clinic entry led to 
a significant decline in outpatient utilization and spending, which was offset by a 
significant increase in office-based utilization and spending.  I find these same offsetting 
effects in the user-level analyses as well.  Thus, actual utilization of the onsite clinic 
appears to be the mechanism that drives this substitution across sites of care.  Looking 
more closely at this substitution behavior, I find that primary care-related physician visits 
and physical therapy were the most probable services that patients shifted between sites.  
Of the services that the onsite clinic offered, these were the only two types of care that I 
found could also be provided in outpatient settings.  This empirical finding of substitution 
supports my theoretical prediction that a shift from community-based to onsite care 
would occur for services also available onsite.  I further predicted that, given the higher 
average switching cost for primary care, patients might only be willing to shift from 
community-based to onsite primary care if they had already born part of the switching 
cost.  I do indeed find that patients who use onsite primary care tend to have first utilized 
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the clinic for lower-severity care.  This may very well be the mechanism that facilitates 
clinic users to substitute towards onsite primary care. 
 In my high-level analyses, I find that clinic introduction led to a significant 
decline in a patient’s likelihood to use the ER.  Therefore, I originally thought that there 
might also be substitution away from the ER and towards office-based settings.  
However, when I performed the user-level analyses, I did not find that clinic utilization 
had a significant impact on either ER utilization or spending.  Clinic use cannot explain 
and does not drive the high-level effect on ER utilization.  Thus, we have a result that 
appears to only be tied to the timing of clinic introduction, not to the clinic itself.  What is 
perplexing is that I pick up a significant negative effect on ER utilization in the high-level 
analyses.  Based on what I see in the data, one theory is that the effect is driven by a 
handful of CA-based patients who were very sick and utilized a lot of ER and inpatient 
care during the pre-clinic period.  During the post-clinic period, they recovered from their 
illnesses and dramatically reduced their consumption of hospital-based care.  This 
reduction in ER use is unrelated to utilization of the clinic’s services, but just happens to 
occur contemporaneously with the opening of the clinic.  This story is a bit tenuous, but I 
do see it occur for several patients in the data.  At the same time, I am unsurprised that no 
significant effect on ER utilization or spending is detected in the user-level analyses.  
This is because few services are actually substitutable between the ER and an employer-
based health clinic.  Even for lower-severity conditions that can potentially be treated at 
either site (e.g. middle ear infection, bronchitis, or urinary tract infection), patients who 
visit the ER may have great pain or a more severe form of the condition that merits 
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emergency care.60  Firm A’s employees, who are predominantly high-skill workers, are 
unlikely to utilize ER care unless they absolutely need it.  Also, for a workforce that is 
generally healthy, it is difficult to imagine that clinic utilization would have such a 
substantial impact on employees’ health that it reduces downstream ER utilization.61  
These factors are all consistent with my finding that onsite clinic use does not lead to 
changes in ER utilization or substitution away from the ER.       
 It is important to think about the evidence that both market expansion and 
business stealing occur after the worksite clinic enters the market.  First, consider my 
finding of substitution between outpatient and office-based care.  This behavior appears 
to be driven by patients shifting primary care-related physician visits and physical 
therapy away from outpatient settings and towards the onsite clinic.  If only substitution 
occurred, there would be a zero-sum game.  Patients would simply replace the care they 
planned to receive in community-based settings with onsite care.  We would not expect to 
see a significant post-period change in the likelihood that a patient utilized any care 
during the month.  Also, for primary care and physical therapy, we would not expect to 
see any significant post-period effects on the extensive or intensive margin.  Despite this, 
I consistently find that clinic entry led to a significant increase in overall consumption of 
medical care.  Thus, market expansion is clearly occurring, and this effect is concentrated 
among clinic users.  More specifically, I find that CA-based clinic users responded to the 
convenience of onsite care by increasing their consumption of primary care, physical 
therapy, alternative medicine, and office-based care.  These increases represent 
                                                 
60 I thank Ateev Mehrotra for his input on this issue. 
61 If such an effect is occurring, I may not have a long enough post-period to detect it. 
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consumption of new services.  In other words, a sizeable amount of new utilization 
occurred beyond the substitution of services between outpatient and office-based settings.  
 Lastly, it is necessary to discuss how introduction of an employer-based health 
clinic impacted the cost of care for patients.  The most insightful analyses are the quantile 
regressions that I perform to estimate the clinic’s impact on monthly total spending at 
different points in its distribution.  There are some variations in the findings across the 
full continuously-enrolled sample, full sample of CA clinic users and TX non-users, and 
matched subsample.  However, there is one consistent finding across samples: Clinic 
entry led to a small-magnitude increase in total monthly spending for patients in the 
lower nonzero quantiles of the spending distribution.  In other words, after being exposed 
to the onsite provider option, patients who were generally low spenders and did not 
utilize much care experienced a slight increase in their monthly total spending.  Finding 
an increase in spending is expected, given the convincing evidence that clinic adoption 
led to consumption of new services.  Furthermore, it is not difficult to think of a 
reasonable story for why low-spending patients might experience an increase in spending.  
When these patients take advantage of the clinic’s convenience and increase their 
consumption of low-severity care, their increased demand for services will be 
accompanied by an increase in spending.  
 Proponents of the employer-based health model might be concerned that, in my 
empirical setting, introduction of the worksite clinic led to an increase in patient 
spending.  After all, the rhetoric surrounding workplace health often promotes its 
potential to reduce or better control employee health care costs.  However, I believe that 
reducing health care spending should not be the sole metric on which the worksite clinic 
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model is judged.  My finding of increased spending should not be alarming.  First, it is 
unknown whether reducing employee health care cost growth is explicitly in Firm A’s 
objective function.  Even if cost reduction is considered, it may not be the only goal that 
leadership has in mind.  Firm A could have more altruistic intentions, such as improving 
and investing in worker health.  The decision may also be a strategic move, as providing 
employees with the fringe benefit of worksite health can serve as a recruitment tool.  
Additionally, the consumption of new services could be welfare-enhancing for 
employees.  These patients may be getting appropriate care that they would have 
foregone had the clinic not been available.  For example, they may be receiving important 
chronic condition management, which in turn reduces the likelihood that they will need 
costly downstream care.  With health outcomes data and a longer post-period for the 
claims data, I can potentially test this theory.  Lastly, employees may be more satisfied at 
their job because they have access to workplace health, and this could reduce turnover. 
 
16c. Future Work 
 Although I have already investigated a wide set of questions in my dissertation, 
there is still room for future investigation.  First, I would like to empirically investigate 
how a patient’s relationship with community-based providers affects her decision of 
whether or not to utilize onsite care.  In my theoretical model, I develop the concept that 
switching cost is an increasing function of relationship stock.  I further claim that 
relationship stock has a different impact on switching cost depending on the type of care 
that is sought.  More specifically, relationship stock matters more for primary care than it 
does for lower-severity care (e.g. physical therapy).  I am interested in using the claims 
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data to test these theories and determine if relationship stock can predict a patient’s 
likelihood to utilize the worksite clinic for different types of care. 
While I originally planned to perform this analysis, I ran into several difficulties 
when transforming theory into practice.  The first step is to develop a measure of 
relationship stock, which is a proxy for switching cost.  One thought is to look at a 
patient’s claims data from the pre-clinic period and measure the frequency of visits to a 
particular primary care physician.  This would serve as an “attachment” or “stickiness” 
index.  For example, Patient 1 visits Physician A once, while Patient 2 visit Physician A 
ten times.  Patient 1 would have less attachment than Patient 2.  Such a measure is too 
simplistic, however, because a patient may visit multiple providers during the pre-clinic 
period.  I find that this is not uncommon in the claims data.  In this case, one possible 
way to measure “loyalty” to physicians is to calculate a patient-level HHI, where a 
particular physician’s market share is the number of pre-period primary care visits that 
occurred with that physician divided by the total number of pre-period primary care 
visits.  For example, Patient 1 visits physicians A, B, C, and D one time each and 
therefore has an HHI of 0.25.  Patient 2 visits Physician A three times and Physician B 
once, so she has an HHI of 0.625.  I could then argue that Patient 2 has greater 
attachment to a particular physician than does Patient 1 and is therefore less likely to 
switch to onsite care.  However, this HHI measure has an important shortcoming.  For 
example, Patient 1 visits Physician A once while Patient 2 visits Physician A fifteen 
times.  Both patients have the same HHI of 1, but I want to distinguish between them; 
Patient 2 should have a stronger relationship with her PCP.  Creating a workable measure 
of relationship stock is clearly complicated, and I have not yet been able to investigate the 
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empirical relationship between relationship stock and clinic utilization.  This is an issue 
that I plan to think about more, and I hope to receive feedback for future work. 
 Another subject for future work is how introduction of the worksite clinic 
impacted employees’ use of specialist physician care.  One of the aims of the employer-
based health model is to improve management of patients’ conditions and decrease 
reliance on costly specialist care.  Some critics believe that there could even be implicit 
steering of patients away from specialists.  With the claims data, I can at least study how 
clinic availability and subsequent adoption of onsite services affected a patient’s 
likelihood to use specialist care. 
 While I do study the substitution of services between outpatient and office-based 
settings, I do not look at the movement of care between community-based offices and the 
onsite clinic.  The clinic could steal business from primary care physicians located near 
Firm A’s campus.  I am interested in tracking the movement of primary care services 
between providers and identifying switchers to onsite care.  Interesting areas for research 
include comparing quality of care between community-based PCPs and the onsite clinic, 
and studying how clinic entry affects competition within the local primary care market.   
With longer post-period data, I might test whether onsite clinic availability can 
actually lead to a reduction in health care costs down the line.  Proponents of the 
employer-based health model claim that, through more efficient management of 
employees’ primary care, a worksite clinic can better control future costs and reduce 
downstream utilization of ER and inpatient care.  While I do not find evidence of such 
reductions in cost or downstream utilization, these effects may not manifest until several 
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years after clinic launch.  Still, it is possible that demand expansion is the prevailing 
result and no such reductions materialize. 
 Finally, it would be interesting to study the impact of clinic introduction on 
outcomes within the firm.  Does availability of the onsite clinic have a meaningful effect 
on worker productivity and absenteeism?  There is also a fascinating social learning 
process by which employees acquire information from colleagues about the onsite clinic 
and its quality of care.  This information can then determine whether an employee 
decides to utilize onsite services.  It would be interesting to study the diffusion of 
information on clinic quality through the social web that connects a firm’s employees. 
 
17. Conclusion 
In my dissertation, I observe a unique natural experiment when a large, self-
insured firm opens a worksite clinic on its California campus but does not feature a clinic 
on its Texas campus.  This empirical setting allows me to study an interesting set of 
questions under an important theme: How do patients respond when a new provider 
enters the market for medical care and offers services at lower time cost?  By performing 
high-level and user-level analyses, I am able to estimate how clinic introduction impacted 
patient demand and costs for various types of care.  Additionally, I am able to determine 
that actual adoption of onsite services was the mechanism driving the detected effects. 
I find that clinic entry led to an increase in demand for the limited set of services 
offered at the onsite clinic.  More specifically, there was a substantial amount of new 
utilization of primary care office visits, physical therapy, and alternative medicine.  
Clinic availability also drove some substitution effects: There was a decrease in 
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outpatient utilization that was offset by an increase in office-based utilization.  Total 
spending increased slightly, especially for patients who normally did not utilize much 
care.  These detected effects on utilization and spending were specifically concentrated 
among employees who actually used the onsite clinic. 
 Overall, onsite clinic entry only impacted demand and costs for a particular set of 
services (i.e. services available at the clinic) and a specific population (i.e. employees 
who adopted onsite care).  While some substitution across sites of care occurred, there 
was also a fair amount of new utilization that ultimately led to an increase in spending.  
More work is required before I can comment on the value of this consumption of new 
services.  Employees may now be getting appropriate care that they would have foregone 
had a convenient provider option not been available.  Conversely, this increased demand 
may be for care that is not medically-necessary or duplicative of community-based 
services.  Because my study is limited to the experience of employees at one firm, it is 
difficult to generalize my results to other situations where a low-time cost provider enters 
the market for medical care.  Still, my study provides valuable insight and illustrates that 
consumers can respond as economic theory would predict.  Employer-based health is 
becoming an increasingly common feature of the care delivery landscape.  It will be 
important to continue monitoring how patients respond to such a reduction in the time 
cost of care, as well as determine the impact of this behavior on patient welfare. 
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SUMMARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Summary Table 1: Patient characteristics (Full continuously-enrolled sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CA   TX 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Patient age 32.15 18.88 0 83 
 
29.56 18.17 0 73 
Patient gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.504 0.500 0 1 
 
0.488 0.500 0 1 
          Covering employee age 46.44 7.746 21 76 
 
44.51 6.883 22 72 
Covering employee gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.190 0.393 0 1 
 
0.146 0.354 0 1 
          Patient has a chronic condition (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.218 0.413 0 1 
 
0.206 0.404 0 1 
          Patient is an employee (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.352 0.478 0 1 
 
0.324 0.468 0 1 
Patient is a dependent of an employee (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.403 0.491 0 1 
 
0.454 0.498 0 1 
Patient is a spouse of an employee (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.245 0.430 0 1 
 
0.223 0.416 0 1 
Patient is covered under multiple employees (0 = no,  
1 = yes) 0.0121 0.109 0 1 
 
0.0101 0.100 0 1 
            N = 208,970 patient-months  N = 163,199 patient-months 
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 Summary Table 2: Extensive margin outcomes (Full continuously-enrolled sample) 
 
 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.361 0.480 0 1 
 
0.382 0.486 0 1 
          Has any primary care office visit claims in the 
month 0.221 0.415 0 1 
 
0.230 0.421 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.0684 0.252 0 1 
 
0.0748 0.263 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.0346 0.183 0 1 
 
0.0427 0.202 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0388 0.193 0 1 
 
0.0409 0.198 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.00793 0.0887 0 1 
 
0.00762 0.0869 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00563 0.0748 0 1 
 
0.00379 0.0615 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.341 0.474 0 1 
 
0.362 0.481 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.0867 0.281 0 1 
 
0.0782 0.268 0 1 
          Has any out-of-pocket (OOP) spending in the 
month 0.290 0.454 0 1 
 
0.294 0.456 0 1 
Has any insurer spending in the month 0.312 0.463 0 1 
 
0.308 0.462 0 1 
Has any total spending in the month 0.356 0.479 0 1 
 
0.372 0.483 0 1 
          
 
N = 115,883 patient-months 
 
N = 93,087 patient-months 
            TX (Pre-onsite clinic)   TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.357 0.479 0 1 
 
0.371 0.483 0 1 
          Has any primary care office visit claims in the 
month 0.242 0.428 0 1 
 
0.247 0.431 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.0313 0.174 0 1 
 
0.0325 0.177 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.00289 0.0537 0 1 
 
0.00280 0.0528 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0271 0.162 0 1 
 
0.0283 0.166 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.0147 0.120 0 1 
 
0.0163 0.127 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00600 0.0773 0 1 
 
0.00471 0.0685 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.334 0.472 0 1 
 
0.343 0.475 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.0931 0.291 0 1 
 
0.0995 0.299 0 1 
          Has any out-of-pocket (OOP) spending in the 
month 0.300 0.458 0 1 
 
0.301 0.459 0 1 
Has any insurer spending in the month 0.288 0.453 0 1 
 
0.278 0.448 0 1 
Has any total spending in the month 0.353 0.478 0 1 
 
0.366 0.482 0 1 
          
 
N = 89,275 patient-months 
 
N = 73,924 patient-months 
          Note: Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015.     
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Summary Table 3a: Levels of utilization and spending (Full continuously-enrolled sample) - All 
observations 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 1.149 2.586 0 88 
 
1.234 2.710 0 97 
          # primary care office visit claims per 
month 0.315 0.726 0 14 
 
0.319 0.708 0 15 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.229 1.146 0 51 
 
0.251 1.174 0 35 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.108 0.722 0 33 
 
0.136 0.829 0 23 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.0957 0.625 0 29 
 
0.0964 0.627 0 35 
# ER claims per month 0.0240 0.309 0 14 
 
0.0234 0.307 0 16 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.0349 0.730 0 86 
 
0.0291 0.763 0 64 
# office-based claims per month 0.868 1.904 0 54 
 
0.964 2.040 0 63 
# outpatient claims per month 0.200 0.910 0 42 
 
0.194 0.955 0 65 
          Out-of-pocket spending per month 50.91 192.68 0 6553.29 
 
57.30 210.62 0 7063.19 
Insurer spending per month 392.38 4054.60 0 300852.60 
 
368.02 3577.27 0 282117.40 
Total spending per month 444.87 4116.94 0 300881.30 
 
426.72 3649.36 0 283975.70 
          
 
N = 115,883 patient-months 
 
N = 93,087 patient-months 
                    
          
 
TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 1.067 2.585 0 87 
 
1.095 2.642 0 107 
          # primary care office visit claims per 
month 0.345 0.759 0 17 
 
0.336 0.708 0 17 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.0906 0.673 0 24 
 
0.0868 0.623 0 22 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.00764 0.165 0 10 
 
0.00747 0.167 0 10 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.0590 0.460 0 14 
 
0.0566 0.436 0 18 
# ER claims per month 0.0464 0.461 0 22 
 
0.0517 0.492 0 25 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.0475 0.978 0 73 
 
0.0371 0.771 0 56 
# office-based claims per month 0.751 1.643 0 36 
 
0.748 1.630 0 76 
# outpatient claims per month 0.199 0.853 0 28 
 
0.229 1.052 0 103 
          Out-of-pocket spending per month 38.30 167.75 0 6339.25 
 
45.94 188.34 0 6255.93 
Insurer spending per month 241.45 2320.08 0 181755.50 
 
241.97 2012.77 0 164383.80 
Total spending per month 280.45 2391.32 0 182603.40 
 
289.12 2096.49 0 164383.80 
          
 
N = 89,275 patient-months 
 
N = 73,924 patient-months 
                    
Note: The above summary statistics are based on all observations (including zeroes). Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. 
Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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Summary Table 3b: Levels of utilization and spending (Full continuously-enrolled sample) - | Y>0 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic) CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N Mean SD Min  Max N 
           # claims per month 3.182 3.472 1 88 41,846 3.228 3.574 1 97 35,592 
           # primary care office 
visit claims per 
month 1.423 0.897 1 14 25,657 1.386 0.835 1 15 21,430 
# physical therapy 
claims per month 3.349 2.956 1 51 7,924 3.355 2.830 1 35 6,964 
# acupuncture claims 
per month 3.118 2.387 1 33 4,010 3.180 2.535 1 23 3,977 
# chiropractic claims 
per month 2.464 2.056 1 29 4,500 2.357 2.070 1 35 3,809 
# ER claims per 
month 3.022 1.723 1 14 919 3.076 1.731 1 16 709 
# inpatient hospital 
claims per month 6.195 7.529 1 86 652 7.683 9.750 1 64 353 
# office-based claims 
per month 2.544 2.521 1 54 39,553 2.663 2.640 1 63 33,698 
# outpatient claims 
per month 2.308 2.164 1 42 10,051 2.480 2.450 1 65 7,279 
           Patient out-of-pocket 
(OOP) spending per 
month 175.24 325.60 0.01 6553.29 33,664 194.83 352.20 0.01 7063.19 27,376 
Insurer spending per 
month 1258.66 7186.47 0.07 300852.60 36,126 1193.68 6365.76 0.01 282117.40 28,699 
Total spending per 
month 1250.52 6829.15 0.01 300881.30 41,225 1145.70 5910.45 0.57 283975.70 34,671 
                      
           
 
TX (Pre-onsite clinic) TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N Mean SD Min  Max N 
           # claims per month 2.990 3.603 1 87 31,861 2.951 3.652 1 107 27,423 
           # primary care office 
visit claims per 
month 1.426 0.916 1 17 21,624 1.359 0.800 1 17 18,261 
# physical therapy 
claims per month 2.894 2.520 1 24 2,794 2.667 2.248 1 22 2,406 
# acupuncture claims 
per month 2.643 1.580 1 10 258 2.667 1.709 1 10 207 
# chiropractic claims 
per month 2.174 1.794 1 14 2,422 2.002 1.680 1 18 2,091 
# ER claims per 
month 3.156 2.149 1 22 1,313 3.170 2.235 1 25 1,205 
# inpatient hospital 
claims per month 7.918 9.860 1 73 536 7.879 8.038 1 56 348 
# office-based claims 
per month 2.250 2.170 1 36 29,806 2.180 2.150 1 76 25,372 
# outpatient claims 
per month 2.138 1.914 1 28 8,311 2.298 2.525 1 103 7,352 
           Patient out-of-pocket 
(OOP) spending per 
month 127.83 287.21 0.01 6339.25 26,746 152.42 318.51 0.01 6255.93 22,284 
Insurer spending per 
month 838.42 4265.17 0.01 181755.50 25,709 870.34 3745.07 0.02 164383.80 20,552 
Total spending per 
month 795.33 3975.91 1.67 182603.40 31,480 790.38 3408.77 0.01 164383.80 27,041 
                      
Note: The above summary statistics are based only on observations where the variable is positive. Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 
- July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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Summary Table 4: Patient characteristics (Chronic condition subgroup) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CA   TX 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Patient age 45.19 15.13 0 83 
 
42.46 15.25 0 73 
Patient gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.358 0.480 0 1 
 
0.378 0.485 0 1 
          Covering employee age 49.99 7.945 24 76 
 
47.55 7.665 22 72 
Covering employee gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.180 0.385 0 1 
 
0.161 0.368 0 1 
          Patient is an employee (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.589 0.492 0 1 
 
0.562 0.496 0 1 
Patient is a dependent of an employee (0 = no,          
1 = yes) 0.136 0.342 0 1 
 
0.162 0.368 0 1 
Patient is a spouse of an employee (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.275 0.447 0 1 
 
0.277 0.447 0 1 
Patient is covered under multiple employees (0 = no,       
1 = yes) 0.0158 0.125 0 1 
 
0.00580 0.0760 0 1 
            N = 45,595 patient-months   N = 33,597 patient-months 
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Summary Table 5: Extensive margin outcomes (Chronic condition subgroup) 
 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.445 0.497 0 1 
 
0.451 0.498 0 1 
          Has any primary care office visit claims in the 
month 0.290 0.454 0 1 
 
0.286 0.452 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.0780 0.268 0 1 
 
0.0889 0.285 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.0369 0.188 0 1 
 
0.0486 0.215 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0436 0.204 0 1 
 
0.0486 0.215 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.00988 0.0989 0 1 
 
0.0107 0.103 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00709 0.0839 0 1 
 
0.00653 0.0806 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.417 0.493 0 1 
 
0.419 0.493 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.145 0.352 0 1 
 
0.127 0.333 0 1 
          Has any out-of-pocket (OOP) spending in the month 0.373 0.484 0 1 
 
0.353 0.478 0 1 
Has any insurer spending in the month 0.393 0.488 0 1 
 
0.374 0.484 0 1 
Has any total spending in the month 0.439 0.496 0 1 
 
0.439 0.496 0 1 
          
 
N = 25,393 patient-months 
 
N = 20,202 patient-months 
                  
          
 
TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.441 0.497 0 1 
 
0.442 0.497 0 1 
          Has any primary care office visit claims in the 
month 0.313 0.463 0 1 
 
0.306 0.461 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.0382 0.192 0 1 
 
0.0393 0.194 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.00169 0.0411 0 1 
 
0.00210 0.0458 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0295 0.169 0 1 
 
0.0298 0.170 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.0183 0.134 0 1 
 
0.0191 0.137 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00899 0.0944 0 1 
 
0.00708 0.0839 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.406 0.491 0 1 
 
0.401 0.490 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.154 0.361 0 1 
 
0.153 0.360 0 1 
          Has any out-of-pocket (OOP) spending in the month 0.386 0.487 0 1 
 
0.371 0.483 0 1 
Has any insurer spending in the month 0.371 0.483 0 1 
 
0.347 0.476 0 1 
Has any total spending in the month 0.437 0.496 0 1 
 
0.435 0.496 0 1 
          
 
N = 18,350 patient-months 
 
N = 15,247 patient-months 
          
Note: Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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Summary Table 6a: Levels of utilization and spending (Chronic condition subgroup) - All 
observations 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 1.59 3.14 0 59 
 
1.64 3.37 0 97 
          # primary care office visit claims per 
month 0.444 0.884 0 14 
 
0.426 0.837 0 12 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.259 1.18 0 24 
 
0.285 1.22 0 24 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.107 0.682 0 14 
 
0.141 0.806 0 23 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.104 0.626 0 17 
 
0.102 0.577 0 12 
# ER claims per month 0.0324 0.377 0 14 
 
0.0354 0.396 0 12 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.0540 0.987 0 50 
 
0.0596 1.21 0 64 
# office-based claims per month 1.12 2.11 0 37 
 
1.16 2.16 0 31 
# outpatient claims per month 0.355 1.25 0 42 
 
0.345 1.38 0 58 
          Out-of-pocket spending per month 59.58 202.88 0.00 6553.29 
 
64.99 227.49 0.00 6507.01 
Insurer spending per month 601.30 5244.97 0.00 295242.70 
 
616.42 5531.24 0.00 282117.40 
Total spending per month 665.17 5315.55 0.00 295242.70 
 
683.15 5603.69 0.00 283975.70 
          
 
N = 25,393 patient-months 
 
N = 20,202 patient-months 
                  
          
 
TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 1.55 3.46 0 87 
 
1.55 3.62 0 81 
          # primary care office visit claims per 
month 0.483 0.957 0 17 
 
0.449 0.872 0 17 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.115 0.795 0 24 
 
0.108 0.715 0 18 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.00512 0.136 0 8 
 
0.00551 0.142 0 7 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.0706 0.533 0 14 
 
0.0664 0.525 0 18 
# ER claims per month 0.0657 0.626 0 22 
 
0.0660 0.623 0 25 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.0747 1.21 0 61 
 
0.0681 1.13 0 56 
# office-based claims per month 1.02 2.01 0 34 
 
0.980 2.12 0 76 
# outpatient claims per month 0.353 1.20 0 28 
 
0.366 1.24 0 32 
          Out-of-pocket spending per month 49.21 194.81 0.00 5427.43 
 
54.51 203.20 0.00 6255.93 
Insurer spending per month 402.37 3287.42 0.00 144588.00 
 
378.07 2608.53 0.00 91105.50 
Total spending per month 452.36 3365.94 0.00 145565.10 
 
434.02 2691.59 0.00 92690.47 
          
 
N = 18,350 patient-months 
 
N = 15,247 patient-months 
                   
Note: The above summary statistics are based on all observations (including zeroes). Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. 
Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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 Summary Table 6b: Levels of utilization and spending (Chronic condition subgroup) - | Y>0 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N 
 
Mean SD Min  Max N 
            # claims per month 3.58 3.89 1 59 11,297 
 
3.64 4.23 1 97 9,118 
            # primary care office 
visit claims per 
month 1.53 1.01 1 14 7,362 
 
1.49 0.932 1 12 5,783 
# physical therapy 
claims per month 3.33 2.74 1 24 1,981 
 
3.21 2.70 1 24 1,795 
# acupuncture claims 
per month 2.91 2.11 1 14 936 
 
2.89 2.33 1 23 981 
# chiropractic claims 
per month 2.38 1.89 1 17 1,107 
 
2.10 1.64 1 12 981 
# ER claims per 
month 3.28 1.94 1 14 251 
 
3.31 1.95 1 12 216 
# inpatient hospital 
claims per month 7.61 8.96 1 50 180 
 
9.13 12.0 1 64 132 
# office-based claims 
per month 2.69 2.55 1 37 10,581 
 
2.77 2.58 1 31 8,472 
# outpatient claims 
per month 2.44 2.36 1 42 3,687 
 
2.72 2.94 1 58 2,561 
            Patient out-of-pocket 
(OOP) spending per 
month 159.60 307.09 0.28 6553.29 9,479 
 
183.99 353.03 0.15 6507.01 7,136 
Insurer spending per 
month 1530.25 8282.04 0.72 295242.70 9,978 
 
1648.74 8951.87 0.71 282117.40 7,553 
Total spending per 
month 1514.98 7941.63 2.76 295242.70 11,149 
 
1556.79 8378.74 4.57 283975.70 8,865 
                        
            
 
TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N 
 
Mean SD Min  Max N 
            # claims per month 3.52 4.50 1 87 8,100 
 
3.51 4.77 1 81 6,740 
            # primary care office 
visit claims per 
month 1.55 1.13 1 17 5,740 
 
1.47 0.995 1 17 4,660 
# physical therapy 
claims per month 3.00 2.80 1 24 701 
 
2.74 2.40 1 18 599 
# acupuncture claims 
per month 3.03 1.38 1 8 31 
 
2.63 1.66 1 7 32 
# chiropractic claims 
per month 2.39 2.02 1 14 542 
 
2.23 2.11 1 18 454 
# ER claims per 
month 3.59 2.97 1 22 336 
 
3.46 2.94 1 25 291 
# inpatient hospital 
claims per month 8.30 9.79 1 61 165 
 
9.62 9.53 1 56 108 
# office-based claims 
per month 2.51 2.49 1 34 7,457 
 
2.44 2.76 1 76 6,114 
# outpatient claims 
per month 2.29 2.20 1 28 2,827 
 
2.38 2.30 1 32 2,338 
            Patient out-of-pocket 
(OOP) spending per 
month 127.55 297.27 0.01 5427.43 7,080 
 
147.03 312.68 0.20 6255.93 5,653 
Insurer spending per 
month 1085.50 5330.65 0.02 144588.00 6,802 
 
1090.93 4342.67 0.08 91105.50 5,284 
Total spending per 
month 1034.62 5031.10 2.93 145565.10 8,023 
 
997.96 4012.05 2.02 92690.47 6,631 
                        
Note: The above summary statistics are based only on observations where the variable is positive. Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 
- July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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ANALYSIS TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Table 1: Effect on likelihood to have any claims in the month 
          (1) and (2) 
  
 
LPM 
  
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
          
  CA*Post-washout period 0.00655* 
    
 
(0.00344) (6.42e-05)*** p = 0.3905 
  
      CA*Washout period 0.0104** 
    
 
(0.00520) (1.67e-06)*** p = 0.1415 
  
      CA*Post-clinic period 0.00751** 
    
 
(0.00317) (2.92e-05)*** p = 0.3430 
  
      N 372,169     
  R-squared 0.024 
    Month FE YES 
    Patient FE NO 
    Standard errors in parentheses     
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
      
      Table 2: Effect on likelihood to have any primary care office visit claims in the month 
         (1) and (2) 
  
 
LPM 
  
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
          
  CA*Post-washout period 0.00486 
    
 
(0.00304) (9.42e-05)** p = 0.5950 
  
      CA*Washout period -0.000898 
    
 
(0.00459) (3.28e-05)** p = 0.5600 
  
      CA*Post-clinic period 0.00342 
    
 
(0.00280) (5.13e-05)*** p = 0.6215 
  
      N 372,169     
  R-squared 0.019 
    Month FE YES 
    Patient FE NO     
  Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 3: Effect on likelihood to have any physical therapy claims in the month 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00557*** 
  
 
(0.00156) (0.000190)** p = 0.6120 
    CA*Washout period 0.00635*** 
  
 
(0.00233) (9.86e-05)*** p = 0.5855 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00576*** 
  
 
(0.00143) (0.000163)** p = 0.5335 
        
N 372,169 
  R-squared 0.022 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
    
    Table 4: Effect on likelihood to have any acupuncture claims in the month 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00855*** 
  
 
(0.000977) (0.000274)** p = 0.5125 
    CA*Washout period 0.00825*** 
  
 
(0.00148) (0.000136)** p = 0.5300 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00847*** 
  
 
(0.000890) (0.000241)** p = 0.5700 
        
N 372,169 
  R-squared 0.024 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Effect on likelihood to have any chiropractic claims in the month 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.000740 
  
 
(0.00129) (5.12e-05)** p = 0.6365 
    CA*Washout period 0.00325* 
  
 
(0.00192) (2.39e-05)*** p = 0.563 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00137 
  
 
(0.00118) (3.23e-05)** p = 0.5015 
        
N 372,169 
  R-squared 0.010 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
    
    Table 6: Effect on likelihood to have any ER claims in the month 
       (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period -0.00164** 
  
 
(0.000794) (4.69e-05)** p = 0.3725 
    CA*Washout period -0.00262** 
  
 
(0.00118) (1.81e-05)*** p = 0.3000 
    CA*Post-clinic period -0.00188*** 
  
 
(0.000727) (3.50e-05)** p = 0.3415 
    N 372,169     
R-squared 0.002 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Effect on likelihood to have any inpatient claims in the month 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period -0.000618 
  
 
(0.000508) (2.30e-05)** p = 0.5245 
    CA*Washout period -0.000304 
  
 
(0.000698) (1.47e-05)** p = 0.4205 
    CA*Post-clinic period -0.000539 
  
 
(0.000468) (2.24e-05)** p = 0.3400 
    N 372,169     
R-squared 0.001 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
    
    Table 8: Effect on likelihood to have any office-based claims in the month 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.0104*** 
  
 
(0.00340) (2.58e-05)*** p = 0.2660 
    CA*Washout period 0.0151*** 
  
 
(0.00513) (1.39e-05)*** p = 0.2980 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.0116*** 
  
 
(0.00313) (6.49e-06)*** p = 0.2860 
    N 372,169     
R-squared 0.021 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Effect on likelihood to have any outpatient claims in the month 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period -0.0134*** 
  
 
(0.00203) (8.18e-05)*** p = 0.6475 
    CA*Washout period -0.0167*** 
  
 
(0.00310) (1.19e-05)*** p = 0.5510 
    CA*Post-clinic period -0.0142*** 
  
 
(0.00187) (4.83e-05)*** p = 0.5350 
    N 372,169     
R-squared 0.032 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Effect on likelihood to incur any monthly spending 
      Monthly out-of-pocket spending 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00358 
  
 
(0.00327) (0.000145)** p = 0.5510 
    CA*Washout period 0.00297 
  
 
(0.00480) (3.49e-05)*** p = 0.4690 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00343 
  
 
(0.00300) (0.000121)** p = 0.6380 
    N 372,169     
R-squared 0.025 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
 
        
  Monthly insurer spending   Monthly total spending 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
 
      
 
      
 
0.0102*** 
   
0.00539 
  
 
(0.00320) (0.000144)*** p = 0.6225 
 
(0.00343) (4.81e-05)*** p = 0.4165 
        
 
-0.00761 
   
-0.000401 
  
 
(0.00506) (3.83e-05)*** p = 0.3520 
 
(0.00517) (2.56e-07)*** p = 0.1370 
        
 
0.00572* 
   
0.00394 
  
 
(0.00298) (0.000203)** p = 0.5015 
 
(0.00316) (6.40e-05)** p = 0.5400 
          372,169      372,169     
 
0.033 
   
0.023 
  
 
YES 
   
YES 
    NO      NO     
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Effect on number of claims per month 
 
 
 
Table 12: Effect on number of primary care office visit claims per month 
 
  (1) and (2) (3) and (4) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
                
CA*Post-washout period 0.0342*** 
  
0.0451*** 
  
1.046 
 
(0.0124) (0.00196)** p = 0.2790 (0.0157) (0.00272)*** p = 0.2260 
 
        CA*Washout period 0.0285 
  
0.0152 
  
1.015 
 
(0.0190) (0.00367)* p = 0.3015 (0.0234) (0.00358)*** p = 0.0815* 
 
        CA*Post-clinic period 0.0327*** 
  
0.0375*** 
  
1.038 
 
(0.0116) (0.00241)** p = 0.3675 (0.0144) (0.00306)*** p = 0.2310 
                 
N 86,972 
  
372,169 
   R-squared 0.021 
      Month FE YES     YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) and (2) (3) and (4) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES 
Robust 
SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
                
CA*Post-washout period 0.0581 
  
0.0404** 
  
1.041 
 
(0.0420) (0.000968)** p = 0.6400 (0.0167) (0.00471)*** p = 0.3155 
 
        CA*Washout period 0.172*** 
  
0.0807*** 
  
1.084 
 
(0.0647) (0.00157)*** p = 0.7175 (0.0245) (0.00203)*** p = 0.2535 
 
        CA*Post-clinic period 0.0871** 
  
0.0506*** 
  
1.052 
 
(0.0388) (0.00178)** p = 0.7020 (0.0154) (0.00372)*** p = 0.2895 
                 
N 136,722 
  
372,169 
   R-squared 0.024 
      Month FE YES     YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Effect on number of physical therapy claims per month 
 
  (1) and (2) (3) and (4) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES 
Robust 
SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
Robust 
SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
                
CA*Post-washout period 0.188** 
  
0.125*** 
  
1.133 
 
(0.0867) (0.00761)** p = 0.6835 (0.0484) (0.00424)*** p = 0.1945 
 
        CA*Washout period 0.291** 
  
0.221*** 
  
1.247 
 
(0.132) (0.00738)** p = 0.8065 (0.0741) (0.00508)*** p = 0.2625 
 
        CA*Post-clinic period 0.213*** 
  
0.149*** 
  
1.16 
 
(0.0809) (0.00696)** p = 0.7560 (0.0449) (0.00352)*** p = 0.2000 
                 
N 20,088 
  
372,169 
   R-squared 0.021 
      Month FE YES     YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
 
Table 14: Effect on number of office-based claims per month 
 
  (1) and (2) (3) and (4) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES 
Robust 
SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
                
CA*Post-washout period 0.148*** 
  
0.0938*** 
  
1.098 
 
(0.0281) (0.00188)*** p = 0.3515 (0.0154) (0.00593)*** p = 0.2240 
 
        CA*Washout period 0.299*** 
  
0.152*** 
  
1.164 
 
(0.0454) (0.00217)*** p = 0.3495 (0.0232) (0.00160)*** p = 0.2680 
 
        CA*Post-clinic period 0.187*** 
  
0.108*** 
  
1.115 
 
(0.0263) (4.97e-05)*** p = 0.2040 (0.0142) (0.00432)*** p = 0.2785 
                 
N 128,429 
  
372,169 
   R-squared 0.028 
      Month FE YES     YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Effect on number of outpatient claims per month 
 
  (1) and (2) (3) and (4) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
VARIABLES 
Robust 
SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
                
CA*Post-washout period -0.0149 
  
-0.176*** 
  
0.839 
 
(0.0575) (0.00331) p = 0.5375 (0.0361) (0.00166)*** p = 0.2860 
 
        CA*Washout period 0.0426 
  
-0.181*** 
  
0.834 
 
(0.0789) (0.00492)* p = 0.5320 (0.0488) (0.000171)*** p = 0.3000 
 
        CA*Post-clinic period 0.000105 
  
-0.177*** 
  
0.838 
 
(0.0507) (0.00388) p = 0.9330 (0.0323) (0.00131)*** p = 0.2460 
                 
N 32,993 
  
372,169 
   R-squared 0.013 
      Month FE YES     YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
 
Table 16: Effect on monthly out-of-pocket spending 
 
  (1) and (2) (3) and (4) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) and Observations with Y > 0 GLM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
Exp(Coef) 
Robust SE 
Exp(Coef) 
CRSE on 
state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
                
CA*Post-washout 
period -0.0924*** 
  
0.912 0.926*** 
  
 
(0.0179) (0.00100)*** p = 0.4140 
 
(0.0276) (0.00347)*** p = 0.3070 
        CA*Washout period -0.0737** 
  
0.929 0.921 
  
 
(0.0289) (0.00177)** p = 0.4100 
 
(0.0466) (0.00706)*** p = 0.3000 
        CA*Post-clinic period -0.0881*** 
  
0.916 0.925*** 
  
 
(0.0167) (0.000284)*** p = 0.5395 
 
(0.0261) (0.00435)*** p = 0.2540 
               
N 110,070 
   
372,169 
  R-squared 0.130 
      Month FE YES       YES     
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Table 17: Quantiles of monthly total spending 
 
  25th Percentile 50th Percentile 64th Percentile 70th Percentile 
          
Value of Monthly Total Spending 0 0 10.086 92.54 
     (95% CI) (0 , 0) (0 , 0) (0 , 15.9) (92.16 , 93.16) 
          
 
75th Percentile 80th Percentile 85th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile 99th Percentile 
            
141.4 208.42 319.66 532.65 1090.92 5684.88 
      (140 , 143.34) (205.78 , 210.58) (316 , 322.32) (526.8 , 539.62) (1076.35 , 1104.14) (5510.6 , 5895.92) 
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Table 18: Quantile regression results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
64th 
Percentile 
70th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
            
CA*Post-Washout Period 0 0 0.184 5.631** 12.42*** 
 
(0) (0) (0.271) (2.806) (3.848) 
CA*Washout Period 0 0 0 9.770* 5.946 
 
(0) (0) (1.106) (5.075) (6.109) 
      CA 0 0 0.110 19.14*** 50.08*** 
 
(0) (0) (0.132) (1.569) (2.337) 
      Constant 0 0 1.469 -7.566*** 0.477 
 
(0) (0) (1.586) (2.061) (3.562) 
      Observations 372,169 372,169 372,169 372,169 372,169 
R-squared 
     Pseudo R-squared 
  
0.0073 0.0085 0.0096 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
80th Percentile 85th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile 99th Percentile OLS Results 
            
13.52*** 11.99* 3.606 -58.13** -803.5** -12.36 
(4.493) (6.320) (10.18) (26.35) (313.5) (22.09) 
6.567 2.717 -1.907 -74.81* -941.0** -69.84** 
(6.800) (9.993) (16.38) (38.49) (386.5) (30.91) 
      85.93*** 144.6*** 232.9*** 379.6*** 1,012*** 143.8*** 
(2.669) (4.000) (6.137) (14.01) (175.0) (14.35) 
      7.572** 8.146*** 12.37*** 16.99 647.0** 7.273 
(3.141) (3.034) (2.677) (10.82) (321.5) (34.20) 
      372,169 372,169 372,169 372,169 372,169 372,169 
     
0.003 
0.0121 0.0153 0.0190 0.0225 0.0374 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19: Effect on likelihood to have any claims in the month                                                                   
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00692 
  
 
(0.00770) (0.000279)** p = 0.324 
    CA*Washout period 0.00573 
  
 
(0.0117) (0.000197)** p = 0.4 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00663 
  
 
(0.00710) (0.000158)** p = 0.364 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.026 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Table 20: Effect on likelihood to have any primary care office visit claims in the month  
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
        (1) and (2) 
  
 
LPM 
  
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
          
  CA*Post-washout period 0.00398 
    
 
(0.00711) (0.000305)** p = 0.690 
  
      CA*Washout period 0.00258 
    
 
(0.0109) (5.51e-05)** p = 0.186 
  
      CA*Post-clinic period 0.00364 
    
 
(0.00656) (0.000211)** p = 0.614 
          
  
      N 79,192 
    R-squared 0.020 
    Month FE YES 
    Patient FE NO     
  Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: Effect on likelihood to have any physical therapy claims in the month 
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.0113*** 
  
 
(0.00364) (4.94e-05)*** p = 0.347 
    CA*Washout period 0.00637 
  
 
(0.00570) (9.61e-05)*** p = 0.62 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.0101*** 
  
 
(0.00336) (8.36e-05)*** p = 0.456 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.016 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Table 22: Effect on likelihood to have any acupuncture claims in the month   
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.0111*** 
  
 
(0.00217) (7.84e-05)*** p = 0.409 
    CA*Washout period 0.0121*** 
  
 
(0.00335) (7.84e-05)*** p = 0.685 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.0113*** 
  
 
(0.00198) (7.39e-05)*** p = 0.344 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.021 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
148 
 
Table 23: Effect on likelihood to have any chiropractic claims in the month    
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00603** 
  
 
(0.00295) (3.29e-05)*** p = 0.277 
    CA*Washout period 0.00205 
  
 
(0.00449) (3.65e-05)** p = 0.325 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00506* 
  
 
(0.00271) (2.57e-06)*** p = 0.213 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.007 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Table 24: Effect on likelihood to have any ER claims in the month                    
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.000767 
  
 
(0.00191) (7.54e-05)* p = 0.338 
    CA*Washout period -0.00229 
  
 
(0.00298) (3.76e-05)** p = 0.567 
    CA*Post-clinic period 2.03e-05 
  
 
(0.00176) (3.36e-05) p = 0.776 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.004 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25: Effect on likelihood to have any inpatient claims in the month            
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00161 
  
 
(0.00136) (9.26e-05)** p = 0.793 
    CA*Washout period 0.000809 
  
 
(0.00187) (6.40e-06)*** p = 0.642 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00141 
  
 
(0.00124) (6.79e-05)** p = 0.649 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.002 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Table 26: Effect on likelihood to have any office-based claims in the month       
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00735 
  
 
(0.00762) (0.000344)** p = 0.306 
    CA*Washout period 0.0135 
  
 
(0.0116) (0.000238)** p = 0.395 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00886 
  
 
(0.00703) (0.000231)** p = 0.350 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.025 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27: Effect on likelihood to have any outpatient claims in the month          
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period -0.0145*** 
  
 
(0.00541) (0.000150)*** p = 0.328 
    CA*Washout period -0.0248*** 
  
 
(0.00854) (0.000169)*** p = 0.380 
    CA*Post-clinic period -0.0170*** 
  
 
(0.00504) (2.46e-05)*** p = 0.655 
       
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.026 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Table 28: Effect on likelihood to have any monthly total spending                     
(Chronic condition subgroup) 
      (1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA*Post-washout period 0.00558 
  
 
(0.00769) (0.000315)** p = 0.310 
    CA*Washout period -0.00511 
  
 
(0.0117) (0.000193)** p = 0.724 
    CA*Post-clinic period 0.00297 
  
 
(0.00709) (0.000141)** p = 0.309 
        
    N 79,192 
  R-squared 0.025 
  Month FE YES 
  Patient FE NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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SUMMARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
Summary Table 7: Patient characteristics (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CA   TX 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Patient age 45.20 8.688 22 69 
 
45.23 7.872 22 72 
Patient gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.320 0.466 0 1 
 
0.210 0.407 0 1 
          Patient has a chronic condition (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.316 0.465 0 1 
 
0.360 0.480 0 1 
          Patient is an employee (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 0 1 1 
 
1 0 1 1 
Patient is covered under multiple employees     
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0.00288 0.0536 0 1  0.00823 0.0904 0 1 
            N = 26,001 patient-months   N = 51,378 patient-months 
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Summary Table 8: Extensive margin outcomes (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.372 0.483 0 1 
 
0.459 0.498 0 1 
          Has any onsite claims in the month 0.000211 0.0145 0 1 
 
0.144 0.351 0 1 
Has any primary care office visit claims in the month 0.201 0.401 0 1 
 
0.243 0.429 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.115 0.319 0 1 
 
0.150 0.357 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.0552 0.228 0 1 
 
0.0749 0.263 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0663 0.249 0 1 
 
0.0647 0.246 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.00620 0.0785 0 1 
 
0.00627 0.0790 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00359 0.0598 0 1 
 
0.00500 0.0705 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.350 0.477 0 1 
 
0.440 0.496 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.0996 0.300 0 1 
 
0.0880 0.283 0 1 
          Has any total spending in the month 0.368 0.482 0 1 
 
0.442 0.497 0 1 
          Has any spending on onsite care in the month 0.000211 0.0145 0 1 
 
0.124 0.330 0 1 
Has any spending on primary care in the month 0.200 0.400 0 1 
 
0.240 0.427 0 1 
Has any spending on PT in the month 0.110 0.313 0 1 
 
0.146 0.353 0 1 
Has any spending on acupuncture in the month 0.0535 0.225 0 1 
 
0.0740 0.262 0 1 
Has any spending on chiropractic in the month 0.0629 0.243 0 1 
 
0.0614 0.240 0 1 
Has any spending on ER care in the month 0.00620 0.0785 0 1 
 
0.00627 0.0790 0 1 
Has any spending on inpatient care in the month 0.00359 0.0598 0 1 
 
0.00500 0.0705 0 1 
Has any spending on office-based care in the month 0.346 0.476 0 1 
 
0.422 0.494 0 1 
Has any spending on outpatient care in the month 0.0988 0.298 0 1 
 
0.0866 0.281 0 1 
          
 
N = 14,204 patient-months 
 
N = 11,797 patient-months 
           TX (Pre-onsite clinic)  TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.350 0.477 0 1 
 
0.376 0.484 0 1 
          Has any onsite claims in the month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
Has any primary care office visit claims in the month 0.226 0.418 0 1 
 
0.243 0.429 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.0415 0.200 0 1 
 
0.0422 0.201 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.00456 0.0673 0 1 
 
0.00271 0.0520 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0383 0.192 0 1 
 
0.0360 0.186 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.0116 0.107 0 1 
 
0.0135 0.115 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00484 0.0694 0 1 
 
0.00399 0.0631 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.324 0.468 0 1 
 
0.346 0.476 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.108 0.311 0 1 
 
0.117 0.322 0 1 
          Has any total spending in the month 0.346 0.476 0 1 
 
0.372 0.483 0 1 
          Has any spending on onsite care in the month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
Has any spending on primary care in the month 0.225 0.417 0 1 
 
0.241 0.428 0 1 
Has any spending on PT in the month 0.0407 0.198 0 1 
 
0.0414 0.199 0 1 
Has any spending on acupuncture in the month 0.00456 0.0673 0 1 
 
0.00266 0.0515 0 1 
Has any spending on chiropractic in the month 0.0367 0.188 0 1 
 
0.0341 0.182 0 1 
Has any spending on ER care in the month 0.0112 0.105 0 1 
 
0.0132 0.114 0 1 
Has any spending on inpatient care in the month 0.00463 0.0679 0 1 
 
0.00374 0.0610 0 1 
Has any spending on office-based care in the month 0.321 0.467 0 1 
 
0.342 0.474 0 1 
Has any spending on outpatient care in the month 0.107 0.309 0 1 
 
0.116 0.320 0 1 
          
 
N = 28,097 patient-months 
 
N = 23,281 patient-months 
          Note: Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015.     
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Summary Table 9a: Levels of utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) - All 
observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 1.308 2.780 0 59 
 
1.725 3.169 0 73 
          # onsite clinic claims per month 0.000422 0.0291 0 2 
 
0.397 1.288 0 27 
# primary care office visit claims per month 0.285 0.682 0 9 
 
0.345 0.735 0 9 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.378 1.390 0 26 
 
0.512 1.636 0 24 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.186 0.958 0 17 
 
0.248 1.167 0 23 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.153 0.726 0 19 
 
0.131 0.639 0 13 
# ER claims per month 0.0183 0.252 0 8 
 
0.0181 0.261 0 9 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.0247 0.676 0 43 
 
0.0410 0.930 0 61 
# office-based claims per month 1.009 2.107 0 37 
 
1.433 2.596 0 34 
# outpatient claims per month 0.235 1.054 0 42 
 
0.213 0.937 0 31 
          Total spending per month 476.8 4,310 0 292,615 
 
486.1 2,999 0 156,808 
          Onsite clinic spending per month 0.0261 1.860 0 147.4 
 
13.73 45.29 0 694.7 
Primary care spending per month 57.91 166.8 0 3,997 
 
71.81 217.2 0 9,363 
PT spending per month 61.96 354.9 0 29,534 
 
58.84 262.1 0 5,667 
Acupuncture spending per month 44.87 243.6 0 6,665 
 
53.30 291.1 0 6,099 
Chiropractic spending per month 18.75 111.4 0 2,937 
 
11.38 75.99 0 2,752 
ER spending per month 22.77 507.3 0 42,572 
 
22.42 460.5 0 32,646 
Inpatient spending per month 86.26 3,024 0 289,344 
 
90.06 2,150 0 153,839 
Office-based spending per month 188.4 493.2 0 9,428 
 
228.1 855.5 0 46,551 
Outpatient spending per month 173.6 2,675 0 154,998 
 
140.3 1,567 0 56,073 
          
 
N = 14,204 patient-months 
 
N = 11,797 patient-months 
                  
          
 
TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 1.069 2.520 0 62 
 
1.164 2.673 0 82 
          # onsite clinic claims per month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
# primary care office visit claims per month 0.317 0.708 0 12 
 
0.329 0.693 0 12 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.115 0.753 0 24 
 
0.112 0.690 0 18 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.0116 0.201 0 10 
 
0.00653 0.143 0 6 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.0859 0.561 0 14 
 
0.0761 0.509 0 12 
# ER claims per month 0.0359 0.385 0 13 
 
0.0406 0.419 0 21 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.0354 0.827 0 61 
 
0.0354 0.820 0 56 
# office-based claims per month 0.745 1.648 0 36 
 
0.795 1.740 0 76 
# outpatient claims per month 0.232 0.915 0 21 
 
0.267 1.030 0 21 
          Total spending per month 271.4 2,289 0 145,565 
 
294.0 2,216 0 164,384 
          Onsite clinic spending per month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
Primary care spending per month 38.94 109.8 0 4,317 
 
43.61 111.8 0 2,389 
PT spending per month 11.13 108.6 0 9,337 
 
11.40 93.95 0 4,832 
Acupuncture spending per month 2.418 42.42 0 1,915 
 
1.215 27.74 0 1,272 
Chiropractic spending per month 5.457 47.51 0 2,970 
 
4.338 33.95 0 1,289 
ER spending per month 17.41 244.5 0 13,587 
 
24.00 318.2 0 17,985 
Inpatient spending per month 57.11 1,570 0 145,559 
 
51.78 1,504 0 124,570 
Office-based spending per month 91.14 315.7 0 14,503 
 
111.1 487.6 0 22,922 
Outpatient spending per month 100.8 1,488 0 129,918 
 
101.0 1,350 0 164,037 
          
 
N = 28,097 patient-months 
 
N = 23,281 patient-months 
                  
Note: The above summary statistics are based on all observations (including zeroes). Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. 
Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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Summary Table 9b: Levels of utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) - | Y>0 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N 
 
Mean SD Min  Max N 
            # claims per month 3.514 3.608 1 59 5,286 
 
3.755 3.773 1 73 5,419 
            # onsite clinic claims per 
month 2 0 2 2 3 
 
2.761 2.237 1 27 1,698 
# primary care office visit 
claims per month 1.417 0.842 1 9 2,859 
 
1.417 0.836 1 9 2,872 
# physical therapy claims 
per month 3.280 2.691 1 26 1,637 
 
3.415 2.816 1 24 1,770 
# acupuncture claims per 
month 3.361 2.444 1 17 784 
 
3.309 2.838 1 23 884 
# chiropractic claims per 
month 2.304 1.731 1 19 942 
 
2.029 1.569 1 13 763 
# ER claims per month 2.955 1.277 1 8 88 
 
2.878 1.638 1 9 74 
# inpatient hospital claims 
per month 6.882 9.046 1 43 51 
 
8.203 10.38 1 61 59 
# office-based claims per 
month 2.880 2.699 1 37 4976 
 
3.257 3.062 1 34 5189 
# outpatient claims per 
month 2.363 2.475 1 42 1415 
 
2.422 2.153 1 31 1038 
            Total spending per month 1,295 7,028 2.760 292,615 5,230 
 
1,099 4,434 6.380 156,808 5,220 
            Onsite clinic spending per 
month 123.4 41.73 75.17 147.4 3 
 
110.4 76.37 3 694.7 1,467 
Primary care spending per 
month 289.8 268.3 3.630 3,997 2,839 
 
299.1 358.5 12.25 9,363 2,832 
PT spending per month 562.0 928.3 20 29,534 1,566 
 
1,721 403.4 576.3 12 5,667 
Acupuncture spending per 
month 838.5 666.4 26 6,665 760 
 
720.2 815.9 12 6,099 873 
Chiropractic spending per 
month 298.3 337.7 31.20 2,937 893 
 
185.5 248.7 12.25 2,752 724 
ER spending per month 3,676 5,331 26.94 42,572 88 
 
3,574 4,625 23.49 32,646 74 
Inpatient spending per 
month 24,023 44,847 32.47 289,344 51 
 
18,007 24,743 20.66 153,839 59 
Office-based spending per 
month 545.0 713.6 3.630 9,428 4911 
 
540.2 1,251 2.730 46,551 4981 
Outpatient spending per 
month 1,756 8,345 3.570 154,998 1404 
 
1,620 5,098 2 56,073 1022 
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TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N 
 
Mean SD Min  Max N 
            # claims per month 3.055 3.476 1 62 9828 
 
3.092 3.610 1 82 8760 
            # onsite clinic claims per 
month 
    
0 
     
0 
# primary care office visit 
claims per month 1.401 0.834 1 12 6351 
 
1.354 0.767 1 12 5664 
# physical therapy claims 
per month 2.775 2.505 1 24 1167 
 
2.658 2.124 1 18 983 
# acupuncture claims per 
month 2.547 1.557 1 10 128 
 
2.413 1.352 1 6 63 
# chiropractic claims per 
month 2.243 1.843 1 14 1076 
 
2.113 1.703 1 12 838 
# ER claims per month 3.098 1.820 1 13 326 
 
3.010 2.029 1 21 314 
# inpatient hospital claims 
per month 7.309 9.432 1 61 136 
 
8.849 9.552 1 56 93 
# office-based claims per 
month 2.296 2.193 1 36 9116 
 
2.297 2.302 1 76 8059 
# outpatient claims per 
month 2.137 1.912 1 21 3046 
 
2.272 2.116 1 21 2732 
            Total spending per month 784.2 3,840 2.010 145,565 9724 
 
791.3 3,581 0.100 164,384 8651 
            Onsite clinic spending per 
month 
    
0 
     
0 
Primary care spending per 
month 173.4 174.2 2.010 4,317 6308 
 
180.6 164.5 4.980 2,389 5620 
PT spending per month 273.3 467.3 15.58 9,337 1144 
 
275.5 375.2 15.57 4,832 963 
Acupuncture spending per 
month 530.8 339.8 80 1,915 128 
 
456.2 287.6 32.92 1,272 62 
Chiropractic spending per 
month 148.9 200.7 16.16 2,970 1030 
 
127.0 134.9 15.57 1,289 795 
ER spending per month 1,553 1,719 16.75 13,587 315 
 
1,814 2,103 12.06 17,985 308 
Inpatient spending per 
month 12,342 19,596 3 145,559 130 
 
13,856 20,473 12 124,570 87 
Office-based spending per 
month 283.7 505.6 1.870 14,503 9027 
 
325.0 791.2 0.100 22,922 7958 
Outpatient spending per 
month 943.4 4,465 2.040 129,918 3002 
 
871.3 3,879 2.040 164,037 2700 
     
Note: The above summary statistics are based only on observations where the variable is positive. Pre-onsite clinic means April 
2011 - July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
156 
 
Summary Table 10: Patient characteristics (Matched subsample) 
 
  CA   TX 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Patient age 44.65 8.259 22 68 
 
44.98 7.575 22 72 
Patient gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.243 0.429 0 1 
 
0.172 0.378 0 1 
          Patient has a chronic condition (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.302 0.459 0 1 
 
0.339 0.473 0 1 
          Patient is an employee (0 = no, 1 = yes) 1 0 1 1 
 
1 0 1 1 
Patient is covered under multiple employees           
(0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0.00174 0.0417 0 1  0.00569 0.0752 0 1 
            N = 17,232 patient-months   N = 43,218 patient-months 
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Summary Table 11: Extensive margin outcomes (Matched subsample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.247 0.431 0 1 
 
0.378 0.485 0 1 
          Has any onsite claims in the month 0.000214 0.0146 0 1 
 
0.134 0.340 0 1 
Has any primary care office visit claims in the month 0.155 0.362 0 1 
 
0.210 0.407 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.0297 0.170 0 1 
 
0.0906 0.287 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.00674 0.0818 0 1 
 
0.0339 0.181 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0167 0.128 0 1 
 
0.0350 0.184 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.00385 0.0619 0 1 
 
0.00596 0.0770 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00118 0.0343 0 1 
 
0.00419 0.0646 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.227 0.419 0 1 
 
0.361 0.480 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.0706 0.256 0 1 
 
0.0713 0.257 0 1 
          Has any total spending in the month 0.245 0.430 0 1 
 
0.361 0.480 0 1 
          Has any spending on onsite care in the month 0.000214 0.0146 0 1 
 
0.112 0.316 0 1 
Has any spending on primary care in the month 0.154 0.361 0 1 
 
0.207 0.405 0 1 
Has any spending on PT in the month 0.0291 0.168 0 1 
 
0.0896 0.286 0 1 
Has any spending on acupuncture in the month 0.00674 0.0818 0 1 
 
0.0338 0.181 0 1 
Has any spending on chiropractic in the month 0.0161 0.126 0 1 
 
0.0343 0.182 0 1 
Has any spending on ER care in the month 0.00385 0.0619 0 1 
 
0.00596 0.0770 0 1 
Has any spending on inpatient care in the month 0.00118 0.0343 0 1 
 
0.00419 0.0646 0 1 
Has any spending on office-based care in the month 0.225 0.418 0 1 
 
0.342 0.475 0 1 
Has any spending on outpatient care in the month 0.0700 0.255 0 1 
 
0.0700 0.255 0 1 
          N = 9,351 patient-months 
 
N = 7,881 patient-months 
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TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          Has any claims in the month 0.299 0.458 0 1 
 
0.342 0.474 0 1 
          Has any onsite claims in the month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
Has any primary care office visit claims in the month 0.198 0.399 0 1 
 
0.224 0.417 0 1 
Has any physical therapy claims in the month 0.0230 0.150 0 1 
 
0.0306 0.172 0 1 
Has any acupuncture claims in the month 0.000722 0.0269 0 1 
 
0.000915 0.0302 0 1 
Has any chiropractic claims in the month 0.0212 0.144 0 1 
 
0.0256 0.158 0 1 
Has any ER claims in the month 0.00926 0.0958 0 1 
 
0.0123 0.110 0 1 
Has any inpatient hospital claims in the month 0.00234 0.0483 0 1 
 
0.00310 0.0556 0 1 
Has any office-based claims in the month 0.276 0.447 0 1 
 
0.314 0.464 0 1 
Has any outpatient claims in the month 0.0907 0.287 0 1 
 
0.105 0.306 0 1 
          Has any total spending in the month 0.296 0.457 0 1 
 
0.338 0.473 0 1 
          Has any spending on onsite care in the month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
Has any spending on primary care in the month 0.197 0.397 0 1 
 
0.223 0.416 0 1 
Has any spending on PT in the month 0.0227 0.149 0 1 
 
0.0301 0.171 0 1 
Has any spending on acupuncture in the month 0.000722 0.0269 0 1 
 
0.000915 0.0302 0 1 
Has any spending on chiropractic in the month 0.0206 0.142 0 1 
 
0.0243 0.154 0 1 
Has any spending on ER care in the month 0.00892 0.0940 0 1 
 
0.0121 0.109 0 1 
Has any spending on inpatient care in the month 0.00225 0.0474 0 1 
 
0.00295 0.0542 0 1 
Has any spending on office-based care in the month 0.273 0.446 0 1 
 
0.310 0.462 0 1 
Has any spending on outpatient care in the month 0.0893 0.285 0 1 
 
0.104 0.305 0 1 
          
 
N = 23,539 patient-months 
 
N = 19,679 patient-months 
          
Note: Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015.     
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Summary Table 12a: Levels of utilization and spending (Matched subsample) - All observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 0.635 1.576 0 23 
 
1.255 2.757 0 73 
          # onsite clinic claims per month 0.000428 0.0292 0 2 
 
0.359 1.235 0 27 
# primary care office visit claims per month 0.198 0.517 0 6 
 
0.284 0.645 0 8 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.0834 0.617 0 13 
 
0.303 1.277 0 22 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.0158 0.251 0 12 
 
0.106 0.744 0 19 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.0302 0.280 0 6 
 
0.0716 0.501 0 13 
# ER claims per month 0.0105 0.180 0 5 
 
0.0176 0.261 0 9 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.00567 0.195 0 12 
 
0.0368 0.991 0 61 
# office-based claims per month 0.467 1.218 0 23 
 
1.006 2.062 0 30 
# outpatient claims per month 0.142 0.642 0 10 
 
0.178 0.919 0 31 
          Total spending per month 171.7 1,101 0 40,834 
 
366.1 3,005 0 156,808 
          Onsite clinic spending per month 0.0315 2.156 0 147.4 
 
12.08 41.74 0 694.7 
Primary care spending per month 38.69 120.7 0 2,287 
 
56.16 186.9 0 9,363 
PT spending per month 8.313 67.57 0 2,042 
 
26.56 174.9 0 5,502 
Acupuncture spending per month 2.765 44.28 0 1,550 
 
18.84 180.2 0 5,424 
Chiropractic spending per month 2.756 30.42 0 1,020 
 
4.719 40.25 0 1,475 
ER spending per month 9.149 174.2 0 7,152 
 
22.25 484.5 0 32,646 
Inpatient spending per month 19.20 705.8 0 40,595 
 
71.04 2,131 0 153,839 
Office-based spending per month 79.48 259.5 0 6,338 
 
138.6 650.4 0 46,551 
Outpatient spending per month 58.93 683.5 0 23,325 
 
128.7 1,680 0 56,073 
          
 
N = 9,351 patient-months 
 
N = 7,881 patient-months 
                  
          
 
TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max 
 
Mean SD Min  Max 
          # claims per month 0.762 1.707 0 33 
 
0.953 2.087 0 42 
          # onsite clinic claims per month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
# primary care office visit claims per month 0.263 0.612 0 10 
 
0.293 0.636 0 9 
# physical therapy claims per month 0.0595 0.518 0 21 
 
0.0849 0.612 0 13 
# acupuncture claims per month 0.00178 0.0865 0 10 
 
0.00173 0.0669 0 4 
# chiropractic claims per month 0.0410 0.362 0 10 
 
0.0556 0.443 0 11 
# ER claims per month 0.0257 0.298 0 10 
 
0.0352 0.357 0 10 
# inpatient hospital claims per month 0.0128 0.343 0 23 
 
0.0229 0.531 0 34 
# office-based claims per month 0.539 1.200 0 22 
 
0.653 1.389 0 26 
# outpatient claims per month 0.173 0.721 0 15 
 
0.225 0.908 0 18 
          Total spending per month 142.4 832.4 0 29,275 
 
237.2 2,027 0 164,384 
          Onsite clinic spending per month 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 
Primary care spending per month 30.43 80.65 0 1,440 
 
38.11 100.2 0 2,242 
PT spending per month 4.446 41.73 0 2,244 
 
7.255 62.40 0 2,986 
Acupuncture spending per month 0.254 11.86 0 997.2 
 
0.279 12.01 0 1,030 
Chiropractic spending per month 2.408 25.04 0 1,372 
 
3.276 30.00 0 889.5 
ER spending per month 10.84 150.7 0 7,763 
 
21.30 292.1 0 17,985 
Inpatient spending per month 18.23 536.8 0 28,437 
 
35.46 1,267 0 124,570 
Office-based spending per month 60.02 170.2 0 5,392 
 
88.96 398.3 0 22,922 
Outpatient spending per month 50.73 512.9 0 22,425 
 
87.64 1,405 0 164,037 
          
 
N = 23,539 patient-months 
 
N = 19,679 patient-months 
                  
Note: The above summary statistics are based on all observations (including zeroes). Pre-onsite clinic means April 2011 - July 2013. 
Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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Summary Table 12b: Levels of utilization and spending (Matched subsample) - | Y>0 
 
  CA (Pre-onsite clinic)   CA (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N 
 
Mean SD Min  Max N 
            # claims per month 2.572 2.253 1 23 2308 
 
3.318 3.640 1 73 2981 
            # onsite clinic claims per 
month 2 0 2 2 2 
 
2.685 2.276 1 27 1053 
# primary care office visit 
claims per month 1.273 0.595 1 6 1451 
 
1.351 0.736 1 8 1654 
# physical therapy claims per 
month 2.806 2.273 1 13 278 
 
3.349 2.793 1 22 714 
# acupuncture claims per 
month 2.349 1.985 1 12 63 
 
3.135 2.618 1 19 267 
# chiropractic claims per 
month 1.808 1.229 1 6 156 
 
2.043 1.772 1 13 276 
# ER claims per month 2.722 1.031 1 5 36 
 
2.957 1.681 1 9 47 
# inpatient hospital claims per 
month 4.818 3.188 1 12 11 
 
8.788 12.74 1 61 33 
# office-based claims per 
month 2.052 1.808 1 23 2127 
 
2.784 2.611 1 30 2847 
# outpatient claims per month 660 2.015 1.436 1 10 
 
2.498 2.463 1 31 562 
            Total spending per month 701.1 2,140 2.760 40,834 2290 
 
1,015 4,939 6.380 156,808 2842 
            Onsite clinic spending per 
month 147.4 0 147.4 147.4 2 
 
107.6 72.37 3 694.7 885 
Primary care spending per 
month 251.8 203.1 29.79 2,287 1437 
 
271.0 332.3 27 9,363 1633 
PT spending per month 285.8 279.1 20 2,042 272 
 
296.4 511.6 12.25 5,502 706 
Acupuncture spending per 
month 410.4 354.6 50 1,550 63 
 
558.1 814.5 12 5,424 266 
Chiropractic spending per 
month 170.7 169.8 31.20 1,020 151 
 
137.7 170.5 12.25 1,475 270 
ER spending per month 2,377 1,523 102.1 7,152 36 
 
3,730 5,107 23.49 32,646 47 
Inpatient spending per month 16,323 13,154 32.47 40,595 11 
 
16,966 28,690 20.66 153,839 33 
Office-based spending per 
month 352.7 450.0 6.830 6,338 2107 
 
404.6 1,062 2.730 46,551 2699 
Outpatient spending per month 841.3 2,454 4.410 23,325 655 
 
1,837 6,099 2 56,073 552 
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TX (Pre-onsite clinic) 
 
TX (Post-onsite clinic) 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min  Max N 
 
Mean SD Min  Max N 
            # claims per month 2.546 2.279 1 33 7043 
 
2.789 2.761 1 42 6726 
            # onsite clinic claims per 
month 
    
0 
     
0 
# primary care office visit 
claims per month 1.326 0.694 1 10 4662 
 
1.305 0.695 1 9 4415 
# physical therapy claims per 
month 2.588 2.264 1 21 541 
 
2.774 2.193 1 13 602 
# acupuncture claims per 
month 2.471 2.125 1 10 17 
 
1.889 1.183 1 4 18 
# chiropractic claims per 
month 1.938 1.592 1 10 498 
 
2.175 1.751 1 11 503 
# ER claims per month 2.771 1.405 1 10 218 
 
2.864 1.509 1 10 242 
# inpatient hospital claims per 
month 5.491 4.554 1 23 55 
 
7.377 6.105 1 34 61 
# office-based claims per 
month 1.955 1.565 1 22 6494 
 
2.082 1.781 1 26 6175 
# outpatient claims per month 1.904 1.557 1 15 2136 
 
2.146 1.939 1 18 2061 
            Total spending per month 480.8 1,475 3.110 29,275 6972 
 
702.8 3,442 0.100 164,384 6643 
            Onsite clinic spending per 
month 
    
0 
     
0 
Primary care spending per 
month 154.8 117.6 4.740 1,440 4626 
 
171.1 149.4 4.980 2,242 4383 
PT spending per month 195.6 198.2 15.58 2,244 535 
 
240.8 270.4 15.57 2,986 593 
Acupuncture spending per 
month 351.4 275.0 84.03 997.2 17 
 
305.4 261.2 32.92 1,030 18 
Chiropractic spending per 
month 116.9 130.7 16.16 1,372 485 
 
134.9 139.1 15.57 889.5 478 
ER spending per month 1,216 1,043 16.75 7,763 210 
 
1,761 2,002 12.06 17,985 238 
Inpatient spending per month 8,099 7,983 6 28,437 53 
 
12,033 20,175 12 124,570 58 
Office-based spending per 
month 219.5 266.3 1.870 5,392 6436 
 
287.3 674.8 0.100 22,922 6093 
Outpatient spending per 
month 567.8 1,629 2.880 22,425 2103 
 
845.8 4,292 2.040 164,037 2039 
     
Note: The above summary statistics are based only on observations where the variable is positive. Pre-onsite clinic means April 
2011 - July 2013. Post-onsite clinic means August 2013 - June 2015. 
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ANALYSIS TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Table 29: Distance preferences for primary care provider (N = 1,524 patients) 
 
 ALL DISTANCES FROM WORK 
           
 
Prefer PCP closer 
to home % 
Prefer PCP closer 
to work % Indifferent % 
 
p-value 
Clinic PCP User 152 17.16% 101 16.86% 5 12.82% 
 
0.88076 
 
Not Clinic PCP 
User 734 82.84% 498 83.14% 34 87.18% 
   
Total 886 
 
599 
 
39 
   
         
         
 
LIVE <=10 MILES FROM WORK 
  
         
 
Prefer PCP closer 
to home % 
Prefer PCP closer 
to work % Indifferent % 
 
p-value 
Clinic PCP User 89 18.05% 46 16.43% 5 12.82% 
 
0.56868 
 
Not Clinic PCP 
User 404 81.95% 234 83.57% 34 87.18% 
   
Total 493 
 
280 
 
39 
   
         
         
 
LIVE >10 MILES FROM WORK 
           
 
Prefer PCP closer 
to home % 
Prefer PCP closer 
to work % 
   
p-value 
Clinic PCP User 63 16.03% 55 17.24% 
   
0.66720 
 
Not Clinic PCP 
User 330 83.97% 264 82.76% 
     
Total 393 
 
319 
     
         
Note: p-value is for the following hypothesis test: % clinic users among the "prefer PCP closer to home" group = % clinic users 
among the "prefer PCP closer to work" group 
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Table 30: Distance preferences for physical therapy/alternative medicine provider (N = 645 patients) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALL DISTANCES FROM WORK 
           
 
Prefer provider 
closer to home % 
Prefer provider 
closer to work % Indifferent % 
 
p-value 
Clinic 
PT/acup/chiro User 77 24.76% 64 20.06% 2 13.33% 
 
0.15854 
 
Not Clinic 
PT/acup/chiro User 234 75.24% 255 79.94% 13 86.67% 
   
Total 311 
 
319 
 
15 
   
         
         
 
LIVE <=10 MILES FROM WORK 
           
 
Prefer provider 
closer to home % 
Prefer provider 
closer to work % Indifferent % 
 
p-value 
Clinic 
PT/acup/chiro User 44 25.00% 29 17.68% 2 13.33% 
 
0.10100 
 
Not Clinic 
PT/acup/chiro User 132 75.00% 135 82.32% 13 86.67% 
   
Total 176 
 
164 
 
15 
   
         
         
 
LIVE >10 MILES FROM WORK 
           
 
Prefer provider 
closer to home % 
Prefer provider 
closer to work % 
   
p-value 
Clinic 
PT/acup/chiro User 33 24.44% 35 22.58% 
   
0.71138 
 
Not Clinic 
PT/acup/chiro User 102 75.56% 120 77.42% 
     
Total 135 
 
155 
     
         Note: p-value is for the following hypothesis test: % clinic users among the "prefer provider closer to home" group = % clinic users 
among the "prefer provider closer to work" group 
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Table 31: Effect on overall utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
Table 32: Effect on primary care utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  Any primary care claims in the month   Any primary care spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0247*** 
   
0.0232*** 
  
 
(0.00690) (0.000313)*** p = 0.7445 
 
(0.00687) (0.000327)*** p = 0.6845 
        CA User*Washout period 0.0235** 
   
0.0215** 
  
 
(0.0106) (0.000103)*** p = 0.2445 
 
(0.0105) (9.26e-05)*** p = 0.3155 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0244*** 
   
0.0228*** 
  
 
(0.00634) (0.000210)*** p = 0.6905 
 
(0.00632) (0.000222)*** p = 0.7445 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.025 
   
0.024 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
  Any claims in the month   Any total spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0461*** 
   
0.0466*** 
  
 
(0.00799) (0.000794)** p = 0.2750 
 
(0.00798) (0.000871)** p = 0.7540 
        CA User*Washout period 0.102*** 
   
0.0525*** 
  
 
(0.0121) (0.000337)*** p = 0.3030 
 
(0.0121) (0.000315)*** p = 0.2705 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0599*** 
   
0.0480*** 
  
 
(0.00735) (0.000555)*** p = 0.7935 
 
(0.00733) (0.000583)*** p = 0.6915 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.033 
   
0.031 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 33: Effect on physical therapy utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
Table 34: Effect on acupuncture utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  Any acupuncture claims in the month   Any acupuncture spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0191*** 
   
0.0200*** 
  
 
(0.00338) (0.000188)*** p = 0.7180 
 
(0.00335) (0.000189)*** p = 0.6330 
        CA User*Washout period 0.0288*** 
   
0.0294*** 
  
 
(0.00555) (0.000111)*** p = 0.7495 
 
(0.00552) (0.000119)*** p = 0.7380 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0215*** 
   
0.0223*** 
  
 
(0.00313) (0.000176)*** p = 0.7085 
 
(0.00310) (0.000178)*** p = 0.6555 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.038 
   
0.037 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
 
  Any PT claims in the month   Any PT spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0237*** 
   
0.0259*** 
  
 
(0.00493) (0.000268)*** p = 0.3375 
 
(0.00487) (0.000271)*** p = 0.1945 
        CA User*Washout period 0.0652*** 
   
0.0622*** 
  
 
(0.00816) (0.000290)*** p = 0.6255 
 
(0.00803) (0.000281)*** p = 0.6325 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0339*** 
   
0.0348*** 
  
 
(0.00459) (0.000160)*** p = 0.2375 
 
(0.00453) (0.000161)*** p = 0.3070 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.032 
   
0.030 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 35: Effect on chiropractic utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  Any chiropractic claims in the month   Any chiropractic spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period -0.00304 
   
-0.00141 
  
 
(0.00376) (6.61e-05)** p = 0.1960 
 
(0.00370) (6.79e-05)** p = 0.2025 
        CA User*Washout period 0.0117** 
   
0.00827 
  
 
(0.00591) (0.000236)** p = 0.7530 
 
(0.00563) (0.000262)** p = 0.6470 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.000592 
   
0.000968 
  
 
(0.00350) (2.26e-06)*** p = 0.1775 
 
(0.00342) (6.46e-06)*** p = 0.2960 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.007 
   
0.007 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
 
Table 36: Effect on ER utilization and spending (All CA Users and TX Non-Users) 
 
  Any ER claims in the month   Any ER spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period -0.00185 
   
-0.00195 
  
 
(0.00152) (4.27e-05)** p = 0.1810 
 
(0.00151) (4.27e-05)** p = 0.2100 
        CA User*Washout period -0.00174 
   
-0.00196 
  
 
(0.00226) (1.74e-05)*** p = 0.1970 
 
(0.00225) (1.95e-05)*** p = 0.3075 
        CA User*Post-clinic period -0.00182 
   
-0.00195 
  
 
(0.00139) (2.80e-05)*** p = 0.1760 
 
(0.00138) (2.74e-05)*** p = 0.2125 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.002 
   
0.002 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
 
167 
 
Table 37: Effect on inpatient utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  Any inpatient claims in the month   Any inpatient spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period 0.00219** 
   
0.00227** 
  
 
(0.00109) (1.60e-05)*** p = 0.1855 
 
(0.00108) (1.80e-05)*** p = 0.2200 
        CA User*Washout period 0.00222 
   
0.00219 
  
 
(0.00171) (1.64e-05)*** p = 0.6940 
 
(0.00170) (1.74e-05)*** p = 0.7440 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.00220** 
   
0.00225** 
  
 
(0.00101) (8.05e-06)*** p = 0.2225 
 
(0.000997) (9.24e-06)*** p = 0.2850 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.002 
   
0.002 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
 
Table 38: Effect on office-based utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  Any office-based claims in the month   Any office-based spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0523*** 
   
0.0534*** 
  
 
(0.00791) (0.000730)*** p = 0.2735 
 
(0.00790) (0.000794)*** p = 0.1930 
        CA User*Washout period 0.113*** 
   
0.0608*** 
  
 
(0.0120) (0.000411)*** p = 0.7475 
 
(0.0120) (0.000398)*** p = 0.8100 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0671*** 
   
0.0552*** 
  
 
(0.00728) (0.000492)*** p = 0.1690 
 
(0.00726) (0.000507)*** p = 0.3010 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.030 
   
0.028 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 39: Effect on outpatient utilization and spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  Any outpatient claims in the month   Any outpatient spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period -0.0189*** 
   
-0.0196*** 
  
 
(0.00490) (5.78e-05)*** p = 0.2500 
 
(0.00487) (7.54e-05)*** p = 0.1850 
        CA User*Washout period -0.0284*** 
   
-0.0294*** 
  
 
(0.00753) (1.28e-05)*** p = 0.2530 
 
(0.00749) (2.41e-06)*** p = 0.3115 
        CA User*Post-clinic period -0.0212*** 
   
-0.0220*** 
  
 
(0.00454) (3.37e-05)*** p = 0.2965 
 
(0.00452) (4.94e-05)*** p = 0.3105 
        N 77,379       77,379     
R-squared 0.022 
   
0.022 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 40: Effect on number of primary care claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0521* 
  
 
(0.0287) (0.00176)** p = 0.6480 
    CA User*Washout period 0.0316 
  
 
(0.0398) (0.00287)* p = 0.6375 
    CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0470* 
  
 
(0.0264) (0.00202)** p = 0.7205 
       
N 17,746 
  R-squared 0.026 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.150*** 
  
1.161 
(0.0364) (0.000295)*** p = 0.2980 
 
    0.136*** 
  
1.145 
(0.0524) (0.00509)*** p = 0.2995 
 
    0.146*** 
  
1.157 
(0.0336) (0.00148)*** p = 0.2550 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 41: Effect on amount of primary care spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.0990*** 
  
0.906 
 
(0.0249) (0.000936)*** p = 0.6615 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.0599* 
  
0.942 
 
(0.0354) (0.000461)*** p = 0.1965 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.0892*** 
  
0.915 
 
(0.0227) (0.000543)*** p = 0.7915 
          
N 17,599 
   R-squared 0.098 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.0693 
  
1.072 
(0.0499) (0.00698)*** p = 0.2880 
 
    0.0530 
  
1.054 
(0.0642) (0.0112)*** p = 0.2260 
 
    0.0653 
  
1.067 
(0.0448) (0.00253)*** p = 0.2265 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 42: Effect on number of PT claims (All CA Users and TX Non-Users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period 0.258* 
  
 
(0.145) (0.00135)*** p = 0.2615 
    CA User*Washout period 0.120 
  
 
(0.224) (0.0175)* p = 0.6865 
    CA User*Post-clinic period 0.221 
  
 
(0.136) (0.00249)*** p = 0.1920 
       
N 5,557 
  R-squared 0.033 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.224*** 
  
1.251 
(0.0750) (0.0379)*** p = 0.2265 
 
    0.239** 
  
1.270 
(0.114) (0.123)* p = 0.2110 
 
    0.228*** 
  
1.256 
(0.0708) (0.0589)*** p = 0.1690 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 43: Effect on amount of PT spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.566*** 
  
0.568 
 
(0.0609) (0.0248)** p = 0.1920 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.662*** 
  
0.516 
 
(0.0940) (0.0307)** p = 0.2020 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.591*** 
  
0.554 
 
(0.0563) (0.0283)** p = 0.2330 
          
N 5,394 
   R-squared 0.097 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
-0.0808 
  
0.922 
(0.0952) (0.0422)* p = 0.2915 
 
    -0.0240 
  
0.976 
(0.146) (0.0271) p = 0.3135 
 
    -0.0667 
  
0.935 
(0.0886) (0.0381)* p = 0.0870* 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 44: Effect on number of acupuncture claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period 0.341 
  
 
(0.311) (0.00369)*** p = 0.7100 
    CA User*Washout period 0.160 
  
 
(0.401) (0.0199)* p = 0.1990 
    CA User*Post-clinic period 0.273 
  
 
(0.273) (0.00734)** p = 0.8045 
       
N 1,859 
  R-squared 0.057 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.995*** 
  
2.705 
(0.222) (0.136)*** p = 0.2695 
 
    0.307 
  
1.359 
(0.265) (0.312) p = 0.3095 
 
    0.765*** 
  
2.149 
(0.184) (0.242)*** p = 0.2080 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 45: Effect on amount of acupuncture spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES 
Robust 
SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.230 
  
0.794 
 
(0.162) (0.0120)** p = 0.2950 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.421** 
  
0.656 
 
(0.208) (0.0124)** p = 0.2680 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.303** 
  
0.739 
 
(0.136) (0.00946)** p = 0.2370 
          
N 1,823 
   R-squared 0.083 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
1.496*** 
  
4.465 
(0.265) (1.027) p = 0.1880 
 
    0.694** 
  
2.002 
(0.296) (0.0142)*** p = 0.2185 
 
    1.277*** 
  
3.585 
(0.223) (0.759)* p = 0.2315 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 46: Effect on number of chiropractic claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period -0.0801 
  
 
(0.124) (0.0298) p = 0.7945 
    CA User*Washout period -0.327* 
  
 
(0.188) (0.0391)* p = 0.4160 
    CA User*Post-clinic period -0.144 
  
 
(0.116) (0.0262) p = 0.6965 
       
N 3,619 
  R-squared 0.025 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
-0.0461 
  
0.955 
(0.0888) (0.0307) p = 0.7255 
 
    0.0138 
  
1.014 
(0.137) (0.000686)*** p = 0.2450 
 
    -0.0308 
  
0.970 
(0.0819) (0.0233) p = 0.7865 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 47: Effect on amount of chiropractic spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.490*** 
  
0.613 
 
(0.0654) (0.00211)*** p = 0.3050 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.334*** 
  
0.716 
 
(0.105) (0.00688)** p = 0.2995 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.452*** 
  
0.636 
 
(0.0610) (0.00317)*** p = 0.3175 
          
N 3,442 
   R-squared 0.154 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
-0.330*** 
  
0.719 
(0.117) (0.0244)*** p = 0.2420 
 
    -0.121 
  
0.886 
(0.174) (0.0482)** p = 0.2565 
 
    -0.277*** 
  
0.758 
(0.107) (0.00878)*** p = 0.3100 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 48: Effect on number of ER claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period 0.103 
  
 
(0.324) (0.0204) p = 0.3075 
    CA User*Washout period -1.013* 
  
 
(0.589) (0.0926)* p = 0.7150 
    CA User*Post-clinic period -0.151 
  
 
(0.305) (0.0386) p = 0.2980 
       
N 802 
  R-squared 0.082 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.0258 
  
1.026 
(0.151) (0.00647)*** p = 0.6995 
 
    -0.547** 
  
0.579 
(0.252) (0.0587)*** p = 0.1970 
 
    -0.103 
  
0.902 
(0.146) (0.0229)*** p = 0.1875 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 49: Effect on amount of ER spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.174 
  
0.840 
 
(0.250) (0.00719)** p = 0.6955 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.132 
  
0.876 
 
(0.320) (0.0303) p = 0.5300 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.164 
  
0.849 
 
(0.225) (0.0124)** p = 0.6780 
          
N 785 
   R-squared 0.099 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
-0.359 
  
0.699 
(0.268) (0.0417)*** p = 0.2780 
 
    -0.296 
  
0.744 
(0.406) (0.116)** p = 0.2985 
 
    -0.344 
  
0.709 
(0.246) (0.00253)*** p = 0.1935 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 50: Effect on number of inpatient claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period 1.572 
  
 
(2.239) (0.419) p = 0.4755 
    CA User*Washout period -5.014 
  
 
(3.503) (1.317) p = 0.3700 
    CA User*Post-clinic period -0.264 
  
 
(2.105) (0.0510) p = 0.1995 
       
N 339 
  R-squared 0.225 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.528* 
  
1.695 
(0.302) (0.0199)*** p = 0.1850 
 
    -0.354 
  
0.702 
(0.351) (0.415) p = 0.1935 
 
    0.261 
  
1.298 
(0.275) (0.0436)*** p = 0.3105 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 51: Effect on amount of inpatient spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE 
CRSE on 
state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period 0.411 
  
1.508 
 
(0.579) (0.124) p = 0.6435 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.793 
  
0.453 
 
(0.887) (0.0866)* p = 0.2115 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0716 
  
1.074 
 
(0.551) (0.0435) p = 0.3935 
          
N 327 
   R-squared 0.200 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
1.047** 
  
2.848 
(0.412) (0.140)*** p = 0.2775 
 
    -0.0569 
  
0.945 
(0.581) (0.563) p = 0.8405 
 
    0.765** 
  
2.149 
(0.382) (0.164)*** p = 0.2705 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 52: Effect on number of office-based claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period 0.226*** 
  
 
(0.0707) (0.000187)*** p = 0.3065 
    CA User*Washout period 0.764*** 
  
 
(0.116) (0.0122)** p = 0.5715 
    CA User*Post-clinic period 0.367*** 
  
 
(0.0665) (0.00953)** p = 0.6110 
       
N 27,340 
  R-squared 0.040 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.203*** 
  
1.225 
(0.0338) (0.00203)*** p = 0.2795 
 
    0.439*** 
  
1.552 
(0.0479) (0.000979)*** p = 0.1860 
 
    0.265*** 
  
1.303 
(0.0310) (0.00258)*** p = 0.2245 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 53: Effect on amount of office-based spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.199*** 
  
0.820 
 
(0.0283) (0.000721)*** p = 0.6730 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.217*** 
  
0.805 
 
(0.0454) (0.00228)*** p = 0.7010 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.203*** 
  
0.816 
 
(0.0264) (0.00113)*** p = 0.6340 
          
N 26,877 
   R-squared 0.075 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.0157 
  
1.016 
(0.0563) (0.0259) p = 0.6955 
 
    -0.156** 
  
0.855 
(0.0766) (0.00714)*** p = 0.1980 
 
    -0.0261 
  
0.974 
(0.0494) (0.0204) p = 0.7125 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 54: Effect on number of outpatient claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period -0.0954 
  
 
(0.121) (0.0177) p = 0.7065 
    CA User*Washout period -0.174 
  
 
(0.148) (0.0177)* p = 0.7590 
    CA User*Post-clinic period -0.116 
  
 
(0.108) (0.0182)* p = 0.7500 
       
N 8,231 
  R-squared 0.015 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
-0.235*** 
  
0.790 
(0.0715) (0.0135)*** p = 0.2175 
 
    -0.297*** 
  
0.743 
(0.100) (0.00403)*** p = 0.2445 
 
    -0.251*** 
  
0.778 
(0.0651) (0.00941)*** p = 0.2915 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 55: Effect on amount of outpatient spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.0718 
  
0.931 
 
(0.101) (0.000456)*** p = 0.2505 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.183 
  
0.832 
 
(0.147) (0.00318)** p = 0.7480 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.101 
  
0.904 
 
(0.0912) (0.00191)** p = 0.6290 
          
N 8,128 
   R-squared 0.044 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
-0.0458 
  
0.955 
(0.175) (0.0925) p = 0.7220 
 
    -0.426 
  
0.653 
(0.273) (0.192)** p = 0.2615 
 
    -0.137 
  
0.872 
(0.164) (0.103) p = 0.2920 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 56: Effect on number of all claims (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, Observations with Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0925 
  
 
(0.0947) (0.00453)** p = 0.1970 
    CA User*Washout period 0.452*** 
  
 
(0.146) (0.0106)** p = 0.3075 
    CA User*Post-clinic period 0.186** 
  
 
(0.0881) (0.0100)** p = 0.2650 
       
N 29,293 
  R-squared 0.019 
  Month FE YES     
 
(3) and (4) 
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.129*** 
  
1.138 
(0.0350) (0.00571)*** p = 0.2845 
 
    0.305*** 
  
1.356 
(0.0492) (0.0133)*** p = 0.2475 
 
    0.174*** 
  
1.190 
(0.0321) (0.0100)*** p = 0.2715 
         
77,379 
   
    YES      
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 57: Effect on amount of total spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) and (2) 
 
OLS, ln(Y) | Y > 0 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
          
CA User*Post-washout period -0.221*** 
  
0.802 
 
(0.0342) (0.00125)*** p = 0.6965 
 
     CA User*Washout period -0.264*** 
  
0.768 
 
(0.0530) (0.000885)*** p = 0.3535 
 
     CA User*Post-clinic period -0.231*** 
  
0.793 
 
(0.0317) (0.000677)*** p = 0.7420 
          
N 28,825 
   R-squared 0.040 
   Month FE YES       
 
(3) and (4) 
GLM 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Score wild 
cluster 
bootstrap Exp(Coef) 
        
0.0554 
  
1.057 
(0.104) (0.0370) p = 0.2590 
 
    -0.241 
  
0.786 
(0.152) (0.0641)*** p = 0.2050 
 
    -0.0149 
  
0.985 
(0.0963) (0.0364) p = 0.7175 
         
77,379 
   
    YES       
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 58: Quantiles of monthly total spending (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  25th Percentile 50th Percentile 63rd Percentile 70th Percentile 75th Percentile 
            
Value of Monthly Total 
Spending 0 0 11.71 93.16 140 
(95% CI) (0 , 0) (0 , 0) (0 , 22) (92.43 , 93.60) (138.15 , 143.60) 
            
 
80th Percentile 85th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile 99th Percentile 
          
200.98 304.08 518 1119.15 5198.48 
(197.01 , 205.41) (297.60 , 311.05) (503.50 , 532.75) (1086.88 , 1151.79) (4847.64 , 5564.35) 
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Table 59: Quantile regression results (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
63rd 
Percentile 
70th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
            
CA User*Post-Washout Period 0 0 34.17*** 25.38*** 20.83** 
 
(0) (17.95) (3.523) (8.115) (10.38) 
CA User*Washout Period 0 0 45.98*** 44.13*** 42.86** 
 
(0) (0) (11.86) (11.55) (17.63) 
      CA User 0 0 0.0685 43.49*** 76.72*** 
 
(0) (0) (0.308) (5.436) (6.303) 
      Constant 0 0 32.42** 67.91*** -93.12*** 
 
(0) (313.1) (13.00) (20.04) (28.37) 
      Observations 77,379 77,379 77,379 77,379 77,379 
R-squared 
     Pseudo R-squared 
  
0.0093 0.0112 0.0122 
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
80th 
Percentile 
85th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
95th 
Percentile 
99th 
Percentile 
OLS 
Results 
            
18.27 15.42 4.322 57.53 -254.7 11.00 
(13.65) (20.89) (32.56) (71.34) (669.4) (53.50) 
51.69** 70.62* 60.98 41.64 -2,551*** -97.28 
(24.87) (37.89) (43.53) (103.8) (707.9) (68.22) 
      120.6*** 205.2*** 334.4*** 491.0*** 1,671*** 189.5*** 
(8.252) (13.09) (20.46) (14.15) (562.1) (38.49) 
      -135.3*** -249.6*** -238.2* 23.80 9,806*** 122.5 
(35.82) (55.22) (125.4) (197.7) (2,835) (271.1) 
      77,379 77,379 77,379 77,379 77,379 77,379 
     
0.004 
0.0146 0.0185 0.0228 0.0245 0.0395 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 60: Comparison of means between CA users and TX non-users, before and after matching 
 
FULL SAMPLE (N = 1,720 patients)               
 
CA Clinic Users (N = 581) 
 
TX Non-Users (N = 1,139) 
   Variable Mean SD 
 
Mean  SD 
 
t-stat p-value 
Female 0.310 0.463 
 
0.207 0.405 
 
4.530 < 0.01 
Age 42.938 8.612 
 
43.357 7.886 
 
-0.982 0.3265 
Any chronic condition 0.306 0.461 
 
0.355 0.479 
 
-2.029 0.04292 
Total number of claims 31.974 36.944 
 
26.363 30.750 
 
3.147 < 0.01 
Total spending 11655.640 34168.030 
 
6695.229 15594.970 
 
3.327 < 0.01 
Total spending on PCP visits 1415.863 1657.140 
 
960.559 1190.693 
 
5.892 < 0.01 
Total spending on PT 1514.890 3517.328 
 
274.522 1150.731 
 
8.277 < 0.01 
Total spending on acupuncture 1096.854 3523.893 
 
59.650 776.746 
 
7.008 < 0.01 
Total spending on chiropractic 458.492 1258.923 
 
134.606 482.372 
 
5.981 < 0.01 
Total spending on ER care 556.781 2621.612 
 
429.447 1321.363 
 
1.102 0.2711 
Total spending on inpatient care 2108.765 21938.190 
 
1408.687 9873.630 
 
0.732 0.4643 
Total spending on office-based care 4606.919 6227.115 
 
2248.144 3652.011 
 
8.421 < 0.01 
Total spending on outpatient care 4243.655 20309.250 
 
2486.369 8267.069 
 
2.003 0.04567 
                  
MATCHED SUBSAMPLE (N = 1,366 patients) 
      
 
CA Clinic Users (N = 399) 
 
TX Non-Users (N = 967) 
   Variable Mean SD 
 
Mean  SD 
 
t-stat p-value 
Female 0.238 0.426 
 
0.172 0.377 
 
2.705 < 0.01 
Age 42.426 8.230 
 
43.092 7.553 
 
-1.392 0.1647 
Any chronic condition 0.291 0.455 
 
0.333 0.472 
 
-1.545 0.1231 
Total number of claims 14.880 14.709 
 
18.542 17.017 
 
-3.992 < 0.01 
Total spending 4023.772 6464.032 
 
3466.893 4941.871 
 
1.545 0.1232 
Total spending on PCP visits 906.726 843.682 
 
740.717 682.056 
 
3.488 < 0.01 
Total spending on PT 194.825 450.625 
 
108.237 318.697 
 
3.495 < 0.01 
Total spending on acupuncture 64.792 320.039 
 
6.178 74.863 
 
3.618 < 0.01 
Total spending on chiropractic 64.592 217.180 
 
58.623 226.190 
 
0.456 0.6484 
Total spending on ER care 214.422 826.566 
 
263.977 759.502 
 
-1.031 0.3032 
Total spending on inpatient care 450.003 3392.346 
 
443.877 2685.352 
 
0.032 0.9744 
Total spending on office-based care 1862.633 1954.577 
 
1461.026 1458.271 
 
3.701 < 0.01 
Total spending on outpatient care 1381.038 3688.008 
 
1234.860 2731.060 
 
0.715 0.4751 
         
Note: t-stat and p-value are calculated from a two-tailed hypothesis test of the mean for CA clinic users equaling the mean for TX 
non-users.  Yellow-highlighted p-values are < 0.05. 
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Table 61: Effect on chiropractic utilization and spending (Matched subsample) 
 
  Any chiropractic claims in the month   Any chiropractic spending in the month 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
(1) and (2) 
 
LPM 
 
LPM 
VARIABLES Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
 
Robust SE CRSE on state 
Wild 
cluster 
bootstrap 
        
 
      
CA User*Post-washout period 0.0141*** 
   
0.0141*** 
  
 
(0.00319) (0.000133)*** p = 0.6625 
 
(0.00314) (0.000117)*** p = 0.8120 
        CA User*Washout period 0.0138*** 
   
0.0157*** 
  
 
(0.00485) (0.000243)** p = 0.6925 
 
(0.00480) (0.000252)** p = 0.7595 
        CA User*Post-clinic period 0.0140*** 
   
0.0145*** 
  
 
(0.00286) (0.000162)*** p = 0.8165 
 
(0.00282) (0.000146)*** p = 0.8145 
        N 60,450       60,450     
R-squared 0.004 
   
0.004 
  Month FE YES 
   
YES 
  Patient FE NO       NO     
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 62: Quantiles of monthly total spending (Matched subsample) 
 
  25th Percentile 50th Percentile 70th Percentile 75th Percentile 
          
Value of Monthly Total Spending 0 0 28.08 89.71 
     (95% CI) (0 , 0) (0 , 0) (22.38 , 37.26) (85.57 , 90) 
          
 
80th Percentile 85th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile 99th Percentile 
          
132.96 195.35 306.76 655.22 3340.39 
     (130 , 136.26) (190.26 , 197.74) (299.53 , 315) (628.65 , 679.26) (3068.69 , 3655.52) 
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Table 63: Quantile regression results (Matched subsample) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
70th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
          
CA User*Post-Washout Period 0 0 26.36*** 35.11*** 
 
(0) (0) (5.911) (7.051) 
CA User*Washout Period 0 0 0.176 23.30 
 
(0) (0) (4.721) (17.23) 
     CA User 0 0 -0.176 -1.946 
 
(0) (0) (0.282) (1.929) 
     Constant 0 0 47.74*** 67.20*** 
 
(0) (0) (11.56) (17.51) 
     Observations 60,450 60,450 60,450 60,450 
R-squared 
    Pseudo R-squared 
  
0.0114 0.0110 
Month FE YES YES YES YES 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
80th 
Percentile 
85th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile 
95th 
Percentile 
99th 
Percentile OLS Results 
            
56.51*** 75.48*** 125.4*** 151.7** 1,314** 135.1*** 
(10.35) (15.54) (25.39) (65.94) (645.0) (47.23) 
47.13*** 66.25*** 102.6*** 70.71 -1,275*** -9.859 
(13.59) (18.46) (36.04) (92.13) (420.7) (57.78) 
      -5.407 13.12* 48.10*** 112.5*** 349.7** 25.10** 
(4.832) (6.939) (10.34) (20.31) (141.1) (12.61) 
      -33.86 -115.3** -258.9*** -331.7* 909.3 205.1 
(31.74) (52.47) (76.03) (195.2) (966.4) (228.4) 
      60,450 60,450 60,450 60,450 60,450 60,450 
     
0.004 
0.0100 0.0105 0.0129 0.0165 0.0437 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Overall utilization over time 
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Figure 2: Onsite clinic utilization over time 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of patients utilizing the onsite clinic per month 
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Figure 4: Primary care utilization over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Physical therapy utilization over time 
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Figure 6: Acupuncture utilization over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Chiropractic utilization over time 
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Figure 8: Emergency room utilization over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Inpatient hospital utilization over time 
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Figure 10: Office-based utilization over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 11: Outpatient utilization over time 
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Figure 12: Patient out-of-pocket spending over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 13: Insurer spending over time 
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Figure 15: Quantile regression coefficients (Full continuously-enrolled sample) 
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Figure 16: Number of onsite billing items by service category, over time 
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Figure 17a: Timing of onsite service utilization (Exact dates of first use) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patient falls: 
# of 
patients 
% of onsite 
PCP and 
PT users 
Avg Δ = date of first 
PCP use - date of first 
PT/alt med/other use 
[days] 
Avg Δ in 
months SD of Δ 
Min of 
Δ 
Max 
of Δ 
Above the 45-degree line 41 22.16% -99.659 -3.322 137.637 -455 -1 
On the 45-degree line 33 17.84% 0 0 0 0 0 
Below the 45-degree line 111 60.00% 207.162 6.905 153.799 2 675 
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Figure 17b: Timing of onsite service utilization (Months of first use) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patient falls: 
# of 
patients 
% of onsite 
PCP and PT 
users 
Avg Δ = month of first PCP 
use - month of first PT/alt 
med/other use [months] SD of Δ 
Min of 
Δ 
Max of 
Δ 
Above the 45-degree line 26 14.05% -5.231 4.702 -15 -1 
On the 45-degree line 57 30.81% 0 0 0 0 
Below the 45-degree line 102 55.14% 7.333 4.841 1 22 
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Figure 18a: Overall utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18b: Overall utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 19a: Total spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19b: Total spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 20a: Primary care utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20b: Primary care utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 21a: Primary care spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21b: Primary care spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 22a: PT utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22b: PT utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 23a: PT spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23b: PT spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 24a: Acupuncture utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24b: Acupuncture utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 25a: Acupuncture spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25b: Acupuncture spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 26a: Chiropractic utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26b: Chiropractic utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 27a: Chiropractic spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27b: Chiropractic spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 28a: ER utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28b: ER utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 29a: ER spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29b: ER spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 30a: Inpatient utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30b: Inpatient utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 31a: Inpatient spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31b: Inpatient spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 32a: Office-based utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32b: Office-based utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 33a: Office-based spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33b: Office-based spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 34a: Outpatient utilization over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34b: Outpatient utilization over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 35a: Outpatient spending over time (All CA users and TX non-users) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35b: Outpatient spending over time (Matched subsample) 
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Figure 36: Quantile regression coefficients (All CA users and TX non-users) 
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Figure 37: Quantile regression coefficients (Matched subsample) 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A-1: ICD-9 diagnosis codes used to identify chronic condition patients 
 
Chronic Condition ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes 
Diabetes Mellitus 249.00-249.91, 250.00-250.93 
Hypertension 401.00-405.99 
Coronary Artery Disease 410.0-414.9, 492.2 
Hyperlipidemia 272.0-272.9 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 490-496 
Chronic Kidney Disease 585.1-586 
 
See the 2015 ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes for more information. 
 
 
 
Table A-2: Number of patients identified as having chronic conditions 
 
 
  
Using claims from first year of 
data   
Using claims from full pre-
clinic period 
Chronic Condition 
Number of 
Patients 
% of 
Sample* 
 
Number of 
Patients 
% of 
Sample* 
      Diabetes 272 3.25 
 
367 4.38 
      Hypertension 680 8.12 
 
993 11.86 
      Coronary Artery Disease / 
Ischemic Heart Disease 76 0.91 
 
124 1.48 
      Hyperlipidemia 1,093 13.06 
 
1,643 19.63 
      COPD (Including Asthma) 410 4.90 
 
825 9.86 
      Chronic Kidney Disease 22 0.26 
 
37 0.44 
      Any Chronic Condition 1738 20.76   2614 31.23 
* % of sample is calculated by dividing by 8,371, the number of patients in the full continuously-
enrolled sample. 
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 Table A-3: CPT Procedure Codes Used to Define Service Categories 
 
Service Category CPT Procedure Codes 
Primary Care Office Visit 
99201-99205, 99211-99215, 99241-99245, 99381-99387, 99391-
99397, 99401-99403 
 
Physical Therapy 97001, 97110, 97112, 97124, 97140, 97010 
 
Acupuncture 
 
97810, 97811, 97813, 97814 
 
Chiropractic 98940-98943 
 
The above table lists the CPT procedure codes I used to categorize billing items into specific service 
categories.  These categories were then used to define what service category a claim fell under.  For 
example, if the claim had a billing item with a primary care-related CPT code, then the claim was labeled 
as a primary care claim. 
 
 
 
Table A-4: List of Items Billed by the Worksite Clinic 
   
CPT Code Service Frequency Percent of Total 
    36415 blood draw 1 0.01 
80061 lipid panel 682 6.73 
82947 glucose blood test 1,352 13.34 
84450 AST test 1,352 13.34 
84460 ALT test 1,352 13.34 
    90471 immunization admin 54 0.53 
90472 additional immunization admin 1 0.01 
90632 Hep A vaccine 1 0.01 
90636 Hep A/Hep B vaccine 16 0.16 
90649 HPV vaccine 1 0.01 
90658 flu vaccine (age 3+) 7 0.07 
90691 typhoid vaccine 1 0.01 
90707 MMR vaccine 4 0.04 
90715 Tdap vaccine 6 0.06 
90736 shingles vaccine 4 0.04 
90746 Hep B vaccine 15 0.15 
    90837 individual pyschotherapy 13 0.13 
90853 group pyschotherapy 1 0.01 
96150 health and behavioral assessment (initial) 15 0.15 
96151 health and behavioral assessment (subsequent) 10 0.1 
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    97001 PT evaluation 54 0.53 
97010 hot or cold packs therapy 5 0.05 
97110 therapeutic exercises 2,859 28.2 
97112 neuromuscular reeducation 195 1.92 
97124 massage therapy 1 0.01 
97140 manual therapy 250 2.47 
    97810 acupuncture without electrical stimulation 501 4.94 
97813 acupuncture with electrical stimulation 2 0.02 
    98940 chiropractic manipulation 43 0.42 
98941 chiropractic manipulation 59 0.58 
98942 chiropractic manipulation 440 4.34 
98943 chiropractic manipulation 2 0.02 
    99202 office/outpatient visit, new 20 0.2 
99203 office/outpatient visit, new 22 0.22 
99204 office/outpatient visit, new 4 0.04 
99212 office/outpatient visit, established 1 0.01 
99213 office/outpatient visit, established 703 6.93 
99241 office consultation 1 0.01 
99385 preventative medicine visit, new (age 18-39) 12 0.12 
99386 preventative medicine visit, new (age 40-64) 36 0.36 
99395 preventative medicine visit, established (age 18-39) 9 0.09 
99396 preventative medicine visit, established (age 40-64) 18 0.18 
99402 preventive counseling for individual 12 0.12 
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